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Over the past decade or so, there has been rapid growth in wireless and mobile
applications technologies. More recently, an increasing emphasis has been on the
potential of infrastructureless wireless mobile networks that are easy, fast and in-
expensive to set up, with the view that such technologies will enable numerous
new applications in a wide range of areas. Such networks are commonly referred
to as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Exchanging sensitive information over
unprotected wireless links with unidentified and untrusted endpoints demand the
deployment of security in MANETs. However, lack of infrastructure, mobility and
resource constraints of devices, wireless communication links and other unique fea-
tures of MANETs induce new challenges that make implementing security a very
difficult task and require the design of specialized solutions.
This thesis is concerned with the design and analysis of security solutions for
MANETs. We identify the initial exchange of authentication and key credentials,
referred to as pre-authentication, as well as authentication and key exchange as
primary security goals. In particular, the problem of pre-authentication has been
widely neglected in existing security solutions, even though it is a necessary pre-
requisite for other security goals. We are the first to classify and analyze different
methods of achieving pairwise pre-authentication in MANETs. Out of this inves-
tigation, we identify identity-based cryptographic (IBC) schemes as well-suited to
secure MANET applications that have no sufficient security solutions at this time.
We use pairing-based IBC schemes to design an authentication and key ex-
change framework that meets the special requirements of MANETs. Our solu-
tions are comprised of algorithms that allow for efficient and secure system set
up, pre-authentication, mutual authentication, key establishment, key renewal, key
revocation and key escrow prevention. In particular, we present the first fully self-
organized key revocation scheme for MANETs that does not require any trusted
third party in the network. Our revocation scheme can be used to amend exist-
ing IBC solutions, be seamlessly integrated in our security framework and even be
adopted to conventional public key solutions for MANETs. Our scheme is based on
propagated accusations and once the number of received accusations against a node
v
reaches a defined threshold, the keys of the accused nodes are revoked. All com-
munications are cryptographically protected, but unlike other proposed schemes,
do not require computationally demanding digital signatures. Our scheme is the
first that efficiently and securely enables nodes to revoke their own keys. Addi-
tionally, newly joining nodes can obtain previous accusations without performing
computationally demanding operations such as verifying digital signatures. Several
security and performance parameters make our scheme adjustable to the hostility
of the MANET environment and the degree of resource constraints of network and
devices. In our security analysis we show how security parameters can be selected
to prevent attacks by colluding nodes and roaming adversaries.
In our proposed security framework, we utilize special properties of pairing-
based keys to design an efficient and secure method for pairwise pre-authentication
and a set of ID-based authenticated key exchange protocols. In addition, we present
a format for ID-based public keys that, unlike other proposed formats, allows key
renewal before the start of a new expiry interval. Finally, we are the first to discuss
the inherent key escrow property of IBC schemes in the context of MANETs. Our
analysis shows that some special features of MANETs significantly limit the escrow
capabilities of key generation centers (KGCs). We propose a novel concept of spy
nodes that can be utilized by KGCs to increase their escrow capabilities and analyze
the probabilities of successful escrow attacks with and without spy nodes.
In summary, we present a complete authentication and key exchange framework
that is tailored for MANET applications that have previously lacked such security
solutions. Our solutions can be implemented using any pairing-based IBC scheme.
The component design allows for the implementation of single schemes to amend
existing solutions that do not provide certain functionalities. The introduction of
several security and performance parameters make our solutions adjustable to dif-
ferent levels of resource constraints and security needs. In addition, we present
extensions that make our solutions suitable for applications with sporadic infras-
tructure access as envisioned in the near future.
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Over the past decade or so, there has been rapid growth in wireless and mobile ap-
plications technologies. Falling prices for personal mobile devices (such as cellular
phones, personal data assistants (PDAs) and laptops) and an increasing number
of available wireless services (such as Internet access via so-called “hotspots” at
numerous public locations) have meant that wireless mobile communications have
become an important part of our daily life. Furthermore, wireless links have re-
placed cords on our desks and ethernet cables in our offices. Exchanging sensi-
tive information and accessing paid services over unprotected wireless links with
unidentified and untrusted endpoints demand the deployment of security in wire-
less mobile applications. While security solutions and standards already exist for
infrastructure based wireless networks—such as the widely deployed IEEE 802.11
standard [68] for wireless local area networks (WLANs) and IEEE 802.16 [72] for
broadband WLANs—solutions for infrastructureless wireless mobile networks are
still in their infancy, with many security problems unsolved. The latter type of
network is commonly referred to as mobile ad hoc network (MANET). As with ev-
ery new technology, MANET applications introduce new security challenges that
require the design of specialized security solutions.
This thesis is concerned with the design and analysis of security solutions for
MANETs. We identify pairwise authentication and key exchange as primary se-
curity goals for securing communications in MANETs. Henceforth, we focus on
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2 Introduction
solutions achieving authentication and key exchange as well as all necessary pre-
requisites and related functionalities of these security goals. In the following section,
we highlight some of the numerous MANET applications, give a motivation for se-
curing MANETs, and outline the unique challenges of implementing security in
these systems. In Section 1.2, we summarize previous work on MANETs. In the
last section, we give an overview of the organization of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
MANETs are infrastructureless wireless networks solely consisting of mobile nodes.
Consequently, all nodes in a MANET must be capable of forming and maintaining
the network by themselves; i.e., without the aid of an external central entity, pre-
deployed infrastructure or backbone access. In addition, mobile nodes must carry
out all network functions including routing. The described property is one of the
main characteristics of MANETs and is often referred to as a self-organization prop-
erty. Self-organization, combined with other MANET properties, allows MANETs
to be instantly formed in a cost-efficient manner.
The unique features of MANETs enable numerous applications in a wide range
of application areas, including military, government, health services and civilian
applications. Initially, MANETs were studied and explored for military applica-
tions, such as for establishing instant communication infrastructures during rescue
missions in war zones and disaster-affected areas [125], collecting data in hostile
environments [116], and self-healing mine fields [67]. Initial investigations in the
military sector lead to suggestions for the deployment of MANETs for countless
other applications, such as law enforcement [125], virtual classrooms [125], con-
necting and reading out medical devices in hospitals [115], smart homes [115],
wireless personal area networks (WPANs) [15], sharing resources [15], ubiquitous
Internet access [7], instant networks for conferences and meetings [109], network
games [7], and many others. A more extensive list of applications can be found in
our survey [52].
While the need for security is apparent for highly security-sensitive military and
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health service applications, we argue that communications in any kind of MANET
should be protected. This is because MANETs are generally susceptible to various
attacks because of use of wireless communication links. Wireless communication
channels do not provide any physical protection and attacks on these channels
are easy to carry out because they do not require expensive equipment, physical
access or close proximity to the network. Attacks include passive eavesdropping and
active attacks, such as modifying, fabricating, replaying, relaying messages as well
as impersonation attacks. Another reason why MANETs require special protection
is the weak physical protection and easy accessibility of mobile nodes, which makes
them susceptible to compromise.
To prevent any kind of malicious modifications, messages should be integrity
protected, which is typically achieved by applying cryptographic primitives such
as hash functions [38] and message authentication codes (MACs) [39]. In order
to thwart eavesdropping all confidential messages should be encrypted [89]. Both,
integrity protection as well as encryption require cryptographic keys. As opposed
to using static long-term keys, fresh cryptographic keys should be used to limit the
amount of available ciphertexts in a crypto analysis as well as to reduce the damage
of key compromise [89]. Such fresh session keys can be derived by executing key
exchange protocols [18]. The described security properties are rendered useless in
most applications if the authenticity of the communication ends cannot be ensured;
i.e., nodes do not know who is sending encrypted and integrity protected data and
who they share a session key with. To provide authentication, and thus thwart
impersonation attacks, nodes can execute authentication protocols [18]. However,
prior to the execution of authentication protocols, all nodes need to share some
authentic credentials to be able to prove their identity to each other. In addition,
if the establishment of a session key is desired, the authentic credentials need to
contain some key material, such as public or secret keys. We refer to the initial
exchange of credentials as pre-authentication. Upon pre-authentication, nodes can
use their pre-shared key material to establish a secure channel. In addition to the
described attacks that apply to any wireless network, new attacks arise from some
of the unique features of MANETs; e.g., attacks on the multi-hop routing proto-
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cols. Thwarting these attacks may also require the use of cryptographic keys to
provide integrity, message authentication, confidentiality, and/or entity authenti-
cation. For example, many secure routing protocols require shared keys between
next hop neighbors or source and destination nodes [63, 65,100].
We conclude that pre-authentication, authentication and key exchange are pri-
mary security goals in MANETs because once provided, all other security properties
can be achieved in a straight-forward manner. An overview of security goals and
applied security mechanisms used throughout this thesis is in Section 2.2. We
can observe that the identified primary security goals are the same as in other
infrastructure-based wired or wireless networks. However, existing security solu-
tions for such networks cannot simply be adopted to secure MANETs because of
the unique properties of MANETs. Basically, the very same features that enable
exciting new applications are the same properties that make implementing secu-
rity a very challenging task. The main challenges that need to be addressed when
designing security solutions for MANETs are:
1. Lack of infrastructure
2. Resource-constrained nodes and communication links
3. Node mobility and network dynamics
4. Likely node compromise
The most challenging property is the lack of infrastructure in MANETs; i.e., the
self-organization property. This affects the choice and design of the pre-authentica-
tion mechanisms, authentication and key exchange protocols as well as all prerequi-
sites and miscellaneous mechanisms concerning the key management. Establishing
a secure pre-authentication channel is a challenging prospect in MANETs because
nodes need to pre-share keys over insecure channels without the aid of a trusted
third party (TTP). Lack of infrastructure also causes problems in most authentica-
tion and key exchange protocols. For example, in public key infrastructure (PKI)
solutions, the network must provide a way to issue and distribute public key cer-
tificates which is typically done by a central certificate authority (CA). In addition,
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PKI solutions must address the problem of providing certificate revocation lists
(CRLs) or other forms of revocation status checks without having a central server
offering this kind of information. On the other hand, symmetric key solutions which
distribute secret keys using a Kerberos server [97] or other type of TTP are not
applicable in MANETs either.
The second challenge, i.e., resource constraints, requires solutions to be efficient
with respect to computational and communication costs. Mobility and dynamics
do not directly affect security protocols; however, these properties must be con-
sidered for designing suitable key management mechanisms. Due to weak physical
protection and easy accessibility, node compromise and thus compromise of key
material, is likely. Hence, security solutions should be sufficiently resilient to the
compromise of some nodes and minimize the damage of such compromises if and
when they occur. We conclude that securing MANETs requires the design of new
security solutions that address all unique features and challenges of MANETs.
1.2 Previous Work
In this section, we review some previous work on MANETs. Historically, MANET
research was driven by the military to enable multi-hop communications in networks
that are easy, fast and inexpensive to set up and do not require any infrastructure.
The next step was developing efficient multi-hop routing protocols to replace the
previous flooding approach. Once basic functionalities were achieved, researchers
started to work on security solutions for MANETs. In the remainder of this section,
we give a brief overview of the history of MANETs, routing protocols and security
solutions.
1.2.1 Early MANET Projects
The initial research on MANETs was driven by the military, more specifically by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The first class of MANETs
were so called packet radio (PR) networks [76] developed under the sponsorship of
DARPA in the late seventies. In PR networks, nodes broadcast messages to their
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in-range neighbors, which in turn relay the received messages to their neighbors,
thus establishing a multi-hop ad hoc network. The used radios in PR networks were
expensive, heavy, had slow CPUs and required a lot of energy. The next generation
of MANETs sponsored by DARPA in the eighties used smaller, less expensive and
lower power radios in so-called Survivable Adaptive Radio Networks (SURAN) [37].
The projects that followed focused mainly on the miniaturization of devices as well
as connectivity of a larger variety of devices (e.g. Piconet [12] and SmartDust [113],
respectively).
1.2.2 MANET Routing
The next wave of research projects focused on more efficient and sophisticated
multi-hop routing protocols for MANETs, replacing the broadcast approach of pre-
vious systems. Due to the dynamic network behavior and lack of static routers in
MANETs, new protocols needed to be designed because existing routing protocols
for LANs and WLANs are not applicable. In 1994, the Highly Dynamic Destination-
Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing (DSDV) protocol [117] for MANETs was pro-
posed, followed by the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol [75] in 1996 and
the Ad Hoc on Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [118] in 1997.
Today most MANET implementations employ DSR, AODV or improvements of
one of these two routing protocols.
After security issues of MANETs were brought to researchers’ attention (see next
Section), numerous attacks exploiting the special properties of multi-hop routing
protocols were discovered and addressed [5, 21, 22, 63, 64, 65, 66, 88, 100, 110, 122].
Most attacks on routing protocols are executed by malicious nodes and are aimed
to disrupt the network connectivity, e.g. blackhole [122], wormhole [64] and rushing
attacks [66]. The routing functionality may also be disrupted by network nodes
that refuse to forward messages in order to save their own battery power. These
kind of nodes are referred to as selfish nodes.
Some of the proposed secure routing protocols employ symmetric cryptogra-
phy [63, 65, 100] or public key cryptography [5, 110, 122]. However, some attacks
cannot be addressed solely by cryptographic means. For example, rushing attacks
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can be prevented by accepting a random—as opposed to the first—routing re-
quest [66], whereas wormhole attacks can be addressed by using timestamps or
location information as part of routing packets [64], and selfish nodes by reward-
ing nodes that faithfully forward messages (as well as punishing selfish nodes [22]).
A more general approach to detect and exclude maliciously acting network nodes
is to use monitoring schemes in which nodes observe their neighborhood for any
malicious behavior [21, 88].
1.2.3 MANET Security
Finally, in 1999, the importance of securing MANETs including their special secu-
rity needs and challenges were discussed for the first time [115]. This groundbreak-
ing paper triggered an explosion of research in MANET security. Due to the large
number of published papers, we organize the security review in terms of utilized
cryptographic primitives rather than chronologically. We refer to Chapter 3 for a
detailed discussion of advantages, disadvantages and applicability of some solutions
and only outline the different lines of research here.
Due to their efficiency, symmetric crypto schemes seem well-suited to address
the resource constraints of MANETs and their nodes. Once two nodes share a secret
key, they can use this key to authenticate each other, establish fresh session keys or
achieve other desirable security properties. However, the initial key distribution in
symmetric schemes, i.e. the pre-authentication, poses a major problem because of
the absence of an on-line key distribution center (KDC) in MANETs. Hence, ex-
isting symmetric key solutions for infrastructure-based networks are not applicable
to MANETs, such as the Kerberos authentication system [97] or symmetric EAP
(Extensible Authentication Protocol) methods—such as EAP-GPSK [30]—that use
RADIUS or DIAMETER authentication servers. To enable the use of symmetric
cryptography in MANETs, secret keys must be either pre-deployed or exchanged
over a secure channel within the network. Several probabilistic key pre-distribution
protocols, which assign each node a subset of the entire key pool, have been pro-
posed [36, 84]. In these schemes, two nodes wishing to communicate check if they
share a secret key. If they do not, the nodes try to find a common neighbor with
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whom they both share a key [36]. In [84] it is assumed that nodes’ locations are
static and known before deployment. This additional information is used to increase
the probability that two neighboring nodes share a key. Probabilistic schemes limit
the damage of key compromise and save memory space compared to network-wide
secrets and pairwise shared keys among all nodes, respectively.
If key pre-distribution is not feasible, nodes must establish shared keys in
the network. In the first proposed symmetric scheme for MANETs [115], secret
keys are exchanged by physical contact, which ensures a confidential and authen-
tic key exchange. Another symmetric scheme for MANETs suggests sharing a
low-entropy password among participating nodes/users [4], for instance by writ-
ing it on a blackboard in a conference room, and then running a multi-party
password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol to derive a cryptograph-
ically strong key. If only efficient (unidirectional) authentication is required with-
out the need for establishing keys, the use of Lamport’s hash chains [80] has
been suggested for MANETs [120, 121]. Here the anchors of the hash chains
must be securely exchanged, where [120] uses previous experiences with a node
and [121] digitally signed anchors for this purpose. Note that the latter compro-
mises the efficiency of a solely symmetric solution. The current IEEE standards for
WLANs IEEE 802.11 [68] as well as Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs)
IEEE 802.15 [70] and IEEE 802.15.4 [71] establish shared keys by pre-loading the
keys into all devices. However, security amendments IEEE 802.11i [69] and IEEE
802.16e [73] both use the EAP framework for authentication and key establishment
which requires infrastructure access and are thus not suitable for MANETs.
The limitations of symmetric key solutions caused by the key distribution prob-
lem in MANETs triggered the research on public key solutions. The first papers
on public key solutions focused on the implementation of an on-line CA that is-
sues and distributes public key certificates within the network in a self-organized
manner [67, 85, 125]. In [85, 125], the power and tasks of a CA are distributed to
several network nodes using a (k, n)-threshold scheme. In [67], trust is generated in
a PGP manner and each node issues and distributes certificates. To avoid the com-
plications of implementing an on-line CA, some papers proposed exchanging public
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keys over location-limited—and thus authentic—channels which makes the use of
public key certificates redundant [7,23]. Sometimes additional information such as
the geographic location of a node is used to establish an authentic channel [23].
Due to their efficient key management and other desirable properties, IBC
schemes have been recently considered for securing MANETs [33, 77, 124]. Solu-
tions proposed in [33, 77] both use an internal key generation center (KGC). The
KGC is emulated using a (k, n)-threshold scheme, as has been previously proposed
for internal CAs in PKIs. The authors claim that their schemes are more efficient
than fully self-organized PKIs because of the efficient key management of the un-
derlying IBC schemes. The authors of [124] propose an IBC scheme in which nodes
are initialized by an external KGC and all other tasks such as key renewal and key
revocation are executed in the network. This approach provides a more efficient
network set up than the solutions in [33,77] but compromises the self-organization
property during this phase.
Key revocation and key renewal are essential mechanisms in all public key based
security solutions for MANETs. However, most proposed solutions either do not
provide such mechanisms at all, or only outline a solution. For instance, [33,67,77]
do not provide any mechanism for key revocation, whereas [125] suggests that
the internal CA should be able to revoke collaboratively certificates, but does not
introduce any algorithm. In [32, 85, 124], so-called accusation schemes are used
where each node is able to accuse other nodes of malicious behavior. If the number
of accusations is greater than a certain threshold δ, the certificate is considered
to be revoked. The revocation scheme in [85] is outlined in one paragraph with
a suggestion to implement a sign&broadcast approach to securely distribute the
accusation tables. A more sophisticated scheme is introduced in [32]; however, the
propagation of accusation tables in this scheme is not secured and nodes derive
their own accusation tables by finding majorities over received accusations. Key
revocation and key renewal mechanisms for IBC schemes are introduced [124] in




The diversity of MANET applications prevents the design of a universal one-size-
fits-all solution. Existing security solutions for MANETs, as reviewed in the previ-
ous section, are only suitable for some selected MANET applications. In this thesis
we specify some common parameters of targeted MANET applications and present
solutions for these MANETs. We keep the specifications as general as possible and
show how our proposed solutions can be adopted to accommodate other classes of
MANET applications. Hence, our solutions are applicable to a large number of
MANET applications that have no sufficient security solutions yet. In addition,
we discuss how the performance and security of our solutions can be further im-
proved by taking advantage of (sporadic) infrastructure access envisioned for the
next generation of MANETs.
Many security goals are completely neglected in existing security solutions for
MANETs or are treated in an insufficient manner. For instance, pre-authentication
has been widely ignored. We identify pre-authentication as crucial to achieving
other security goals and discuss several pre-authentication models including solu-
tions in each of the model. We believe that IBC schemes have some distinctive
features that make them an excellent tool for MANET security. Until now, the
role of IBC schemes as enabler for security in MANETs has not been thoroughly
explored. In this thesis we present the first complete ID-based authentication and
key exchange framework for MANETs. Our solutions improve existing schemes
and provide solutions to problems that have not been addressed before. For in-
stance, we present the first fully self-organized revocation scheme for IBC schemes
deployed in MANETs that does not require any external or internal KGC. Our
scheme is the first revocation scheme for MANETs that provides an algorithm that
allows nodes to securely and efficiently revoke their own keys. Furthermore, our
revocation scheme is the first that allows newly joining nodes to receive previous ac-
cusations without the need of verifying signatures which makes our scheme efficient.
Several performance and security parameters allow our solution to be adjusted to
the level of hostility and constraints posed by particular MANET applications. We
show in our security analysis how parameters should be selected to prevent attacks
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by colluding and roaming adversaries.
In this thesis, we introduce the first key renewal algorithm for ID-based keys
that allows key renewal before the next expiry interval starts. Furthermore, we
are the first to address the key escrow property inherit in all IBC schemes in the
context of MANETs. We propose the novel concept of so-called spy nodes that may
be deployed by KGCs to increase their key escrow abilities. We then analyze the
probability of key escrow attacks with and without spy nodes and present counter-
measures which can significantly reduce the likelihood of key escrow in MANETs.
In addition, we are the first to discuss the suitability of ID-based AKE protocols
in MANETs and present a set of ID-based AKE protocols targeted to the com-
putational and communication constraints of MANETs. The provided security-
performance analysis allows the selection of the best-suited protocol with respect
to the degree of constraints and required security level of particular MANET ap-
plications. In summary, we provide the first complete ID-based authentication and
key exchange solution for MANETs.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce
definitions and notations used throughout this thesis. In Chapter 3, we identify and
categorize secret and public key pre-authentication models for MANETs and discuss
their applicability. In Chapter 4, we first discuss features and challenges of IBC
schemes employed in MANETs. Then we introduce an ID-based authentication and
key exchange framework consisting of algorithms for system set up, key derivation,
key distribution, and pre-authentication. In addition, we present and analyze a set
of ID-based AKE protocols. In Chapter 5, we introduce a fully self-organized key
revocation scheme as well as a key renewal scheme for MANETs. In Chapter 6, we
analyze key escrow in the special context of MANETs and propose the novel concept
of spy nodes. In Chapter 7, we analyze opportunities and challenges of envisioned
future applications of MANETs. In particular, we modify the key revocation and
key renewal schemes from Chapter 5 and introduce more AKE protocols such that
they take advantage of sporadic network access in mesh networks. Finally, we
summarize our contributions as presented in this thesis and discuss directions for




For an easier understanding of the presented solutions and results in this thesis,
we briefly review necessary background information and concepts about MANETs
and security primitives. Furthermore we define terms and notations that are used
throughout this thesis. Please refer to Table 2.3 for a list of used symbols.
2.1 MANETs
The diversity of MANET applications and research projects, as outlined in Sec-
tions 1.1 and 1.2, respectively, use or emphasize different unique properties of
MANETs, respectively. Hence, clear definitions of MANET properties and param-
eters are missing. Henceforth, we distinguish between properties and parameters,
where MANET properties are universal, whereas parameters depend on particular
applications or implementation environments. In this section, we present a defini-
tion for MANETs that we use in the remainder of this thesis. Since this thesis is
concerned with security aspects in MANETs, we limit our focus to unique MANET
properties and parameters that make implementing security a challenging task.
We specify parameters of target MANET applications and limit our discussions to
MANET applications that do not have sufficient security solutions yet.
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2.1.1 Wireless Communication Technologies
Typical wireless communication technologies used in MANETs are IEEE 802.11 [68],
IEEE 802.15.1 [70]/Bluetooth [15], IEEE 802.15.4 [71]/ZigBee [126], IEEE 802.16 [72],
and IrDA infrared data protocols [74]. For an easier comparison, we list the com-
munication ranges, data throughput, and quantitative power consumptions of these
communication technologies in Table 2.1. Note that except IrDa, all listed stan-
dards use radio technologies. If two nodes i and j in a MANET are in each others
immediate transmission range, they can directly exchange messages with each other.
This is sometimes called one-hop communication and illustrated in Figure 2.1-a.
However, from Table 2.1 we can observe that the aforementioned communication
technologies have a very restrictive communication ranges. Hence, to enable nodes
to communicate with other nodes outside their communication ranges, multi-hop
routing must be used. Therefore, each network node acts as router r and packets
are repeatedly forwarded to other nodes in direct communication range, until the
packets reach their destinations. Multi-hop routing between nodes i and j via in-
termediate nodes r1, r2, r3, and r4 acting as routers is illustrated in Figure 2.1-b,
where, for simplicity, we assume that transmission range Tx and reception range
Rx are equal, i.e. R = Tx = Rx, and the same for all network nodes. Another
constraint imposed by the employed wireless technology are the limited bandwidths
(see Table 2.1).
2.1.2 Node Properties
Typical MANET nodes are laptops, PDAs, pocket PCs, cellular phones or any
other mobile wireless devices. In contrast to WLANs, MANETs typically consists
of a set of similarly constrained devices because no servers, routers or other pow-
erful entities are deployed or accessible. Due to their mobility, MANET devices
are typically lightweight and battery-operated. Furthermore, MANET devices are
generally inexpensive to enable wide usage. These features of MANET devices lead
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Table 2.1: Ranges, Bandwidths and Power Consumption of Some Common Wireless
Communication Technologies
• small memory
• limited battery power
• weak physical protection
These constraints, as first summarized in [115], severely limit the computational
and communication capabilities of MANET devices and thus of the overall network.
To illustrate some resource constraints, we list the technical specifications of several
representative MANET devices in Table 2.2. Note that the communication ranges
of MANET devices vary depending on the supported wireless technology. For
example, laptops and PDA typically support IEEE 802.11 and 802.15.1 standards
and thus have communication ranges from 10-100m, whereas sensors and RFID have
far more limited ranges, typically between a few centimeters to several meters.
Due to the limited CPU power, some computationally intensive operations may
not be feasible on a MANET device. Even if such operations are feasible, the
number of executions should be limited because of the power constraints of the
devices. In addition, complex programs or large sets of system data may require too











Figure 2.1: Communication between nodes i and j: (a) one-hop communication,
(b) multi-hop communication.
Moore’s law states that transistor density doubles every two years [93] resulting
in faster small size CPUs, and Shugart’s law states that magnetic storage prices
per bit halve every 18 months. Furthermore, bandwidth constraints will be less
stringent over time due to Gilder’s law [42] that states that bandwidth grows at
least three times faster than computing power. However, technological advances for
extended battery life is comparably much slower. In addition, batteries might not
be rechargeable in the network and a node is excluded from the network once its
battery is drained. From the previous discussion we conclude that power is by far
the most scarce resource in MANETs and thus conserving energy is crucial. Power
can be conserved by limiting the number of transmitted and received packets as well
as the number and kind of executed computations. Please note that transmitting
packets is the most power consuming operation.
Finally, we observe that node compromises are likely because nodes offer only
weak physical protection and are easily accessible by users or other malicious par-
ties.
2.1.3 Network Properties
After discussing the properties of employed communication technologies and MANET































































Table 2.2: Technical Specifications of Some Representative MANET Devices
Def. MANETs: Wireless networks that are spontaneously formed by a group of
mobile nodes without the help of any infrastructure. Once the network is formed
all tasks are performed in a self-organized fashion. Nodes communicate over short-
range wireless links, where each node acts as router enabling multi-hop routing to
increase the nodes’ communication ranges.







6. mobile network nodes
7. resource constrained network nodes (power, CPU, memory)
8. similarly constrained network nodes
The first property refers to the lack of infrastructure in MANETs. This follows
that network nodes must carry out all network operations which is referred to
as self-organization property. Note that the self-organization property may be
relaxed during certain network phases or in some applications as we discuss in
Sections 2.1.4-2.1.6. MANETs are transient because they are spontaneously formed
for a specific purpose or to offer a certain service. Networks are dynamic because
nodes may join or leave the network at any time. As mentioned in Sections 2.1.1
and 2.1.2, nodes are mobile, resource constrained, communicate over short-range
wireless channels, use multi-hop routing to increase their communication ranges,
and are similarly constrained.
Sometimes wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are considered as type of MANET.
However, in this thesis we clearly distinguish between WSNs and MANETs. Both
types of networks have different application areas and many distinguishing prop-
erties. Typically sensors are deployed in an area where they establish a network
and start collecting and processing data, e.g. for monitoring the environment. We
briefly list the most distinguishing properties of WSNs compared to MANETs in
the following:
• number of sensors in network can be orders of magnitude larger that nodes
in a MANET
• broadcast communications versus point-to-point
• many-to-base station communications versus one-to-one
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• severely constrained sensors versus moderately constrained devices (see Ta-
ble 2.2)
• typically stationary sensors versus mobile devices
The different application areas and properties of MANETs and WSNs lead to
completely different security goals and challenges for designing suitable security
solutions. In this thesis we focus on solutions for MANETs and all presented
solutions are designed for securing MANETs and not targeted at WSNs.
2.1.4 Network Phases
We distinguish two network phases in MANETs:
1. network initialization phase
2. running network phase
During the first phase, all nodes that are present at the time of the network
formation are initialized. The initialization is performed by a TTP and includes
the distribution of system parameters and cryptographic key material to each node.
Trusted third parties can be central external entities or distributed internal entities
consisting of a group of network nodes. We discuss external and internal TTPs
in more detail in the next section. Basically, all parameters needed to execute
network protocols, including security protocols, must be distributed to all present
nodes during the network initialization. Note that the distribution of secret key
material requires authentic and confidential channels, whereas the distribution of
public key material requires authentic channels.
Upon network initialization, new nodes may join or present nodes leave the
network at any time in the running network phase. Note that new nodes that
join the network after the network initialization phase must also obtain system
parameters and cryptographic key material. The node initializations may occur
outside the network, i.e., before the nodes join the network, or within the network
by other network nodes. During the running network phase, two or more nodes may
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execute network protocols utilizing parameters and keys that have been established
during network or node initialization.
2.1.5 Trusted Third Parties (TTPs)
We differentiate between external and internal TTPs as well as central and dis-
tributed TTPs. An external TTP is an entity outside the network that is trusted
by all network nodes. The TTP can consist of a single central entity or n distributed
entities. Latter implementation is sometimes chosen to increase the overall trust in
the TTP because trust can be maintained even if some of the TTPs may not be
trustworthy. An internal TTP is a distributed TTP consisting of n network nodes,
where n ≤ Ω with Ω being the total number of nodes in the network. Here, power
and capabilities of a TTP are distributed to n network nodes. Distribution of power
is desirable to avoid single point of failures. This is necessary in MANETs because
of the likelihood of node compromises. So-called (k, n)-threshold schemes [111] can
be used to implement distributed external or internal TTPs. In that case any k out
of n distributed TTPs can collaboratively execute some tasks, such as decrypting
or signing messages. There are two possible cases of distributed internal TTPs: (1)
distributed TTP with special nodes and (2) distributed TTP with conventional net-
work nodes. In the first case, n special nodes that are more powerful than the other
Ω− n network nodes, e.g. in terms of computational and battery power, represent
the TTP. These special nodes have been initialized during the network initialization
phase. This approach has been used in [125]. However,it contradicts Property 8
in our list of MANET properties, namely the assumption that MANET nodes are
similarly constrained. In the second model, any group of n network nodes can
be selected to represent the TTP. This approach has been used in [33, 77, 78, 85].
Please note that while enabling more features and flexibility, distributed on-line
TTPs always impose a lot additional computational and communication costs to
the network due to the use of threshold schemes.
A TTP can have several roles in a network, for instance, a TTP could initialize
nodes with necessary key material during network initialization or before joining
the network, distribute session keys to nodes that wish to securely communicate
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with each other in the running network, or help to verify public key certificates by
providing CRLs.
2.1.6 Parameters
Unlike MANET properties which are universally valid, there are a number of
MANET parameters that may vary for different applications. Parameters have
an impact on the protocol design for particular applications. In this section, we
summarize some typical MANET parameters.
Pre-Existing Trust: In some applications, network nodes have existing trust re-
lationships with each other, e.g., based on personal relationships, mutually trusted
nodes, previous experience with some offered services, or reputation. These rela-
tionships may exist prior to the network initialization or are established over time
in the running network. In other applications there may not be any pre-existing
trust among nodes. However, we always assume that all network nodes trust the
external or internal TTP in the network.
Pre-Authentication Channel: Another crucial parameter is the available chan-
nel for the initial credential exchange between pairs of nodes, i.e. the pairwise
pre-authentication. Pre-authentication may implicitly occur during network ini-
tialization phase, e.g. the TTP distributes one secret key or a set of pairwise secret
keys to all nodes. In that case, the pre-authentication channel must be established
between each node and the TTP, where the channel must be authentic and confi-
dential. Hence, no additional pre-authentication channel between pairs of nodes is
necessary. If no pre-shared secrets exist, the pre-authentication must be carried out
between pair of nodes in the running network. In that case, the pre-authentication
channel must be authentic to exchange public keys or authentic and confidential to
exchange symmetric keys. However, establishing secure pre-authentication chan-
nels without sharing any credentials is difficult. Different solutions of how such
pre-authentication channels can be established are discussed in Chapter 3.
Network Size: MANETs can significantly vary in size, i.e. the number of network
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nodes Ω, depending on the application. In addition, the network size may change
over time due to joining or leaving nodes. The size of a network is crucial for the
design of security solutions, e.g. large or very dynamic networks require scalable
solutions, whereas small networks may allow simplified solutions.
Hierarchical vs. Flat Topology: Hierarchical MANETs have been proposed
as alternative to flat topologies to overcome some limitations of the latter, as for
instance described in [16]. Hierarchical MANETs have two or more network layers,
each layer consisting of a set of similar powerful nodes. For instance, the lowest
layer consists of the least powerful nodes and every level up consists of more pow-
erful nodes, where the top level may have access to some infrastructure, such as
a backbone network or the Internet. In this way, all computationally challenging
operations can be shifted from constrained to more powerful nodes. Although this
model is very attractive for designing security protocols, the applicability is limited
to certain restrictive applications.
Controlled vs. Non-Controlled: In general, all nodes in a MANET have sim-
ilar roles and are assumed to have similar resource constraints. However, some
MANET applications might have a network node entity that controls other nodes.
The controller might be a more powerful entity, whereas the other nodes are very
constrained and simply execute orders. This concept was first introduced in the
“Resurrecting Duckling Model” [115] in which one node acts as a controller (mother
duck) and several devices (the ducklings) follow the controller’s instructions. Po-
tential applications for MANETs with controller nodes are industrial control and
building automation [91]. Designing protocols for networks with controllers is eas-
ier, however, applications are limited and generally only apply to sensor networks.
One Domain vs. Multiple Domains: All devices in one domain share the same
domain parameters, including security parameters of implemented cryptographic
algorithms. For example, domain parameters could be shared keys that have been
distributed during network initialization, the public key certificate of the domain’s
root CA or system parameters required for cryptographic computations. A domain
has one central or distributed TTP that is trusted by all nodes in that domain.
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The TTP is responsible to initialize all nodes with the domain parameters. In
most sensor networks, it is reasonable to assume one domain, whereas applications
with multiple domains can be envisioned for MANETs. Providing authentication
in networks with several domains is harder to implement because nodes do not
necessarily trust a TTP of another domain. However, for cross-domain security,
either nodes need to trust the TTP of the other domain or there must be an
agreement among the TTPs of different domains. Furthermore, nodes from different
domains that wish to authenticate each other, have to first agree on some common
system parameters. For instance, nodes from different domains typically do not
pre-share any secret keys and public key certificates are issued by different domain
CAs and thus cannot be easily verified.
Degree of Resource Constraints: The level of resource constraints depend on
the used network devices and employed communication technology, as illustrated in
Tables 2.1 and 2.2. This in turn is determined by the application. Depending on the
degree of constraints some security solutions might be practical or not. For instance,
computationally demanding operations such as modular exponentiations in public
key algorithms might be infeasible on some devices. In addition, some protocols
demanding a large number of computations might not be feasible due to limited
battery power. Finally, protocols requiring the exchange of many messages might
be impractical due to power and bandwidth restrictions. As mentioned earlier, the
most scarce resource is power. Security solutions need to be designed according to
the degree of resource constraints of particular MANET applications.
Location Awareness of Devices: In some scenarios, network nodes have spe-
cial equipment that provide location information, such as geographical coordinates.
Location information could be utilized to establish an authenticated channel be-
tween nodes [23]. For instance, some high-end PDAs are already equipped with
GPS chips [48]. There are many systems that can be utilized to provide location
coordinates, e.g. : (1) satellite navigation systems, such as GPS or the European
equivalent Galileo [40]; (2) systems for locating devices inside a building using vi-
sual, ultra sonic, radio, or infrared channels; and (3) network based positioning
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system, such as GSM [49] and WLANs [68]. Special equipment for tracking nodes
is unnecessary if their location is predictable. For instance, in some MANETs,
nodes may have an expected location which can be used in location-based key
establishment [84].
Availability of Trusted Third Party (TTP): The availability of a TTP con-
stitutes one of the major challenges of MANETs and is crucial for the design of
security solutions. We distinguish four cases of availability, described in the follow-
ing paragraphs and illustrated in Figure 2.2. The four rows in the figure correspond
to the four availability cases, where the first column describes the network initial-
ization phase, the second column the event of a joining node in the running network
and the third column the event of two nodes executing a network protocol in the
running network.
AV-1: External TTP always available
In this scenario an external TTP is accessible by all network nodes at any time, i.e.
during network initialization, node initialization and during execution of network
protocols. This scenario is generally not considered as an option in MANETs,
because it requires the existence of an infrastructure and interferes with the self-
organization property of MANETs. However, with the growing number of available
network access points at various locations, it is reasonable to assume an Internet or
backbone connection in some MANET applications. An already existing example of
such MANETs are wireless mesh networks in which a MANET can be an extension
of an existing infrastructure. When designing security solutions for this type of
MANET applications, existing solutions from infrastructure-based networks (such
as WLANs) can be modified to cope with the resource constraints of MANETs.
On the other hand, solutions designed for MANETs without TTP access, can be
optimized to take advantage of the infrastructure access.
AV-2: TTP available at network and individual node initializations
The second scenario comprises applications in which an external TTP is accessible
by all nodes present at network initialization and all nodes that subsequently join
the network. This assumption is not as restrictive as it might seem, because the




















Figure 2.2: Scenarios of TTP Availabilities AV-1 – AV-4 : 1. during network initial-
ization; 2. in the running network when a) new nodes join or b) two nodes execute
a network operation.
26 Preliminaries
joins, but only to the new nodes. Clearly, the external TTP does not need to be
anywhere near the actual network. For instance, there might be applications in
which nodes contact a TTP to receive the required system parameters and keys
before joining the network. In these cases, the network itself is still self-organized
and the present nodes have no access to a TTP.
AV-3: TTP available at network initialization phase
In this scenario only nodes that were present at the time of the network forma-
tion, i.e. during network initialization, are initialized by an external TTP. As a
consequence, subsequently joining nodes need to be initialized within the network
by other nodes. This is accomplished by a distributed internal TTP, i.e. a group
of nodes that are already a part of the network. In addition, all protocols are
executed without the help of any external TTP. Hence, the network is completely
self-organized upon network initialization.
AV-4: No external TTP available
In the last scenario, no external TTP is available at any time. Hence, a distributed
internal TTP consisting of network nodes needs to take over all TTP tasks during
network initialization as well as in the running network. Consequently, network
nodes themselves are responsible to carry out the initial network set up, initial-
ize newly joining nodes and execute protocols. These type of applications require
networks to be completely self-organized at any time and thus constitute the most
challenging scenarios for security solution design. This scenario represents the orig-
inal vision of MANETs, because absolutely no infrastructure is necessary. However,
this scenario may be more restrictive than the actual environment of most MANET
applications and thus may put an unnecessary burden on the protocol design.
2.1.7 Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs)
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are a class of MANETs with at least sporadic in-
frastructure access, i.e. TTP availability AV-1 or AV-2 as described in the previous
section. We discuss security solutions for WMNs and their differences to MANET
solutions in Chapter 7. The number of deployed WMNs is growing and WMN com-































Figure 2.3: Types of WMNs: (a) Infrastructure WMN, (b) client WMN.
set up. WMNs are intended to integrate different kinds of existing wireless tech-
nologies, such as IEEE 802.11 WLANs, IEEE 802.16 broadband WMANs, IEEE
802.15 WPANs, cellular networks, etc.. It is envisioned that this integration allows
mobile clients to connect to the Internet and use other web-based services from
virtually everywhere.
An overview of a typical WMN architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.3-a. From
the figure we can observe that mobile wireless clients can access a WMN as long as
they are in communication range of a mesh router (MR), wireless access point (AP)
or base station (BS). If mesh clients are not in range of any of these entities, they
might be still able to access the network through a multi-hop connection consisting
of other mesh clients, where the last hop is in range of one of the access points. Mesh
clients typically communicate over wireless links, but may have wired connections to
MRs. On the other hand, AP and BS operate one radio for client communications
and share a wired connection to a MR. MRs offer bridge and gateway functionalities
to allow inter-operability of various radio technologies and operate at least two
radios, one to communicate with mobile clients, and another one to communicate
with other MRs. MRs communicate in a multi-hop fashion to form the wireless
mesh backbone (WMBB). MRs are inexpensive devices that are powered from
a permanent source, e.g. AC mains powered, and some MRs are equipped with
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gateway functionally to connect the WMBB to the Internet or other backbone
networks. MRs are typically stationary and route messages from mobile clients to
a MR with gateway to the desired network or network service. The backbone of
the network typically includes some kind of authentication server (AS) that is used
to verify the authentication and authorization of mobile clients that wish to access
the network. Typically AAA (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) servers
are used for this purpose, e.g. RADIUS [105] or DIAMETER [106].
Three types of WMNs are commonly distinguished: (1) infrastructure or back-
bone WMNs (see Figure 2.3-a), (2) client WMNs (see Figure 2.3-b), and (3) hybrid
WMNs. Infrastructure WMNs consist of wireless mobile clients which are in im-
mediate communication range of access points, access points, the WMBB, and the
backbone network. On the other hand, a client WMN solely consists of mobile
clients that are all out of range of access points to the WMBB and the backbone
network. Here, clients communicate with each other using multi-hop routing via
intermediate clients and thus client WMNs are a type of MANET. Hybrid WMNs
are a combination of infrastructure and client WMNs and constitute the most likely
scenario. Here, mobile clients that are out of communication range of access points,
may access the network through other clients that are in range.
2.2 Security Definitions
In this section, we briefly review some security concepts that are used in this thesis.
For a general introduction to symmetric and public key cryptography as well as
for a more detailed discussion of security properties, cryptographic primitives and
protocols, please refer to [89]. Please refer to Table 2.3 for notations.
2.2.1 Some Cryptographic Primitives
Def. Long-term and Short-term Credentials: Long-term credentials contain
authentic information to identify an entity and/or key material and are used over
a longer period of time. On the other hand, short-term credentials, also called
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Notations
IDi Identifier of party i
Ni Nonce chosen by party i
Kij Secret key shared between parties i and j
SK Session key
EKij() Symmetric encryption under secret key Kij
(Qi, di) Long-term public and private key pair of party i
(Ti, ri) Ephemeral public and private key pair of party i
certi Public key certificate of party i’s public key
EQi{} Public key encryption under i’s public key
Sdi() Digital signature under i’s private key
fKij() Keyed KDF
f() Un-keyed KDF
h() One-way hash function
hKij() MAC function
SID Session identifier
Table 2.3: List of Notations: Authentication and Key Exchange Protocols
ephemeral credentials, may contain the same information but are changed fre-
quently and used for a shorter period of time, e.g. one session.
Long-term credentials may be used in authentication protocols to prove an en-
tity’s identity or in key exchange protocols to derive session keys. Long-term cre-
dentials can be pre-shared secret keys or certified private and public key pairs,
whereas short-term credentials are typically session keys or ephemeral private and
public key pairs generated for one session. Short-term credentials are typically
used to limit the damage of key compromise and reduce the amount of available
ciphertext in a cryptanalysis.
Def. Hash Functions: A hash function h() maps an arbitrarily long string to a
string of fixed length ν, i.e. for binary strings h() = {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}ν . Secure hash
functions satisfy two properties [38], they are one-way, i.e. it is computationally
infeasible to find any input that maps to a pre-defined output, and collision resis-
tant, i.e. it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map
to the same output.
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Def. Message Authentication Code (MAC): A MAC function maps, on
input of a key K, an arbitrarily long string to a string of fixed length µ, i.e.
hK() = {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}µ. A MAC can be constructed from hash functions as
keyed hash functions which is referred to as HMAC [39]. Computing an HMAC
over an arbitrary input string φ, takes both key K and φ as input to a hash func-
tion h(), which we denote as hK(φ), where K serves as random source to generate
a random output with sufficient entropy.
Def. Key Derivation Function (KDF): A KDF function maps an arbitrarily
long string to a string of fixed size ω, i.e. f() = {0, 1}∗ 7→ {0, 1}ω. KDFs can be
constructed from hash functions and are keyed fK() or un-keyed f() [1]. Keyed
KDFs take an arbitrary input string φ and a key K as input, which we denote
as fK(φ), where K serves as random source to generate a random output with
sufficient entropy.
Note that we distinguish MACs and keyed KDFs even though both are com-
puted over a key and an arbitrary input string and can be constructed from hash
functions. This is done to emphasize the purpose of the respective function in a
security protocol, e.g. MACs can be used for providing authentication and integrity
protection, whereas KDFs are used to derive cryptographic key material.
2.2.2 Identity-Based Cryptography
In 1984, Shamir proposed using user identities (IDs) or more precisely arbitrary
strings as public keys [112] and introduced the first ID-based signature scheme.
Using identities of users as their public keys has many implications. For example,
user identities and their corresponding public keys do not need to be bound by
certificates or any other means. Hence, public keys in ID-based cryptographic
(IBC) schemes are self-authenticating. In IBC schemes the identity of a user i
is represented as binary string IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ of arbitrary length that contains
information that unambiguously identify i, e.g. i’s name, email address, date of
birth, etc.. Identity IDi can be used to derive i’s public key Qi with Qi = g1(IDi),
where g1() is a publicly known function specified by each IBC scheme. Note that
all users are able to derive the public keys of any other user in the network from
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publicly known information without the need to exchange any data. This unique
feature of IBC schemes is based on the assumption that the identities IDi of all
parties i in the network as well as function g1() are pre-known to all other parties
in the network.
Due to the predetermination of public keys in IBC schemes, the private keys of
users need to be generated and distributed by a TTP. Otherwise, users would derive
their private keys from their public keys which would enable all users to compute
the private keys of any other user in the network [112]. For that reason, IBC
schemes require a TTP that serves as a key generation center (KGC) to generate
and distribute private keys. Therefore, the KGC computes the private key di of
each user i in the network using a master secret key s and the user’s public key Qi
as inputs, i.e. di = g2(Qi, s), where g2() is a publicly known function specified in
each IBC scheme. Note that s is only known to the KGC and kept secret. The KGC
then delivers the private keys to all users over a secure channel. We can observe
that the KGC is a key escrow in IBC schemes due to its knowledge of all private
keys in the network. We will discuss key escrow in great detail in Chapter 6.
2.2.3 Authentication and Key Exchange
In this section we introduce terminology and concepts of authentication and key
exchange protocols. For a more detailed discussion refer to [18,89].
Def. Entity Authentication : The process or protocol in which a party i pro-
vides evidence of its identity to another party j and j is assured that i actually
participated in the process.
Upon executing an entity authentication protocol, j is assured that he is cur-
rently talking to i. We refer to the process as authentication for short. Throughout
this thesis we consider protocols that provide mutual authentication, i.e. i and j
mutually authenticate each other. Note that two unilateral authentication proto-
cols, each executed in one communication direction, are not sufficient for providing
mutual authentication because it is not clear whether both parties participated in
both protocols. To resolve this problem, the authentications in both directions
need to be interleaved. A common way to provide (mutual) authentication is the
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challenge-response technique [89] in which a party j successfully authenticates him-
self to a party i by sending a correct response to i’s challenge. To prevent replay
attacks, challenges and responses contain either a nonce, i.e. a random number
that is used once, or a time stamp. Note that due to the lack of a central clock
and the difficulties of synchronizing clocks in MANET, we consider nonces as the
only suitable choice in MANETs. Challenge-response based mutual authentication
protocols using nonces require at least three message flows and can be implemented
using symmetric or public key cryptography [89].
In a symmetric challenge-response protocol, both parties authenticate each other
by providing evidence of their knowledge of a pre-shared key K without revealing
the key. For example, parties could encrypt a challenge or decrypt a challenge that
was encrypted under K. In another approach using symmetric primitives, parties
compute a MAC over a challenge.
There are two general approaches for providing challenge-response based mutual
authentication using public key techniques. In the first one, parties i and j prove
the possession of their private keys by decrypting a challenge encrypted under their
respective public keys. In the other method, parties i and j each sign a challenge
using their private keys.
Def. Key Exchange: The process or protocol whereby a shared key becomes
available to two parties for subsequent cryptographic use.
If two or more parties wish to protect their communications they need to estab-
lish a fresh session key, e.g. using their long-term credentials in some key exchange
protocol. The established key material, commonly referred to as session key, can
be used to derive further keys that can be used to encrypt, authenticate and/or
integrity-protect all further communications during the current session. Key ex-
change protocols can be based on symmetric or public key cryptography and many
protocols exist [18,89].
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Protocol 1. EC-DH Key Exchange Protocol
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : Ti = riP
2. i ←− j : Tj = rjP
Session Key: SK = riTj = rjTi
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange: We now briefly discuss the Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol [34] as example of a public-key based key
exchange protocol. More precisely, we review an elliptic curve variant of the pro-
tocol (referred to as EC-DH key exchange [96]) in which ephemeral public keys are
exchanged to derive a fresh session key SK. This protocol serves as building block
in many protocols proposed in the remainder of this thesis and the protocol flow
is illustrated in Protocol 1. We introduce the following notation, let E(Fq) be an
elliptic curve over a finite field Fq, where q is a prime or multiple of a prime and
P a generator of E(Fq), where all parameters are chosen according to [96]. Now
two parties i and j executing an EC-DH key exchange, each compute an ephemeral
public key with Ti = riP and Tj = rjP , respectively, where ri, rj ∈ Fq are randomly
chosen in each protocol execution and serve as ephemeral private keys. Then both
parties exchange their ephemeral public keys and compute the DH session key as
SK = riTj = rjTi.
Protocol 2. MAC-based AKE Protocol
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : IDi, SID, Xi
2. i ←− j : j, SID,Nj , hKa(IDi, Ni, SID,Nj)
3. i −→ j : IDi, SID, ri = hKa(IDj , Nj , SID, Ni)
Def. Authenticated Key Exchange: Key exchange protocol providing mutual
authentication to ensure that established keys are authentic, i.e. both parties know
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who they share the established session keys with. These kind of protocols are
referred to as authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols.
Protocol 3. Signature-based AKE Protocol
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : IDi, SID, Xi
2. i ←− j : IDj , SID, Xj , Sdj (IDj , SID, Xj , Xi, IDi)
3. i −→ j : IDi, SID, Sdi(IDi, SID,Xi, Xj , IDj)
As authentication protocols, AKE protocols can be implemented using symmet-
ric or public key cryptographic primitives. As proposed in [25], we distinguish three
general approaches for providing authenticated key exchange: MAC-based (see Pro-
tocol 2), digital signature-based (see Protocol 3), and public key encryption-based
(see Protocol 4) AKE protocols. In addition, the session key can be derived in a
symmetric or public key-based manner. First approach uses a keyed KDF with
shared key derivation key Kd and fresh mutually exchanged nonces as input, i.e.
SK = fkd(Ni, Nj), whereas the second approach may use a DH-based key exchange
with SK = riTj = rjTi in EC-DH. Note that Kd may be derived from a secret
key Kij that is shared between two parties i and j. For example, Kd = fKij(2)
in Protocol 2 and kd = Kij in Protocols 3 and 4. Authentication key Ka required
in MAC-based AKE protocols can be derived as Ka = fKij(1) for symmetric key
derivation and Ka = Kij for public key derivation. In the illustrated AKE pro-
tocols 2-4, Xi = Ni and Xj = Nj for symmetric key derivation and Xi = Ti and
Xj = Tj for public key derivation using EC-DH.
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Protocol 4. Public Key Encryption-based AKE Protocol
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : IDi, SID, EQj{Xi}
2. i ←− j : IDj , SID, EQi{Xj}, hXi(IDi, SID,EQi{Xj})
3. i −→ j : IDi, SID, hXj (IDj , SID, EQj{Xi})
We now list some mandatory and desirable security properties of AKE protocols,
where we adopt the definitions from [19,27]. The protocol properties prevent most
common attacks on AKE protocols. All AKE protocols executed by two parties i
and j should achieve at least the three following necessary properties (NP):
• (NP-1) Mutual entity authentication: Ensures that i and j mutually authen-
ticate each other.
• (NP-2) Mutual implicit key authentication: Ensures that the established key
is only known to i and j, i.e. the session key is kept confidential. Key
authentication also implies that the key is fresh, since a key that is not fresh
cannot be guaranteed to be confidential.
• (NP-3) Completeness: Ensures that i and j are both deriving the same session
key after a successful protocol execution.
In addition to the necessary security properties, we consider the following de-
sirable security properties (DP):
• (DP-1) Known-key security: Ensures that even if one or more expired session
keys are compromised the adversary cannot compute new, i.e. currently used,
session keys or gain any other secret information such as long-term private
keys. In other words, this property prevents known-session key attacks.
• (DP-2) Unknown key-share (UKS) resilience: Prevents so-called unknown
key-share or identity-misbinding attacks. An adversary O cannot fool a prin-
cipal j to think that he shares the key with O, although j actually established
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the key with i. Hence, after the protocol execution two principals i and j are
ensured that they both share a key with each other.
• (DP-3) Key control: Indicates that all communication parties contribute to
the session key computation. In that way all principals can ensure that the
generated session key is fresh and has good random properties.
• (DP-4) Deniability: Opposite of non-repudiation which is achieved if a prin-
cipal i, upon executing a protocol run with a party j, cannot prove to a third
party that she has indeed communicated with j.
• (DP-5) Key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience: During a KCI at-
tack an adversary first compromises a long-term private key of a party, say i,
and then masquerades as a different principal, say j, to i. The property of KCI
resilience prevents adversaries from impersonating other network principals
than the compromised ones.
• (DP-6) Perfect forward secrecy (PFS): Achieved if long-term private keys of
some principals are compromised and expired session keys that have been
previously established between the same principals are not compromised too.
This feature cannot be achieved by protocols based on purely symmetric prim-
itives and is usually achieved by executing a DH-like key agreement.
• (DP-7) TTP-PFS: Necessary stronger notion of PFS in ID-based schemes that
considers the compromise of the system’s master key s that is only known to
the TTP. If TTP-FS is provided, an adversary cannot obtain any expired
session keys of previous sessions even if he is in possession of s.
• (DP-8) Non-Repudiation: Opposite of deniability, which ensures that par-
ties involved in a protocol execution cannot deny sending message they have
committed to. Non-repudiation implicitly provides integrity protection and
message authentication.
• (DP-9) Replay resilience: An adversary cannot replay messages from previous
sessions to impersonate a user.
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Note that DP-9 is already covered by NP-1 and NP-2 and only listed for
completeness.
Def. Pre-Authentication : Initial exchange of credentials to establish pre-shared
long-term credentials.
Pre-authentication is a necessary prerequisite for authentication and/or key ex-
change protocols. For instance, in symmetric AKE protocols, both parties need to
pre-share a secret key, whereas in public key-based AKE protocols, both parties
need an authentic copy of each others public key. The same long-term creden-
tials are used in all authentications and/or key exchanges between same pairs of
nodes. The difficulty of providing pre-authentication is based on the problem of
establishing a protected channel for secure credential exchange without sharing any
credentials. Note that “protected” refers to authentic for exchanging public keys
and authentic and confidential for exchanging secret keys. We will discuss methods
of providing protected channels for pre-authentication in MANETs in Chapter 3.
Pre-authentication in MANETs can either occur during network or node initial-
ization, i.e. the TTP helps to establish the pre-shared credentials among pairs of
nodes, or in the running network, i.e. pairs of nodes need to establish a protected
channel without any external help.
Def. Key Distribution : Distribution of individual and pre-shared keys by a TTP
as part of node and/or network initialization.
Def. Key Revocation : Mechanism to revoke expired or compromised keys and
making this information available to all network nodes.
Revocation information is typically provided in form of lists, e.g. a blacklist
containing all revoked certificates or a so-called whitelists with all valid certificates.
Sometimes both lists are combined. Typically the lists are generated by a CA and
then either pushed to all nodes or made publicly available to nodes (pull approach).
In some cases nodes can request the status of specific certificates (pull). A widely
deployed revocation scheme for X.509 certificates uses certificate revocation lists
(CRLs) [103], which are blacklists that are generated by a CA and stored in publicly
accessible repositories. Network nodes can then access the repositories to download
the latest CRL. Many schemes were introduced to reduce the size of the CRLs that
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can grow very large over time. In the simplest approach, only updated information
is provided in the next published CRL, in so called delta CRLs. Another popular
revocation scheme is the Online Certificate Status Protocols (OCSP) [104], in which
network nodes request the status of particular certificates and a CA returns the
signed status of the requested certificates.
We can observe that these solutions require a fixed infrastructure, such as a CA
and/or public repositories, to generate and distribute the revocation information.
Consequently, network nodes that want verify whether a certificate is revoked must
have access to this infrastructure. Hence, existing revocation solutions that are
widely used for infrastructure networks such as LANs and WLANs are not suitable
for a deployment in MANETs. In fact, providing certificate or key revocations in
MANETs is one of the most challenging problems in all MANETs that employ
public key schemes. We will address the revocation problem in Chapter 5.
Def. Key Renewal : Process of obtaining a new key upon the previous one has
expired or been revoked.
Hence, key renewal algorithms are necessary to complement revocation schemes.
In traditional infrastructure-based networks, nodes may simple re-authenticate to
a CA or other TTP and obtain a new key. However, providing key renewal is not
as straightforward in MANETs and solutions rely on the availability of a TTP. We
present a key renewal scheme for MANETs in Chapter 5.
Def. Key Escrow : An entity that is in possession of some or all secret or private
keys in the network.
Key escrows are able to decrypt communications and may be able to impersonate
nodes. For example the KGC in IBC schemes is a key escrow. This feature is
typically considered as a drawback but sometimes looked at as a desirable feature.
We analyze key escrow in MANETs in Chapter 6
Chapter 3
Pre-Authentication Models
As mentioned in the previous chapter, pre-authentication is a crucial prerequisite for
all networks intended to support authentication and key exchange among network
nodes. In this chapter, we categorize and analyze several pre-authentication models
(PAMs) for MANETs. Basically, a PAM describes a method of how a secure channel
for pre-authentication can be established. For each presented model, we identify the
deployment conditions, reference existing protocols that have been introduced in
this model and discuss the model’s applicability and limitations. For easier compar-
ison, we provide a summary of all presented pre-authentication models in Table 3.1.
In Section 3.3 we summarize parameters of our target MANET applications in this
thesis and derive design goals for security solutions for such applications. These
design goals help to identify a suitable pre-authentication model in the last sec-
tion, where we discuss the applicability of all discussed pre-authentication models.
Please note that parts of our discussions are taken from our previous publications
in [52,58].
3.1 Secret Key-Based Solutions
When employing security protocols based on symmetric cryptography, a secret must
be shared among each pair of network nodes. We distinguish between secret key
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Table 3.1: Pre-Authentication Models for MANETs
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nodes share a key. These long-term secrets can be established during the network
initialization phase, before a node joins an existing network, or in the running
network. In first two cases, pre-authentication is done between the TTP and a node,
whereas in latter case pre-authentication is performed by pairs of nodes. Either
way, an authentic and confidential channel needs to be established to ensure secure
pre-authentication. The following models for secret key-based pre-authentication
(PAM-S) describe how such a secure channel can be established.
PAM-S1. Black Box Model
In this model, it is assumed that the secret keys are exchanged over a secure side-
channel during the pre-authentication phase. However, it is not further specified
how this secure channel is achieved. This black box model is assumed in many
authentication, key exchange and other security protocols for MANETs. These
solutions simply assume the existence of pre-shared secrets and leave it up to the
administrator or users how to accomplish pre-authentication. For example, the
security amendments in IEEE 802.11i [69] allow the use of secret key-based EAP
methods [107], such as EAP-GPSK [30], which do not specify how these keys are
shared.
PAM-S2. Administrator Model
In this model, every new node is set up with the same network key prior joining the
network. The network key can be a password, PIN, or a cryptographically strong
key. Typically the key is manually entered in all nodes by an administrator or a
user of the network. It must be ensured that used keys have sufficient entropy to
prevent dictionary attacks. Otherwise, stronger keys need to be securely derived
from initially shorter and more user friendly passwords, e.g. [4,11]. Here the secure
channel consist of a trusted person acting as a TTP and physically entering a key
in authorized nodes. This solution is applicable to small networks, such as WPANs.
These networks can be managed by a single administrator, e.g. one user connecting
several of his devices to form a network, such as laptop, PDA, keyboard, printer,
headset, etc. This model is not applicable to larger networks because it does not
scale well. Another limitation of this approach is the fact that the compromise of
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a single key leads to the compromise of the entire network. This poses a serious
concern in MANETs due to the likelihood of node compromises (see Section 2.1.2).
This model has been applied to several standards for wireless networks. For
instance, in IEEE 802.15.1 for WPANs, also known as Bluetooth, users can set
up a so-called piconet consisting of up to 8 devices by entering the same key in all
devices. The same idea applies to low rate WPANs (LR-WPANs) specified in IEEE
802.15.4, also referred to as ZigBee, where an administrator sets up all devices with
the same key. Another examples is IEEE 802.11 for WLANs where users manually
enter a WEP key in all devices.
PAM-S3. Pairwise Pre-Distribution Model
As in the previous model PAM-S2, a TTP distributes the secret keys to nodes
before they join the network. However, to limit the overall damage of compromised
nodes, this model uses pairwise shared keys instead of a single network key. Key
initialization is done for all nodes at once in an automatic process, e.g. all nodes are
programmed with the keys before released into the network. In a variant, each node
is initialized with a subset of all pairwise keys which helps to save scarce memory
space for sacrificing that each pair of users pre-shares a key. In that case, pre-sharing
becomes probabilistic and protocols are necessary to ensure that nodes that do not
pre-share keys can establish keys [36, 84]. The efficiency of these type of solutions
suits the resource constraints of MANET devices. For this reason this approach is
attractive for WSNs which are typically severely resource constrained. However, the
suitability of this approach for MANET applications is rather limited. For instance,
the model requires that all nodes are present at the network initialization. While
this is common in WSNs (where nodes are typically deployed at the same time),
MANET applications are generally more dynamic and nodes may join or leave at
any time. Pre-distribution does not provide the necessary flexibility and scalability
to allow nodes to join the network after initialization and securely communicate
with any network node. Furthermore, pairwise pre-distribution requires a trust
model that is different from public key-based models. For instance, former approach
requires a central external TTPs for key initialization, where the TTP knows all
secret keys in the network. On the other hand, latter approach can have external
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or internal TTPs, where the TTP is trusted to verify and certify the authenticity
of nodes but does not know the private keys.
PAM-S4. Ad Hoc Model
In this model, pre-authentication is provided in the running network, i.e. nodes are
not initialized by a TTP during network initialization or prior joining the network.
Instead, pairs of nodes exchange credentials whenever they wish to communicate.
This implies that an authentic and confidential channel must be established within
the network without the help of any shared credentials. Without the help of ad-
ditional credentials, there is no other choice but to exchange the secret keys in
plaintext. However, to prevent attacks by eavesdroppers the two nodes need to
be in close proximity to each other. If the key is transmitted over an one-hop
connection and nobody else is in communication range of these nodes, the channel
provides confidentiality and authenticity. The best way to achieve this channel is
by physical contact. The idea of exchanging secrets by physical contact was first
proposed in [115].
We can observe that this is the only true ad hoc pre-authentication model for
secret keys, because it does not require any TTP or any other infrastructure. Since
pair-wise keys are used as opposed to network keys, node compromise is limited to
keys shared by the compromised node and does not compromise the entire network.
In addition, the method is very efficient. However, the applicability of this solution
is very restrictive and only suitable for applications that provide close proximity of
communicating nodes.
3.2 Public Key-Based Solutions
In this section, we describe several public key-based pre-authentication models
(PAM-P) that provide methods to obtain an authentic copy of another node’s pub-
lic key. Due to better, more flexible and scalable key management and thus wider
applicability, most research focuses on public key based security for MANETs. In
addition, only public key-based solutions enable the use of digital signatures, which
are the only cryptographic method to provide non-repudiation in communications.
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We summarize some work on public-key based solutions for MANETs as part of
our discussion. Unlike pre-authentication channel for PAM-S, authentic channels
are sufficient because public keys do not require confidential transmission.
PAM-P1. Location-Limited Model
If close proximity of network nodes is given, a secure pre-authentication channel
can be established by visual or physical contact among communicating nodes. Such
pre-authentication channels enable nodes to directly exchange their public keys,
i.e. without the necessity of a TTP and public key certificates. Please note that
eavesdroppers do not pose a threat when exchanging public keys and thus the
conditions for such location-limited channels are less stringent than in PAM-S4.
However, a node needs to be certain that the received public key was received
from the claimed node and not from somebody else. This model is based on two
assumptions: (1) nodes that wish to communicate are in close proximity to each
other; and (2) all nodes know which other nodes are trustworthy. Latter assumption
is based on the fact that no TTP vows for the credibility of the other node, e.g. by
issuing a certificate. Consequently, nodes need to recognize each other and some
pre-existing trust must exist among nodes. The model works well in all applications
that meet these two assumptions and is not feasible in others. Protocols in this
model have been introduced in [7, 23]. Note that if nodes are able to perform
physical contact, exchanging secret keys is preferable (see PAM-S4).
PAM-P2. Identity-Based Model
IBC schemes use identities as public keys which makes public key certificates redun-
dant. A KGC is required to generate and distribute private keys to all nodes. This
distribution occurs during network initialization and node initializations. Since
nodes do not need to exchange public keys as long as they know the identities of
each other, there is no need for pre-authentication channels among network nodes.
This feature makes the ID-based model attractive for MANETs. We would like to
point out that depending on the application and what kind of information is used
as “identity”, it may or may not be reasonable to assume that all nodes know each
others identities ahead of time. If identities are not pre-known in the network, they
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must be exchanged prior communication. However, identities can be exchanged
over a completely unprotected pre-authentication channel, as long as nodes trust
the KGC that issues the corresponding private keys. For instance, a user may trust
all identities that are email addresses from a trusted domain, such as a company or
university. Or a node trusts a MAC or IP address from a group of trusted addresses.
For a discussion of suitable identity strings please refer to Section 4.3.1.
On the other hand, if identities are pre-known, pre-authentication implicitly
takes place during network initialization between KGC and each node. Note that
this channel needs to be confidential and authentic because private keys are dis-
tributed, as opposed to public keys as in other PKI schemes. The channel conditions
can be relaxed to authentic channels by using a blinding technique as shown in [81].
A well known problem of all ID-based scheme is key escrow, because the KGC is in
possession of the private keys of all network nodes. Some ID-based protocols and
solutions have been recently introduced for MANETs, e.g. [33, 53,77,124].
PAM-P3. Self-Certified Public Key Model
Self-certified public keys in which the certificates are embedded in the public keys
themselves have been introduced in [43]. Consequently, only public keys but no
certificates need to be exchanged among nodes. In fact, a node’s identity is part
of its public key and signed by a TTP and the node itself. A TTP is required to
generate and distribute the self-certified public keys either during network or node
initialization. The pre-authentication, i.e the exchange of public keys occurs in the
running network. Because the authenticity of the public keys is provided by the
keys themselves, pre-authentication does not require a secure channel. No protocols
or solutions for MANETs have been introduced in this model.
PAM-P4. PKI Model
In this model a conventional PKI scheme is deployed. Nodes exchange public key
certificates during pre-authentication, where the certificates help to establish an
authentic channel. If an external CA is implemented, public key certificates are
distributed to all nodes prior joining the network. The nodes then exchange these
certificates with each other in the running network. Public key certificates can
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be relatively long and thus create some communication and storage overhead that
may conflict with node constraints. It is infeasible for nodes to check whether
certificates have been revoked or to renew certificates. Note that the same is true
for all other models employing external TTPs, e.g. PAM-P2 and PAM-P3. To
enable these functionalities, a distributed internal CA needs to be deployed. Here,
a CA is emulated by k out of n nodes using a (k, n)-threshold scheme [111]. A
lot of the early research on MANET security has focused on distributed internal
CAs, e.g. [78, 85, 125]. Note that the use of threshold schemes introduces a lot
of additional computational and communication overhead. Furthermore, threshold
schemes are quite cumbersome to implement and require a fairly large number of
nodes to work well. The same problems occur in other schemes, e.g. ID-based
schemes, when threshold schemes are employed to emulate an on-line TTP.
PAM-P5. Trusted Path Model
In the trusted path model, network nodes issue and distribute their own certificates
and sign other certificates in a PGP manner [102]. In that way no external or
internal TTPs are necessary. Pre-authentication is done within the running network
by exchanging public keys. To ensure that public keys are authentic, a node needs
to find a chain of signed certificates from the node that sent the key back to the
node that received the key. This model emphasizes the self-organization property of
MANETs and assumes the existence of trust among some nodes. The performance
of pre-authentication highly depends on the length of the trusted path, which is
generally hard to predict. This approach is very efficient in the set-up phase and,
unlike schemes using threshold schemes, does not require computations by any
nodes but the communicating ones. However, a node probably needs to verify more
than one certificate for pre-authentication. An example of a proposed protocol in
this model is [67]. This model is also applied to a group case, in which trusted
subgroups search for intersections to create a trusted path [44].
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3.3 Parameter Choices and Design Goals
As mentioned earlier, the properties of MANETs are universal for all applications
and dictate some general design goals for MANET protocols. Other design goals
are determined by the parameter choices of specific applications. In this section, we
first specify the parameter choices for our security solutions that we will present in
the following chapters. Next, we summarize the design goals for security protocols
that are designed to meet the special properties of MANETs as well as the selected
parameters. The derived design goals help to identify suitable pre-authentication
models as well as cryptographic schemes for authentication and key exchange. All
presented security solutions in this thesis will be designed according to the derived
design goals.
We assume the following network parameters for the targeted MANET appli-
cations:
• flat topology, i.e. there is only one layer of network nodes and all nodes have
similar capabilities
• non-controlled, i.e. there are no controller nodes in the network and all nodes
have identical roles
• one domain, i.e. we assume all nodes are from the same domain and there is
only one (central or distributed) TTP
• nodes have moderate resource constraints, e.g. nodes are capable of executing
a few demanding cryptographic operations, such as bilinear pairing computa-
tions and other public key operations. Furthermore, nodes have non-volatile
memory large enough to store system parameters and cryptographic keys.
• no location awareness, i.e. nodes neither know their location nor can prove
their location.
• TTP availability AV-2, i.e. an external TTP is available to initialize all net-
work nodes. However, we show our presented solutions can be extended to
cases AV-1, AV-3 and AV-4.
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• no pre-existing trust, i.e. there are no existing relationships among nodes and
nodes only need to trust the TTP.
• mid-sized networks with average sizes between two to 100 nodes. This ex-
cludes simple solutions for consistently small networks and requires some de-
gree of scalability.
• no protected out-of-band channels for pre-authentication, i.e. solutions should
not require protected pre-authentication channels in the running network.
From the MANET properties as listed in Section 2.1.3 and the selected network
parameters above, we derive the following design goals for our authentication and
key exchange framework:
1. few computational steps per node
2. mostly lightweight computation steps; only a few more demanding operations
3. few number of message exchanges
4. small messages
5. small program and data storage requirements
6. limited consequences of data disclosure
7. balanced protocols, i.e. participants perform similarly hard and many opera-
tions
8. support node mobility
9. support of subsequently joining nodes
10. scalability
11. self-organized solutions for pre-authentication, authentication, key exchange
and key revocation, only initialization and key renewal require access to TTP
3.4 Discussions and Conclusions 49
12. no pre-existing trust among nodes assumed
13. pre-authentication does not require protected channels among nodes
The first six design goals are addressing the resource constraints of MANET
devices as summarized in Section 2.1.2. The seventh design goal addresses the fact
that there is neither a controller nor layers with more powerful nodes in the network.
Goals number 8 and 9 address the mobility and dynamic of MANETs, respectively.
The remaining goals describe design goals specific to the targeted MANET appli-
cations, namely middle-sized MANETs consisting of moderately powerful devices,
such as PDAs, pockets PCs or laptops, in which a TTP initializes all nodes before
joining the network and all network operations are executed without the help of
any infrastructure. Only key renewal requires accessing a TTP. No trust or trusted
channels exist among the devices.
3.4 Discussions and Conclusions
We now summarize the applicabilities and limitations of the presented pre-authen-
tication models. We then point out which of the models is best suited to provide
pre-authentication in the targeted MANET applications (see Section 3.3).
Due to their superior efficiency, symmetric schemes seem more suitable for
MANETs. However, the difficult key distribution significantly reduces the applica-
bility of symmetric schemes. As mentioned earlier, the black box model (PAM-S1)
does not provide a secure pre-authentication channel and emphasizes the impor-
tance that every symmetric security protocol should provide or at least discuss how
pre-shared keys are exchanged. We conclude that symmetric schemes only work for
very small networks with a single administrator (PAM-S2), networks in which all
nodes are in close proximity to each other (PAM-S3) or for WSNs in which a TTP
initializes all nodes before their deployment (PAM-S4).
Public key based schemes are computationally less efficient but provide more
flexibility and ensure that node compromise does not affect uncompromised network
nodes. We distinguish four categories: (1) with TTP and public key certificates, e.g.
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PAM-P4; (2) with TTP and no public key certificates, e.g. PAM-2 and PAM-3; (3)
without TTP but with public key certificates, e.g. PAM-P5; and (4) without TTP
and no public key certificates, e.g. PAM-1. If proximity of nodes is provided, PKI
schemes without certificates can be used in MANETs. If proximity is not provided,
nodes need to exchange public key certificates. Avoiding the use of certificates
without the requirement of node proximity can be achieved by using self-certified
or ID-based public keys, respectively. First approach still requires the exchange of
the keys, whereas latter does not require any key exchange at all.
In this thesis, we consider midsized MANETs, i.e. networks that are larger than
typical PANs yet smaller than WSNs, where we neither assume pre-existing trust
among nodes nor close proximity. This leaves us with PAM-P2, PAM-P3 and PAM-
P4 as potential solutions. Among these, the ID-based model seems most attractive
due to its implicit pre-authentication that does not require the exchange of any
messages among nodes. For this reason we choose the ID-based model as basis for
developing a security framework for the targeted MANET applications.
We would like to note that in all models, nodes cannot verify whether a key
(secret or public) has been revoked. The revocation problem has been addressed
in the PKI model by introducing a distributed internal CA. This approach can be
applied to other models as well. However, as pointed out earlier, threshold schemes
introduce a large overhead to the network which is undesirable in MANETs. For
this reason we introduce a self-organized revocation scheme in this thesis that does
not require any internal TTP.
Chapter 4
Certificateless Authentication and
Key Exchange Framework for
MANETs
Authentication and key exchange are both essential security objectives in any com-
puter network, including MANETs. In this chapter, we propose a certificateless
authentication and key exchange framework for MANETs. Our framework provides
pre-authentication among nodes and enables the use of certificateless authentica-
tion and key exchange protocols. The framework can be used with any ID-based
authentication, key exchange or other security protocol from bilinear pairings. The
solution is especially designed to suit all MANETs properties and design goals
as specified in Sections 2.1.3 and 3.3, respectively. We choose IBC schemes for
developing our security framework because of their special properties enabling effi-
cient pre-authentication in MANETs as discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike
conventional PKI schemes, IBC schemes do not create any storage and communica-
tion overhead for storing and exchanging public key certificates, respectively. IBC
schemes have some other features that are beneficial for a deployment in MANETs
which we discuss later in this chapter. In the remainder of this chapter, we first
review bilinear pairing-based IBC schemes and discuss special features and chal-
lenges of such schemes when deployed in MANETs. Furthermore, we review some
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previous work, before introducing our ID-based authentication and key exchange
framework in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we introduce a set of ID-based AKE
protocols. In Sections 4.5 and 4.6, we analyze the security and performance of
the proposed framework and protocols. Finally, in Section 4.7 we draw conclu-
sions. Earlier versions of our authentication and key exchange framework appeared
in [57,60] and the ID-based AKE protocols can be found in [53].
4.1 Review Bilinear Pairing-Based IBC Schemes
In 2001 Boneh and Franklin introduced the first ID-based encryption (IBE) scheme
from the Weil pairing [17] which we refer to as BF-scheme in the remainder of this
thesis. Much research on ID-based schemes from Weil and other bilinear pairings
has been carried out ever since. Proposed protocols from bilinear pairings include
encryption, signature and authentication schemes, e.g. [17,51,87], respectively. The
ID-based authentication and key exchange framework including the ID-based AKE
protocols proposed later in this chapter are all based on the BF scheme. We now re-
view bilinear pairings and the BF scheme, where we adopt most notations from [17].
4.1.1 Bilinear Pairings
In the following, we give a definition of cryptographic bilinear mappings, the build-
ing block of the BF scheme and all other pairing-based IBC schemes.
Let G1, G2 be two groups of the same prime order q. G1 is as an additive
group, i.e. a group of points on an elliptic curve, whereas G2 is a multiplicative
subgroup of a finite field. Let P be an arbitrary generator of G1. Assume that
discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is hard in both G1 and G2. A bilinear mapping
ê : G1 ×G1 7→ G2 must satisfy the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P, Q)ab for all P , Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q.
• Non-degeneracy: If P is a generator of G1, then ê(P, P ) is a generator of
G2. In other words, ê(P, P ) 6= 1.
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• Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P, Q) for all
P , Q ∈ G1.
Weil pairings [17] and Tate pairings [8] are examples of such cryptographic
bilinear mappings, where Tate pairings are computationally more efficient and thus
preferable in MANETs.
4.1.2 Parameter Generation and System Set Up
The security of pairing-based IBC schemes is based on the so-called Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman Problem (BDHP) [17] which is defined as follows.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP): Given two groups G1 and G2 of
the same prime order q, a bilinear map ê : G1×G1 7→ G2 and a generator P of G1,
the BDHP is to compute ê(P, P )abc ∈ G2 for any a, b, c ∈ Z∗q given (P, aP, bP, cP ).
In any IBC scheme, the KGC is responsible to select the system parameters and
set up the system such that the BDH problem is hard. In the following paragraphs,
we review the set up and extract algorithms of the original BF scheme, which
describe the secure set up of a pairing-based IBC scheme and secure derivation
methods for ID-based keys. The same algorithms serve as a basis in our authenti-
cation and key exchange framework. However, we will not review the encryption
and decryption algorithms, because they are note required in our framework.
Setup:
1. On input of a security parameter k, the KGC uses a BDH parameter as
defined in [17] to generate a prime q, two groups G1 and G2 of order q, and
a bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 7→ G2. The KGC chooses a random generator
P ∈ G1.
2. The KGC picks a random s ∈ Z∗q and sets Ppub = sP .
3. The KGC chooses a hash function that maps an arbitrarily long binary string
to an element in group G1, i.e. H1 : {0, 1}∗ 7→ G∗1.
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The KGC publishes param =< G1,G2, q, P, ê, Ppub, H1 > as public parameters
and keeps s secret. The KGC’s private and public key pair is (s, Ppub).
Extract: The public key Qi ∈ G∗1 of a node i with identity IDi is as
Qi = H1(IDi), (4.1)
where IDi is an arbitrarily long binary string ∈ {0, 1}∗. The KGC derives the
private keys di for every node i as
di = sQi. (4.2)
We can observe that instead of directly using identities as public keys, as done in
Shamir’s scheme, here the identity string is first mapped to a point on an ellip-
tic curve using hash function H1. Note that public keys can be computed from
publicly available information, whereas private keys can only be computed by the
KGC because the computation requires the KGC’s private key s as input. The
KGC generates the private keys and securely distributes them to the nodes. The
key distribution channel between KGC and nodes needs to be authentic and con-
fidential. However, if a blinding technique such as in [81] is used, an authentic
channel is sufficient.
To limit the validity period of an ID-based public key, an expiry date can be
embedded in the key itself. This can be done by concatenating an expiry date tx
to the public key [17], with
Qi = H1(IDi||tx) (4.3)
for the public key Qi of user i. Only if user i is in possession of the matching private
key that corresponds to the correct date, i.e. di = sH1(IDi||tx), he can sign or
decrypt messages. The granularity of the validity period is a system parameter that
describes a security/efficiency trade-off. For instance, a shorter period reduces the
risk of key compromise but induces more overhead because users need to frequently
obtain fresh private keys from the KGC [86].
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In addition to pre-shared public keys, each pair of users i and j in a pairing-
based IBC scheme is able to compute a pairwise pre-shared secret key Kij with
Kij = ê(di, Qj) = ê(Qj, di) (4.4)
= ê(Qi, Qj)
s (4.5)
in a non-interactive fashion [108]. Such pre-shared secret keys have been used in
ID-based authenticated encryption schemes [87] and AKE protocols [19]. For the
key computation both parties compute the bilinear mapping ê(·) over their own
private key di and the public key Qj of the desired communication partner. Note
that the KGC is able to compute all pre-shared keys according to Eq. (4.5).
4.2 IBC Schemes Employed in MANETs
After providing a general overview, we now discuss the deployment of IBC schemes
in MANETs.
4.2.1 Distinctive Features and their Benefits to MANETs
We believe that IBC schemes are an attractive security solution for many MANET
applications, including our targeted applications. IBC schemes provide the follow-
ing special features:
1. implicit and non-interactive pre-authentication among all network nodes
2. implicit public key validity checks
The first feature is due to the use of identities as public keys which entails
many desirable properties. IBC schemes do not require any secure channel for
pre-authentication because public keys are self-authenticating and known prior to
communication. In contrast to public key certificates in PKIs, no additional cre-
dentials to proof the authenticity of keys are needed. The communication overhead
is reduced because public keys do not need to be exchanged.
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The second feature provides an easy way to check whether a public key is valid.
We denote a key as valid if the key is not expired. As shown in Eq. (4.3), the expiry
date can be directly embedded in the public keys. When verifying a signature in
an ID-based signature scheme, we check the validity of the keys at the same time,
whereas in ID-based encryption schemes, only users with valid keys can decrypt.
In contrast, in PKI schemes expiry dates are listed in public key certificates and
thus nodes can still decrypt or sign even if their key is expired. Here, nodes need
to explicitly check the expiry date in a certificate to see whether a key is expired
or not.
All pairing-based IBC schemes offer an additional features that is attractive for
MANETs:
3. every pair of nodes i and j pre-share a pairwise secret key Kij (see Eq. (4.4))
in a non-interactive fashion
This additional feature of paring-based schemes offers all the benefits of sym-
metric key schemes without the need of a secure channel during pre-authentication.
Each pair of users i and j in the network shares a secret Kij, before ever having
communicated with each other. The pre-shared secret keys can be used to enable
the use of symmetric mutual authentication, key exchange and other security pro-
tocol at low computational and communications costs. Please note that ID-based
pre-shared keys can only be computed in a non-interactive fashion if the identities
are pre-known. Otherwise, identities must be first exchanged. In that case we loose
the non-interactive property of the pre-shared keys, but maintain the bandwidth
and memory savings by using certificateless keys. Note that pairwise secret keys
can be derived in PKIs too, e.g. static Diffie-Hellman keys. However, those keys re-
quire the authentic exchange of public keys (typically using public key certificates)
and are not derived in a non-interactive fashion.
4.2.2 Challenges
After discussing the benefits, we now comment on some known problems of IBC
schemes and their implications to MANETs. The special role of the KGC as a
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key escrow is considered a problem in most civilian applications and is one of the
main reasons that prevented IBC schemes from a wide deployment so far. The
KGC is a key escrow because it derives all private keys di in the network (see
Eq. (4.2)) and is able to compute all pairwise pre-shared keys Kij using publicly
available information and master key s, as shown in Eq. (4.5). We will discuss the
key escrow problem in great depth in Chapter 6, where we discuss existing escrow
prevention solutions and introduce methods to decrease or increase the likelihood
of key escrow in MANETs.
Another drawback of IBC schemes is the requirement of a confidential and au-
thentic channel between the KGC and each network node for the secure distribution
of private keys. However, when using a blinding technique as proposed in [81], an
authentic channel (such as required in PKI schemes) is sufficient. We will use such
a blinding technique in our security framework to enable the use of authenticated
channels for node initializations.
As in all security solutions in MANETs (secret key and public key), key revo-
cation is difficult to provide in IBC schemes employed in MANETs due to the lack
of a central TTP. However, providing revocation is essential in MANETs due to
the likelihood of node compromises and malicious nodes. An approach to provide
revocation in MANETs is using a distributed TTP, as in [125], or so-called accu-
sation schemes, as in [32, 85, 124]. We present the first key revocation schemes for
IBC schemes employed in MANETs that is completely self-organized and does not
require any external or internal TTP in Chapter 5.
Finally, providing key renewal is difficult in IBC schemes. The public key format
with embedded expiration date as given in Eq. (4.3) is only sufficient in schemes
without revocation. In schemes with explicit key revocation, public keys can be
revoked before they expire and thus nodes might want to instantly request new
keys. However, static IDs and fixed expiry intervals prevent key renewals before
the next expiry interval. We address the problem of key renewal in Chapter 5 as
part of our revocation scheme.
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4.2.3 Related Work
Recently, IBC schemes have been considered for securing MANETs [33, 77, 124]
due to their efficient key management and other desirable features as discussed
in Section 4.2.1. [33, 77] both propose emulating an internal KGC using (k, n)-
threshold schemes, as previously introduced for internal CAs in PKIs [85, 125].
The key management in both solutions is entirely self-organized and the authors
claim that their schemes are more efficient than fully self-organized PKIs due to
the efficient key management of the underlying IBC schemes. However, threshold
schemes generally introduce a lot of computational and communication overhead.
In [124], an external KGC is used to distribute all keys, whereas an internal
distributed KGC provides key revocation and key renewal. This approach signifi-
cantly reduces the cost of network and node initialization. While [124] provides key
revocation and key renewal algorithms, the schemes in [33,77] do not provide such
algorithms. We review existing revocation schemes for MANETs in more detail and
introduce our own revocation scheme in Chapter 5. So far, no ID-based authenti-
cation, key exchange and other security protocols that are especially designed for
MANETs have been proposed. In [33], the authors suggest using a pre-shared key
for encryption. However, static keys should not be used for encryption and key
exchange protocols that establish a fresh session keys are desirable.
4.3 Basic IBC Framework for MANETs
In this section, we discuss how proper identities of all network nodes should be
chosen. Then we introduce the algorithms of our basic authentication and key
exchange framework for MANETs and possible extensions.
4.3.1 Choosing Identities
Suitable identities used in our ID-based framework must satisfy the following prop-
erties:
1. unique for each entity in the network
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2. unchangeably bound to an entity for its entire lifetime
3. not transferable
The string of information that can be used as identity depends on the application
and needs to be chosen accordingly. For example, it has to be considered who needs
to be authenticated or identified in the network. Generally, we can distinguish three
cases of entities an identity is bound to:
1. a user operating a network node
2. a node
3. a network interface of a node
In the first case the ID string corresponds to a user, e.g. his email address. In
that case multiple users are able to share the same device. For example, if an
application enables two users to securely communicate with each other, the use of
user-dependent IDs is desirable. In the second case, the ID is bound to hardware
of a device, e.g. to the MAC address. In sensor networks and other MANETs in
which users do not operate the network nodes, the MAC address seems to be a good
choice. A combination of both previous approaches is possible using two different
sets of ID-based keys to meet the requirements of different protocol layers. In the
last case, the ID corresponds to a network interface of a node and might be derived
from an IP address. However, we cannot generally assume network addresses such
as IP addresses in all MANETs, because nodes are mobile and may join or leave
the network at any time.
4.3.2 Basic Framework
We now introduce our ID-based authentication and key exchange framework. The
framework is based on the BF scheme and is suitable for MANETs with external
KGCs. The external KGC sets up all nodes with their private keys before the nodes
join the network. This corresponds to TTP availability scenario AV-2 in Fig. 2.2 as
discussed in Section 2.1.6. Once, in the network, nodes cannot access the external
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KGC any longer. During network and node set up, the external KGC can be utilized
to execute algorithms for system and node set up, whereas in the running network all
algorithms are executed in a self-organized manner by the network nodes. The basic
framework is specified by 4 algorithms: (1.) Setup, (2.) Extract, (3.) Distribute,
and (4.) Pre-Authentication. Algorithms 1-3 are executed by an external KGC, i.e.
outside the network during network or node initialization. These algorithms are
executed by the KGC to initialize nodes before they join the network. Algorithm 4
is executed by the network nodes, i.e. completely independent of any KGC. These
four algorithms constitute a basic framework that provides secure and efficient pre-
authentication between pairs of nodes and enables nodes to securely execute other
security protocols. As an example of such security protocols, we present a set of
ID-based AKE protocols in Section 4.4 that can be seamlessly integrated into our
security framework. We introduce the four algorithms of the basic framework in
the following paragraphs and discuss extensions in Section 4.3.3.
(1.) Setup. On the input of a security-parameter k, the KGC selects two groups
G1 and G2 of order q, where q is a prime, and a map ê : G1 × G1 7→ G2. The
map ê is bilinear, non-degenerate, and computable, and the parameters are chosen
such that the BDH problem is hard in G1, as defined in Section 4.1. Furthermore,
the KGC chooses a random generator P ∈ G1, picks a random number s ∈ Z∗q and
computes Ppub = sP . The parameters (s, Ppub) are the KGC’s long-term private
and public key. In addition, the KGC selects two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ 7→ G∗1
and H2 : G2 7→ Z∗q. First is used to derive nodes’ public keys from their binary
identity strings and latter to generate blinding factors for secure key distribution.
After the set-up is completed, the KGC makes the following system parameters
publicly available params = 〈q,G1,G2, ê, P, Ppub, H1, H2〉. The KGC’s long-term
private key s, also referred to as master key, is kept confidential.
(2.) Extract. The KGC extracts the long-term private key di for each network
node i with identity IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗. For doing so the KGC first derives the node’s
public key Qi = H1(IDi||tx) according to Eq. (4.3) and then computes the private
key di = sQi using the system’s master key.
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(3.) Distribute. During private key distribution, the KGC bootstraps all nodes
with their private keys di. Our security framework provides two ways of private
key distribution, the first one (Scenario A) requires an authentic and confidential
communication channel between KGC and each network node, whereas the second
case (Scenario B) requires only an authentic channels.
Scenario A. Upon successful authentication of node i to the KGC, the KGC
sends the private key di to i over a secure channel. The channel needs to be
confidential and authentic. For example, such a channel is established if users
physically go to the KGC or if private keys are directly embedded in the node
during manufacturing. Node i verifies its private key by checking whether the
following equation
ê(di, P ) = ê(Qi, Ppub) (4.6)
is true.
Scenario B. The condition for the distribution channel can be relaxed in order
to enable secure key distribution in a wider field of MANET applications. This
can be done by using a simple blinding technique to protect the confidentiality of
the private keys similar to the method proposed in [81]. Node i chooses a blinding
factor x, computes X = xP , then sends (IDi, X) to the KGC over an authentic
channel. The KGC computes a blinded private key d′i = H2(ê(sX, Ppub))di and
sends it over an authentic channel back to IDi. Node IDi derives its private key





Somebody who is listening to the key distribution channel cannot derive the private
keys because the blinding factor can only be removed by node i and the KGC with
H2(ê(Ppub, Ppub)
x)) = H2(ê(sX, Ppub)). Node i verifies its private key di by checking
whether Eq. (4.6) is true.
(4.) Pre-Authentication. Whenever two nodes i and j wish to communicate
for the first time, they each compute their pairwise pre-shared key Kij according
to Eq. (4.4). Alternatively, the computations can be done at once for all potential
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communication partners. The computation is non-interactive and no messages or
keys need to be exchanged in this step. After their computations, the keys can be
stored for future communications with the same nodes.
4.3.3 Enhancements
After introducing the basic framework, we now point out some possible extensions.
We propose solutions to some of these extensions in the following sections and
chapters.
• ID-based Security Protocols. The proposed framework establishes pairwise
pre-shared keys that can be used in ID-based security protocols to achieve
more security objectives. For instance, the pre-shared keys can be used to
derive symmetric keys to be used in secure routing protocols that employ
symmetric cryptography and thus require pre-shared secrets, e.g. [63,65,100].
The pre-shared keys can be used in any symmetric authentication and key
exchange protocol and we introduce a set of ID-based AKE protocols that
utilize the pre-shared keys in Section 4.4. The proposed protocols offer a va-
riety of security properties and can be seamlessly integrated into the proposed
framework .
• Key Revocation and Key Renewal. The framework can be extended to provide
key revocation and key renewal schemes which are both essential mechanisms
in MANETs due to the likelihood of node compromises. Keys must be revoked
in the running network and thus the revocation algorithm must be executed
in a self-organized fashion. If revocation is offered, nodes must be able to
request a new key upon revocation of their current key, i.e. an algorithm
for key renewal is needed. We introduce a novel completely self-organized
key revocation scheme for MANETs that can be used as extension to the
introduced framework in Chapter 5. The revocation scheme is complemented
by a key renewal scheme presented in the same chapter.
TTP Availabilities. The basic framework works for TTP availability scenario
AV-2 as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Hence, possible extensions to the basic
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framework could be adaptations to other availability scenarios. MANET ap-
plications without the support of any external TTP, i.e. AV-4, require all
algorithms to be executed in a self-organized fashion by the network nodes
themselves. Therefore, Algorithms 1-3 in the basic framework must be exe-
cuted by an internal KGC. Such an internal KGC can be implemented using
a (k, n)-threshold scheme. These kind of distributed KGCs have been pre-
sented in [33, 77, 124] for pairing-based IBC schemes employed in MANETs
and the Setup, Extract, and Distribute algorithms can be adopted from these
solutions. Note that Algorithm 4 Pre-authentication is fully self-organized in
the basic framework and thus does not require any modifications for a fully
self-organized solution.
For MANET applications with TTP availability AV-3, an external TTP can
implement and execute Algorithms 1-3 from the basic framework to initial-
ize all nodes that are present at network initialization. The in the running
network a distributed (k, n)-KGC executes these algorithms to initialize all
subsequently joining nodes, as described in the previous paragraph. Again,
Algorithm 4 does not need to be modified.
Finally, in MANET applications with TTP availability AV-1, the basic frame-
work could be directly implemented without any changes. However, the pro-
posed Algorithms 1-3 could be optimized to take advantage of (sporadic)
backbone access. Even though the basic algorithms cannot be significantly
optimized, possible extensions to the basic framework can be significantly im-
proved by utilizing sporadic network/backbone access. We discuss benefits
and challenges of such MANET applications and their impact on the design of
security solutions, including our proposed security framework, in Chapter 7.
4.4 ID-Based AKE Protocols
We are now introducing a set of ID-based AKE protocols that is suitable for imple-
mentation in MANETs and our proposed security framework. All AKE protocols
presented in this section are designed to meet the design goals specified in Sec-
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tion 3.3 and achieve all necessary and some of the desirable security properties
defined in Section 2.2. We first present a lightweight protocol, Protocol 5. Then,
we gradually add more security features resulting into more complex Protocols 6-
10. Please refer to Table 5.1 for notations. An early version of our protocols can
be found in [53].
Protocol 5. Lightweight ID-based AKE Protocol
Pre-shared Key: (ka, kd) = (fKij (1), fKij (2))
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : IDi, SID, Ni
2. i ←− j : j, SID,Nj , rj = hka(IDi, Ni, SID,Nj)
3. i −→ j : IDi, SID, ri = hka(IDj , Nj , SID,Ni)
Session Key: SK = fkd(Ni, Nj)
4.4.1 Protocols with Pre-Shared Keys
Protocol 5: We introduce a lightweight ID-based AKE protocol which utilizes the
pre-shared key Kij from Eq. (4.4). The protocol is based on a MAC-based AKE
protocol using symmetric session key derivation as discussed in Protocol 2 and the
message flows are illustrated in Protocol 5. The pre-shared key Kij is used to derive
an authentication key ka = fKij(1) and a key derivation key kd = fKij(2) employing
a secure KDF fk(·). The key ka is used as input to a MAC function hk(·) to provide
mutual authentication, whereas kd is used as input in a KDF fk(·, ·) to derive the
session key SK.
In the first step, party i randomly chooses a nonce Ni ∈ {0, 1}2k, where k
is a security parameter, and sends (IDi, SID, Ni) to j, where SID is a session
identifier. Upon receipt of the message, j randomly chooses a nonce Nj ∈ {0, 1}2k,
computes rj = hka(IDi, Ni, SID, Nj) and sends (IDj, SID,Nj, rj) to i. Upon
receipt, i verifies rj and (if successful) i computes ri = hka(IDj, Nj, SID, Ni),
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sends (IDi, SID, ri) to j and computes the session key SK = fkd(Ni, Nj). Upon
receipt, j verifies ri and if successful computes SK = fkd(Ni, Nj).
Protocol 6. ID-based AKE Protocol Using Signatures
Pre-shared Key: Kij
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : IDi, SID, Ni
2. i ←− j : IDj , SID, Nj , Sdj (IDj , SID, Nj , Ni, IDi)
3. i −→ j : IDi, SID, Sdi(IDi, SID,Ni, Nj , IDj)
Session Key: SK = fKij (Ni, Nj)
We now discuss the security properties of Protocol 5:
NP-1: Nonces Ni and Nj act as challenges, where the responses are computed as
MACs over the challenges using pre-shared key ka. Since the KGC is a key escrow,
this property only holds if the KGC is neither malicious nor compromised.
NP-2: Pre-shared key Kij and thus kd are only known to i and j, which follows that
SK can only be computed by these parties. Again, the KGC is able to compute
all pre-shared keys (see Eq. (4.5)) and thus the property only holds if the KGC is
honest and not compromised.
NP-3: The session key is derived in a symmetric fashion, thus both parties compute
the session key SK = fkd(Ni, Nj) in the same way.
DP-1: All session keys SK are computed independently from each other and cannot
reveal any information of other secret keys.
DP-2: Pre-shared keys ka and kd are derived from the identity of the respective
communication partner. Thus both principals can be sure about the identity of
their communication partner.
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DP-3: Both principals contribute their own fresh input to the session key compu-
tation. In order to achieve strict key control, derivation function fkd(·) has to be
chosen in a way that j cannot effectively manipulate the outcome of the session key
computation by choosing some special values of his key share Nj.
DP-4: Deniability is provided because pair-wise shared keys are known to a pair of
principals. Hence, j can deny to have talked to i, because i could have simulated a
protocol run without interacting with j.
Protocol 7. ID-based AKE Protocol Using ECDH
Pre-shared Key: Kij
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : IDi, SID, Ti
2. i ←− j : IDj , SID, Tj , hKij (IDi, Ti, SID, Tj)
3. i −→ j : IDi, SID, hKij (IDj , Tj , SID, Ti)
Session Key: SK = riTj = rjTi
Protocol 6: We now present Protocol 6 which is derived from Protocol 5 by
replacing the MAC function with an ID-based signature scheme Sdi(·). The protocol
is based on signature-based AKE protocol such as illustrated in Protocol 3 and
discussed in Section 2.2.3. Protocol 6 achieves the same security properties as
Protocol 5, except Protocol 6 achieves KCI resilience (DP-5) but cannot provide
deniability (DP-4) due to the use of digital signatures. An implementation of
Protocol 6 in the proposed authentication and key exchange framework requires
two additional algorithms, namely Algorithms 5. Sign and 6. Verify, where any
pairing-based ID-based signature scheme can be used for that matter, e.g. [51].
Protocol 7: To provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS), we now present Protocol 7
which replaces the symmetric session key computation in Protocol 5 with an EC-
DH key agreement, i.e. SK = riTj = rirjP = rjTi. Using rather EC-DH than
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finite field DH is desirable because the underlying ID-based scheme already utilizes
elliptic curves. The protocol is a MAC-based AKE protocol with public key session
key derivation, as illustrated in Protocol 2 and discussed in Section 2.2.3. Protocol 7
preserves all security properties of Protocol 5 and additionally provides PFS (DP-6)
and TTP-PFS (DP-7). PFS is achieved by using EC-DH, i.e. the ephemeral private
keys ri and rj used for session key computation are not a part of the exchanged
messages. Similarly, TTP-PFS is achieved because even if an adversary knows the
master key s, he does not know ri and rj and thus cannot derive the session key. An
implementation of this protocol in the proposed authentication and key exchange
framework requires an additional Algorithm 7. EC-DH.
4.4.2 Protocols without Pre-Shared Keys
In this section we present three ID-based AKE protocols that provide more security
features than the previous Protocol 5-7 for sacrificing computational and commu-
nication efficiency. These protocols use either ID-based signatures or public key
encryption to provide authentication and/or an EC-DH key agreement to derive
the session key. Hence, Protocol 8-10 do not require pre-shared keys.
Protocol 8. ID-based AKE Protocol Using Signatures and
EC-DH
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : IDi, SID, Ti
2. i ←− j : IDj , SID, Tj , Sdj (IDj , SID, Tj , Ti, IDi)
3. i −→ j : IDi, SID, Sdi(IDi, SID, Ti, Tj , IDj)
Session Key: SK = riTj = rjTi
Protocol 8: Combining Protocols 6 and 7, i.e. using digital signatures for authen-
tication and EC-DH key agreement for session key derivation, yields Protocol 8 that
achieves KCI resilience (DP-5) and all security properties of Protocol 7 except of
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deniability (DP-4). Again, using digital signatures prevents KCI attacks but pre-
vents principals from denying their participation in a protocol run. Implementing
this protocol in the basic framework requires the implementation of Algorithms 5,
6, and 7.
Protocol 9. ID-based AKE Protocol Using Public Key
Encryption
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : IDi, SID, EQj{Ni}
2. i ←− j : IDj , SID, EQi{Nj}, hNi(IDi, SID, EQi{Nj})
3. i −→ j : IDi, SID, hNj (IDj , SID,EQj{Ni})
Session Key: SK = f(Ni, Nj)
Protocol 9: Protocols 5-8 provide either deniability (DP-4) or KCI resilience (DP-
5), but fail to provide both security features at once. We show that when applying
public key encryption, we can design protocols that are resistant to KCI attacks and
provide the deniability feature at the same time, which cannot be achieved by using
signatures or MACs. Protocol 9 can be obtained from Protocol 5 by encrypting the
exchanged nonces Ni and Nj with an ID-based public key encryption scheme EQi{·}
under the receiver’s public key Qi. Both parties decrypt the received challenges
using their private key. The decrypted challenge is then used as a MAC key. The
session key SK = f(NA, NB) is derived from the exchanged nonces. Protocol 9
preserves all security properties of Protocol 5 and additionally provides DP-5 and
DP-6. DP-5 is achieved by forcing the receiver of a message to use its private key to
decrypt and DP-4 is achieved because no messages are signed. Protocol 9 provides
partial forward secrecy, because an adversary needs to know both private keys di
and dj in order to decrypt the exchanged messages and obtain the session key.
Hence, the knowledge of one private key is not sufficient for an attack. Note that
an implementation of Protocol 9 in the basic framework requires two additional
algorithms, namely 8. Encryption and 9. Decryption, e.g. using the BF scheme.
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Protocol 10: In order to develop a protocol that resists KCI attacks, achieves
deniability, and provides PFS, public key encryption can be combined with an
EC-DH key agreement. Hence, we combine Protocol 7 with Protocol 9 to derive
Protocol 10. The protocol inherits all properties from Protocol 9 and additionally
provides PFS and TTP-PFS.
Protocol 10. ID-based AKE Protocol Using Public Key
and EC-DH
Protocol Flow:
1. i −→ j : IDi, SID, EQj{Ti}
2. i ←− j : IDj , SID, EQi{Tj}, hTi(IDi, SID, EQi{Tj})
3. i −→ j : IDi, SID, hTj (IDj , SID,EQj{TA})
Session Key: SK = riTj = rjTi
4.5 Security Analysis
We now analyze the security of the previously proposed authentication and key
exchange framework and ID-based AKE protocols.
4.5.1 Authentication and Key Exchange Framework
The proposed ID-based authentication and key exchange framework employ the BF
scheme as underlying IBC scheme and the first three algorithms of the framework
are adopted from the BF scheme. When the IBC scheme is set up according to the
conditions specified in the respective algorithms, the BF scheme has been shown to
be IND-ID-CCA secure [17], i.e. to provide chosen ciphertext security. Note that if
vulnerabilities of the BF scheme will be discovered in the future, the underlying IBC
scheme in our security framework can be replaced by any other secure pairing-based
IBC scheme. Scenario B in Algorithm 3 provides secure key distribution, because
the blinding factor can only be computed by node i and the KGC (see Eq. (4.7)).
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Algorithm 4 does not require any message exchanges and thus cannot be attacked
by any eavesdropper or active attacker, where the pre-shared keys Kij have been
shown to be secure in [17, 19]. Recall that all private as well as pre-shared keys
are known to the KGC. Attacks by malicious KGCs will be analyzed in Chapter 6
and the discussed countermeasures to prevent such attacks can be adopted to our
security framework.
The fully self-organized ID-based AKE framework as outlined in Section 4.3.3,
requires collaborative computations by a group of network nodes that form the
internal KGC using a (k, n)-threshold scheme. The security of those collabora-
tive computations in Algorithms 1-3 depend on the underlying ID-based threshold
schemes [6, 17,33,77].
4.5.2 ID-based AKE Protocols
We already discussed the provided security properties of the presented ID-based
AKE protocols. For an easier comparison, Table 4.1 summarizes the desirable secu-
rity properties (DP) of all protocols. For completeness we also list non-repudiation
(DP-8) and replay resilience (DP-9). Note that non-repudiation is provided by all
protocols employing digital signatures, where the property is by definition mutually
exclusive with deniability. Replay resilience is provided by all presented protocols
because they all employ nonces using a challenge-response technique. We can ob-
serve that all presented protocols provide all necessary properties NP1-NP3 and
desirable properties DP1-DP3 and DP-9. As a consequence, the protocols resist
the most common attacks, such as impersonation, known session key, UKS, and re-
play attacks. The presented set of AKE protocols demonstrate the typical security-
performance trade-off of cryptographic security protocols, because protocols that
offer more features to thwart additional attacks induce larger computational and
communication overhead.
PFS is not achieved in Protocols 5 and 6, because they use very efficient sym-
metric key derivation functions rather than computationally demanding DH key
agreements. However, the protocols are still attractive for many MANET applica-
tions because PFS is not necessary in some scenarios, especially in all applications
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in which authenticity of data is more important than secrecy of the data, as dis-
cussed in [79]. Partial FS, as provided in Protocol 9, is desirable if parties have
different roles, such as in server-client scenarios in which compromised servers are
far less likely than compromised clients. However, for most MANET application we
assume all nodes to have equal roles and thus their private keys are equally strong
protected. This fact makes partial FS less interesting for MANET applications.
Protocols 9 and 10 are the only protocols that achieve KCI resilience (DP-5)
and deniability (DP-4). Both protocols employ public-key encryption to enable
achieving both properties at the same time. Interestingly, Boyd, Mao and Paterson
suggested that deniability and KCI resilience might be mutually exclusive [19].
Note, that another protocol that achieves both properties by applying the discussed
principal is the SKEME protocol [79].
In addition to analyzing the security properties of the protocols, we now point
out how the protocols can be formally analyzed in the Canetti and Krawczyk secu-
rity model for key exchange protocols [25]. The model helps to analyze the security
of n-party message driven key exchange protocols with point-to-point communica-
tion. In their model the security of a protocol Π is first shown to be secure in an
authenticated-link model (AM) in which an adversary can only passively eavesdrop
on the communications. The protocol is then transformed into a protocol Π′ that is
secure in the more realistic unauthenticated-link model (UM) by using so-called au-
thenticators. We omit a detailed description of the formal security model and refer
the interested reader to the original papers [10, 25]. The ID-based AKE protocols
presented in Section 4.4 are all designed using authenticators, namely MAC-based
authenticators [25], signature-based authenticators [10], and encryption-based au-
thenticators [10]. Instead of providing a formal security proof, we describe how the
presented protocols can be derived from existing protocols that are proven secure
in the model. Furthermore, we list the conditions for each protocol to be secure.
Protocol 5: Protocol 5 is similar to a REKEY protocol in [25] in which pre-shared
keys Kij are used. In [19], pre-shared keys from Eq. (4.4) are shown to be secure
for their use in MAC-based authenticators. This proof combined with the security
proof of the REKEY protocol in [25], allows us to conclude that Protocol 5 is secure
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without PFS in the UM model if the following three conditions hold:
Condition 1. Pre-shared keys Kij from Eq. (4.4) are random keys chosen under
security parameter k.
Condition 2. The BDHP is hard in the implemented IBC scheme.
Condition 3. The employed MAC function hk(·) is secure.
Protocol 6: Protocol 6 is derived from Protocol 5 by replacing the MAC-based
authenticator by signature-based authenticators [10]. Hence, Protocol 6 is secure
without PFS in the UM model if Conditions 1, 2 and the following Condition 4
hold:
Condition 4. The employed ID-based signature scheme Sd(·) is secure against cho-
sen message attacks.
Protocol 7: The protocol employs an EC-DH key agreement in which mutual
authentication is provided by MAC-authenticators. Similar to the SIG-DH pro-
tocol in [25] that applies signature-based authenticators to a DH key agreement,
Protocol 7 is secure with PFS in the UM model if Conditions 1-3 and the following
Condition 5 hold:
Condition 5. The ECDH problem must be hard in the implemented IBC scheme.
Note that a similar protocol was proven secure in the UM model in [19].
Protocol 8: The protocol is identical to the SIG-DH protocol in [25], except that
a EC-DH key agreement is used rather than a finite field one. Hence, Protocol 8 is
secure with PFS in the UM model if Conditions 4 and 5 hold.
Protocol 9: The protocols employs public key encryption-based authenticators [10]
replacing the MAC-based authenticators in Protocol 5. The protocol is secure
without PFS in the UM if the following two conditions hold:
Condition 6. The employed ID-based encryption scheme EQ{} is secure against
chosen cipher text attacks (CCA-secure) and MAC function hk(·) is secure.
An example of such CCA-secure IBE scheme is [24].
Condition 7. The employed key derivation function f(·) is secure.
Protocol 10: The protocol secures a EC-DH key agreement by using public key
encryption-based authenticators [10]. Hence, the protocol is secure in the UM with
PFS if Conditions 5 and 6 hold.
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Protocol Desirable Properties (DP)
DP-1 DP-2 DP-3 DP-4 DP-5 DP-6 DP-7 DP-8 DP-9
Protocol 5 X∗ X X X –† – – – X
Protocol 6 X X X – X – – X X
Protocol 7 X X X X – X X – X
Protocol 8 X X X – X X X X X
Protocol 9 X X X X X o‡ – – X
Protocol 10 X X X X X X X – X
Table 4.1: Desirable Security Properties of Protocols 5-10
∗X denotes that the security property is provided by the protocol
†– denotes that the security property is not provided by the protocol
‡o denotes that the security property is partially provided by the protocol
4.6 Performance Analysis
We now analyze the performance of the proposed ID-based authentication and
key exchange framework and ID-based AKE protocols with respect to memory re-
quirements, communication and computational overhead which represent the main
constraints in MANETs.
4.6.1 Authentication and Key Exchange Framework
Efficient implementations of IBC schemes and bilinear parings have been intro-
duced in the literature [9, 13, 17, 92]. To achieve 1024-bit security and an efficient
implementation, a 512 bit curve is chosen, where computations are executed in 170
bit subgroups. This follows that keys and pre-shared keys are 170 bits long. Fur-
thermore, we believe identities IDi of size 64 bits are sufficient, e.g. 32 bits static
data and 32 bits for dynamic data such as expiry date tx. Consequently, storage
requirements are very low in the presented scheme and can compete with EC-
based PKI implementations. Nodes can either store pre-shared keys and/or public
keys together with the corresponding identities or derive these keys on-demand.
Computing pre-shared keys requires a pairing computation and public keys the
use of mapping function H1(·). Storing versus on-demand computations consti-
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tutes a memory/computation trade-off and the best implementation needs to be
chosen according to the nodes’ constraints in particular applications. With small
key sizes and growing memory space, storing keys seems more desirable in most
applications. In addition to low memory requirements, the employed IBC scheme
reduces the bandwidth requirements because neither keys nor certificates need to
be exchanged.
The computational complexity of the proposed security framework depends on
the implemented bilinear pairing, the number and frequency pre-shared keys need
to be computed, as well as the implemented ID-based AKE protocol. The per-
formance of the ID-based AKE protocols is discussed in more detail in the next
section. Computing pre-shared keys Kij as well as Protocols 6, 8, 9 and 10 require
the computation of bilinear pairings, such as Weil or Tate pairings. Latter pairing
is favored due to its better computational performance. Clearly, the pairing compu-
tation is the most demanding computation in framework and protocols. However,
efficient algorithms and implementations exist, e.g. [9, 13, 92] and the Tate pairing
has been implemented on such constrained platforms as smartcards [13]. Never-
theless, the number of required pairing computations should be limited, because
on battery-operated devices, such as cell phones or PDAs, demanding computa-
tions can drain the battery. In very constrained environments in which potential
communication partners are known ahead of time, the one-time computation of
pre-shared keys can be performed off-line. For instance, Kij can be computed on a
desktop computer, and then be downloaded to a user’s PDA. In another scenario,
a central TTP computes pairwise shared keys of all network nodes and distributes
them securely to each node at the time when nodes are bootstrapped with their
private keys. Note that the KGC is able to compute all pre-shared keys in any IBC
scheme and thus the previous scenario does not give the KGC additional power. In
the extreme case that communication partners are not known in advance and the
nodes cannot compute pairings, node i could send a communication request to j,
where j requests and downloads the pre-shared key Kij next time it is docked to a
more powerful device or connected to a TTP.
The overall network performance, especially with respect to computational and
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communication costs highly depends on the implementation of an external or dis-
tributed internal KGC. Latter, fully self-organized implementation, shows signifi-
cantly worse performance due to the use of (k, n)-threshold schemes. Hence, this
implementation should only be used when an external TTP is not available at all
(AV-4). In all other scenarios, nodes should be at least initialized by an external
TTP and should the external TTP no longer available, all subsequent initializations
can be carried out by an internal KGC (AV-3). The initialization by an external
TTP is feasible in our target applications specified in Section 3.3. Furthermore,
we believe that this type of TTP availability occurs in many real-world MANET
applications. For example, network nodes may be initialized by their manufacturer,
network provider, service provider or system administrator.
4.6.2 ID-based AKE Protocols
To achieve good performance in terms of communication costs, all presented ID-
based AKE protocols have three protocol flows which is the minimum number of
flows to provide mutual entity authentication using nonces [89]. For computa-
tional efficiency, symmetric cryptographic primitives are used whenever possible
and nonces are used for two purposes: (1) as challenges for entity authentication,
and (2) as fresh inputs for session key derivation. We now analyze the performances
of the individual protocols.
We can observe that Protocol 5 uses only symmetric primitives except of the
computation of pre-shared keys Kij. However, the pre-shared keys only need to be
computed once and can be stored for future communications with the same node.
In addition, the computation can be performed off-line, i.e. before the protocol
execution, as discussed in the previous section. No interaction between the com-
municating parties is required to share keys kA and kd because both are derived
from the non-interactively pre-shared key Kij. We conclude that Protocol 5 shows
excellent computational and communications performance, and is thus well-suited
for MANET applications in very constrained environments. All other presented
protocols are less efficient, because they require the on-line computation of some
pairings and modular exponentiations (Protocol 6, 7, 9 and 10) and/or scalar mul-
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tiplications (Protocol 8, 9, and 10). These computations are orders of magnitude
more demanding than symmetric operations.
In particular, Protocols 6 and 8 both employ signatures and the protocol per-
formance depends on the implemented ID-based signature scheme. For instance
in [51], signing takes two modular exponentiations in G1 and verifying takes two
pairing computations and one modular exponentiation in Fp. Protocols 7, 8 and
10 require the implementation of EC-DH, which requires the computation of two
scalar multiplications in G1 per node. Protocol 9 and 10 employ an ID-based en-
cryption scheme. In the BF scheme, encryption takes one pairing computation and
decryption one pairing and one modular exponentiation in G1. Please note that
in order for Protocols 9 and 10 to be secure, the encryption scheme needs to be
CCA-secure which is not provided by the original BF scheme. A CCA-secure ID-
based encryption scheme is introduced in [24]. However, CCA security adds a lot of
additional overhead which makes it undesirable for implementations in MANETs.
Protocols 9 and 10 are the only protocols providing deniability and KCI resilience
at the same time. Hence, the protocols are of interest whenever both features are
required and should be replaced by a more efficient protocol whenever one of the
feature is sufficient.
4.7 Discussions and Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed an ID-based authentication and key exchange frame-
work that enables efficient and secure pre-authentication, authentication and au-
thenticated key exchange among network nodes in MANETs. The basic scheme is
suitable for MANET applications with KGC availabilities AV-2 (see Figure 2.2),
and as part of our discussed extensions in Section 4.3.3, we outlined how the frame-
work can be adopted to KGC availabilities AV-3 and AV-4. Our framework is
flexible and can be implemented with any pairing-based IBC scheme, where the
security of the framework is based on the implemented IBC scheme. We described
an algorithm for efficient system set up in which costs are solely carried by an ex-
ternal KGC. In addition, pre-authentication is efficient and secure because pairwise
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pre-shared keys are derived in a non-interactive fashion. The derived pairwise pre-
shared keys enable the use of any symmetric or ID-based AKE protocol to establish
fresh session keys.
The presented set of ID-based AKE protocols in this chapter can be seamlessly
integrated in our proposed authentication and key exchange framework but also
serve as an independent solution. The first AKE protocol is an extremely effi-
cient and purely symmetric protocol that utilizes pairwise pairing-based keys as
pre-shared secrets. We then derived more protocols by gradually adding security
features, which sacrifices some of the computational efficiency of the first protocol.
In our security analysis we prove which security properties are achieved by each
protocol. Our performance and security analysis enables the selection of the most
efficient AKE protocol for particular MANET applications depending on network





Many proposed PKI and IBC schemes for MANETs do not provide schemes for
key revocation and key renewal. However, due to the weak physical protection of
nodes combined with node exposure in potentially hostile environments, node com-
promises including key disclosures are very likely in MANETs. Hence, we believe
that key revocation and key renewal are of great importance in MANETs and ev-
ery node should be able to instantly verify whether a public key has been revoked.
Frequent key renewals to prevent key compromises are either computationally chal-
lenging in solutions with distributed on-line TTPs or simply infeasible in solutions
with off-line TTPs. In this chapter, we propose key revocation and key renewal
schemes for IBC schemes that are especially designed to meet the requirements and
constraints of MANETs. The proposed schemes can be seamlessly integrated in
the ID-based authentication and key exchange framework from Chapter 4. In addi-
tion, the schemes can be used in any pairing-based IBC scheme and the revocation
scheme can be modified to serve as certificate revocation scheme in PKI solutions
in MANETs.
In our revocation scheme, each node uses a neighborhood watch algorithm to
monitor nodes in communication range for suspicious behavior. All observations
are securely propagated to an m-hop neighborhood. The public key of a node is
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revoked if at least δ nodes accused that node. Our key revocation scheme is scalable
in parameters m and δ, i.e. the level of security can be chosen as performance trade-
off. To enable key renewal in IBC schemes, we introduce a new format for ID-based
public keys such that new keys can be issued for the same identity after the previous
key has been revoked. In addition, we discuss and efficiently solve two problems of
nodes wishing: 1) to revoke their own keys and 2) to learn about past accusations
and revocations upon joining the network.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we
summarize some previous work on revocation and monitoring in MANETs and point
out differences to our schemes. In Section 5.2, we discuss the system set-up for our
key revocation and key renewal schemes and introduce the schemes in Section 5.3.
The security and performance of the proposed schemes are analyzed in Sections 5.4
and 5.5, respectively. Finally, we discuss the contributions of the proposed schemes
in Section 5.6. An earlier version of our revocation scheme without extensions and
extensive security analysis appeared in [61].
5.1 Related Work
In this section, we review some existing key revocation schemes for IBC-based
solutions as well as certificate revocation schemes for PKI solutions employed in
MANETs. In the second subsection, we review some monitoring schemes that have
been proposed to identify and ideally exclude malicious network nodes in MANETs.
Monitoring nodes is necessary in our and other existing accusation-based revocation
schemes for deciding which keys should be revoked.
5.1.1 Revocation in MANETs
We discussed some general approaches of certificate revocation for traditional in-
frastructure networks in Section 2.2.3, e.g. CRL and OCSP. However, these widely
deployed solutions are not suitable for MANETs, because they require nodes to
access TTPs or on-line repositories to download or request the status of certifi-
cates. Providing key revocation is crucial in MANETs due to the likelihood of
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node compromises in these networks. In this section, we will discuss previous work
on revocation schemes that have been especially designed for MANETs. However,
despite the importance of key revocation, several of the PKI and IBC-based schemes
that have been introduced for MANETs , e.g. [31, 32, 33, 67, 77, 85, 124, 125], either
completely ignore key revocation and/or key renewal or just briefly outline possible
solutions. Only a few more sophisticated revocation schemes have been proposed
for MANETs [32,124].
In [125], it is suggested that a distributed on-line CA collaboratively revokes cer-
tificates. However no revocation scheme is introduced. In fact, a revocation scheme
in this solution would require threshold signatures, which are computationally de-
manding. In [85], an accusation scheme is briefly outlined in a single paragraph.
The authors propose that each node observes their neighboring nodes for malicious
behavior and based on their observations, nodes propagate signed accusations to
an m-hop neighborhood. All receivers verify the accusations and update their ac-
cusation lists accordingly. If the number of accusations against one node is greater
than a threshold δ, this node’s certificate is revoked. The problem of newly joining
nodes is not addressed in [85] and would require joining nodes to verify accusation
tables from its neighbors to learn about past accusations and revocations. This ap-
proach requires the verification of all previously issued accusation values received
from the neighboring nodes. Even in scenarios with a moderate number of accu-
sations, the verification process is computationally too demanding. Furthermore,
an algorithm for nodes that want to revoke their own compromised keys is not
proposed. In summary, [85] outlines some ideas how to provide self-organized key
revocation in MANETs, but the authors neither propose schemes nor address more
subtle problems.
To our best knowledge, the first paper completely dedicated to certificate re-
vocation in MANETs is [32]. Here, the authors assume that an off-line CA issues
certificates to all network nodes before they join the network. The proposed cer-
tificate revocation scheme employs an accusation scheme with threshold δ, and as
in [85], certificates are revoked if the sum of received accusations against the same
node is greater than δ. All accusations are frequently broadcasted throughout the
82 Self-Organized Key Revocation for MANETs
entire network. Here, each accusation has an associated weight which is a real
number in the range [0, 1], where the weight is computed according to the number
of accusations a node has made so far, how many accusations were reported against
this node, etc.. When a new node joins the network, the node receives the accusa-
tion tables from all network nodes. The accusation messages in [32] are not secured
at all and the authors suggest checking inconsistencies in received accusation tables.
In addition, receivers only accept accusations from senders with sufficiently large
trust value, where trust values are computed in a similar manner as the accusation
weights. An algorithm for nodes that want to revoke their own keys is not proposed
in [32].
A very radical approach for key revocations in MANETs is to revoke the keys
of accusor and accused node, as proposed in [31]. Here, the accusor broadcasts a
signed accusation including its own identity and the one of the accused node. The
receiver verifies the message and then revokes both keys. This method prevents false
accusations from malicious nodes in a simple cost efficient way without the need
of threshold schemes. Thus accusations propagate very fast throughout the net-
work without consuming much memory space, computational power or bandwidth.
However, an obvious disadvantage of the scheme is, that nodes which sent out ac-
cusations must request new keys, which can be quite difficult or even infeasible in
MANETs.
Besides our scheme, we are only aware of one other key revocation scheme for
IBC schemes in MANETs [124]. In [124], an external off-line KGC initializes all
nodes with their first private and public key pair, before nodes join the network.
In the network a distributed on-line KGC consisting of n network nodes (called
D-KGC) carries out key revocation and key renewals. The distributed KGC is
implemented using a (k, n)-threshold scheme. Nodes monitor their neighborhood
for malicious behavior and send their accusations to b assigned D-KGCs. Once a
threshold of at least δ accusations is reached, a group of k D-KGCs collaborative
sign a revocation messages. Each node has two pairs of keys, a static one issued
by an external KGC and one that depends of the current time interval issued by
the distributed on-line KGC. Keys are updated periodically by broadcasts sent
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by the D-KGCs. The message can only be processed by non-revoked nodes to
derive the new keys. The locations of D-KGCs are hidden using an anonymous
routing protocol to prevent attacks targeted at the on-line KGC. Furthermore,
the compromise of at least k D-KGCs compromises all dynamic keys but does
not compromise the master key of the external KGC. Hence, the static keys of
the system are still not compromised. Newly joining nodes can ask neighboring
nodes for a list of previously revoked keys. However, this requires nodes to store
all received signed accusations and new nodes must verify one signature for each
revoked key. This can be computationally challenging for larger numbers of revoked
keys. As in all other discussed schemes, there is no algorithm for nodes that wish
to revoke their own keys in [124].
5.1.2 Misbehavior Detection Schemes
Employing protocols that utilize cryptographic key material and primitives, such
as the ID-based AKE protocols in Section 4.4, can prevent attacks by outsiders.
However due to likelihood of node compromises in MANETs, we need to be able to
identify malicious nodes in the network to prevent attacks by insiders. Once identi-
fied, further actions can be taken, such as key revocation or exclusion from routing
to ultimately prevent attacks by insiders. Hence, we require a metric to measure
malicious behavior, a scheme to observe the specified behavior and a scheme to
punish identified nodes. Due to the lack of a central TTP, identifying and exclud-
ing/punishing malicious nodes must be carried out by network nodes themselves.
We define malicious nodes as nodes that are either compromised or selfish. We
assume that compromised nodes will engage in some kind of malicious activities,
otherwise these nodes cannot be detected. Selfish nodes rather save their own en-
ergy than acting as router to forward other nodes’ packets. Some metrics are needed
to define whether a node is malicious. These metrics can be simple rules, such as
number of dropped packets, or consist of complex systems such as Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDS). Nodes need schemes to measure the behavior of other nodes
to apply the defined metrics, e.g. a monitoring scheme that monitors neighboring
nodes. Another approach for excluding selfish nodes from the network is rewarding
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well behaving nodes rather than punishing malicious ones. This has the advantage
that no scheme for detecting malicious nodes is required. For instance, the au-
thors in [22] suggests the introduction of a virtual currency to reward nodes which
forward packets and to charge nodes which wish to send packets.
The following metrics have been proposed for detecting malicious nodes in
MANETs:
1. count number of dropped packets
2. count number of generated packets
3. check response time of certain nodes
4. wait for messages confirming each hop on a multi-hop routing path
5. use anomaly detection systems to detect unusual behavior
6. run IDS on each node to detect so-called signatures of known attacks
Metric 1 requires nodes to count the number of packets that have been received
by a neighboring node and not been forwarded, even though the packets’ destination
address is different from the address of the monitored node. For example, in [21,88],
nodes check if a packet forwarded by themselves are forwarded by the next node
on the routing path. In another flavor of this metric, nodes count the number of
bits received by a neighbor and compare them to the number of output bits of
the same node [20]. In Metric 2, nodes count the number of generated packets
of neighboring nodes, e.g. route requests, and when this number reaches a certain
threshold the node is marked as malicious [14]. This metric allows to detect denial
of service (DoS) attacks which typically require the generation and propagation of
numerous messages. In Metric 3, nodes send probing messages to check the response
time of certain nodes [29]. Metric 4 requires the employed routing protocol to be
modified such that each node on the routing path sends a confirmation to the
source node [82]. Metrics 5 and 6 use more complex schemes to measure malicious
behavior and compare observed behaviors to previously derived normal behavior
patterns or signatures of known attacks [88, 123], respectively.
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We conclude that Metrics 1, 2, 5, and 6 require the monitoring of neighboring
nodes as mechanism to measure specified behavior, whereas Metrics 3 and 4 ob-
tain their measurements from received messages that are a response to an initiated
process. Furthermore, we can observe that Metrics 1-4 use nodes’ routing behavior
as indicator of maliciousness, whereas Metrics 5 and 6 can take more complex be-
havior patterns into account. Metrics 3 and 4 require the modification of employed
routing protocols and 4 imposes additional network load. Metrics 5 and 6 require
that nodes run special software.
All metrics for identifying malicious nodes that are based on monitoring neigh-
bors, e.g. Metrics 1, 2, 5, and 6, are suitable for our and other accusation-based revo-
cation schemes. For instance, the monitoring schemes proposed in [14,20,21,88,123],
can be used as basis for the revocation schemes in [32, 85, 124] as well as our re-
vocation scheme. Whenever the threshold of the applied metric is reached, the
node is marked as malicious and the key revocation scheme is started by sending
out accusation messages. Here, the key revocation scheme represents the intru-
sion response or punishment mechanism for detected malicious nodes. Monitoring
schemes cannot work completely accurately and there will be always some errors
associated with the implemented scheme. Typically we distinguish two types of
errors, namely false positives and false negatives. Here, false positives are nodes
that are marked as malicious by the monitoring scheme, where in fact the nodes
are good. On the other hand, false negatives are all nodes that are marked as
honest by the scheme, where the nodes are in fact malicious. The two errors of
monitoring schemes are denoted as false positives rate α and false negatives rate β,
where α is the ratio of falsely accused nodes to all honest nodes and β is the ratio
of undetected malicious nodes to all malicious nodes. Hence, 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1, with
typical values ranging from 0.01− 0.1.
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5.1.3 Contributions of Our Key Revocation and Renewal
Scheme
In this subsection, we briefly summarize the contributions of our key revocation
and renewal schemes for MANETs and discuss the differences to existing schemes.
We believe that due to the lack of an infrastructure in MANETs, only network
nodes themselves are able to judge whether a node has been compromised. Hence,
we believe that monitoring neighbors, using one of the mechanisms described in the
previous section, in combination with an accusation-based revocation scheme are
the only option for providing key revocation in MANETs. Furthermore, revocation
schemes for MANETs must be resilient to malicious accusations against honest
nodes. We believe the approach in [31] is too radical for most applications and thus
we only consider accusation-based revocation schemes with threshold δ. Hence, we
compare our accusation-based revocation schemes with threshold δ to other existing
schemes that use a similar approach, namely [32, 85, 124]. Our key revocation and
key renewal schemes for IBC schemes employed in MANETs have the following
features that distinguish them from existing schemes:
1. Accusations are cryptographically protected against impersonations and mod-
ifications without the need of digital signatures.
2. Newly joining nodes efficiently and securely obtain previous accusations.
3. Nodes can efficiently and securely revoke their own compromised keys.
4. The key revocation scheme is completely self-organized and thus independent
of any external off-line or distributed on-line KGC.
5. The ID-based public keys can be renewed before the next expiry interval.
Unlike [32], our scheme protects accusations from impersonations and modifi-
cations. An inconsistency check as in [32] is not sufficient to prevent attacks by an
adversary who controls the communication channel, which is a feasible attack on
wireless links. Our scheme uses pre-shared secret keys from Eq. (4.4) to protect and
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verify accusations and unlike [85, 124] our scheme does not require any signature
scheme. This makes our scheme computationally more efficient. Another advan-
tage of our scheme is that newly joining nodes can obtain previous accusations
without the need to verify many signatures as in [85, 124]. This makes the pro-
cess of joining nodes very efficient while present nodes can save memory space that
would be necessary to store signatures of accusations. Our revocation scheme is the
first that provides an algorithm that enables nodes to revoke their own keys after
noticing that their keys have been compromised. Our proposed so-called harakiri
algorithm is both efficient and secure. Our key revocation scheme is completely self-
organized and does not rely on any off-line or on-line KGC. This has the advantages
that the scheme can be implemented in any KGC availability scenario (AV1-AV4).
Furthermore, no special nodes are targets of attacks, unlike the D-KGCs in [124],
because all nodes are responsible for gathering accusations. Hence, our revocation
scheme does not require extra protection from anonymous routing protocols such
as in [124]. We believe that despite anonymous routing, the D-KGCs in [124] can
still be localized by traffic analysis.
Finally, our key renewal scheme is the first for ID-based keys that allows key
renewal at any time, even before the next expiry interval. Like the key renewal
scheme in [124], our scheme has a renewable yet still predictable part that can be
updated for each public key renewal, however in [124] this can only be done at the
beginning of a new expiry date interval.
5.2 System Set Up
We assume an existing implementation of a pairing-based IBC scheme in the net-
work. System set up, key generation, key distribution and pre-authentication are
executed according to Algorithms 1-4 in the basic framework in Section 4.3.2. Only
the public key format needs to be modified to allow key renewal, which we discuss in
Section 5.2.2. Furthermore, we summarize our system assumptions and notations
in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.3, respectively. We describe how each node creates its indi-
vidual key revocation list (KRL) in Section 5.2.4. Finally, we define the underlying
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trust model of our key revocation and key renewal scheme in Section 5.2.5.
5.2.1 System Assumptions
The network and node assumptions that are necessary for our IBC key revocation
and key renewal schemes to work can be summarized as follows:
1. bidirectional communication links
2. nodes have monitoring schemes implemented
3. each node i has a unique identity IDi
4. nodes know identities and hop-distance of their one-hop neighbors
5. nodes know identities of all nodes in their m-hop neighborhood
6. nodes obtain a private and public key pair (di, Qi) from an off-line KGC prior
joining the network
The first two assumptions are necessary to enable nodes to monitor their neigh-
bor nodes in communication range, which is required in our revocation scheme.
Note that bidirectional links are a common assumption in many lower-layer MA-
NET protocols, e.g. AODV [118] and other AODV-based routing protocols. We
discussed some approaches and metrics for monitoring schemes in Section 5.1.2 and
assume that a suitable scheme is implemented by all network nodes. We would like
to note that most monitoring schemes require nodes to be in promiscuous mode,
which is also a mandatory requirement in dynamic routing protocols, e.g. AODV
and DSR [75]. Assumption 3 is necessary to unambiguously identify nodes. This
kind of identifiers are required for many network tasks and protocols, including
the ID-based authentication and key exchange framework and ID-based AKE pro-
tocols in Chapter 4. Assumption 4 is needed, because neighbor nodes need to be
unambiguously identified before they can be marked as suspicious or trustworthy in
the revocation scheme. This information is usually provided by routing and other
lower-layer protocols, e.g. AODV. In case the identities of neighbors are unknown,
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users must first explore their neighborhood by sending hello messages and waiting
for responses. Assumption 5 is necessary to enable nodes to decide which accusa-
tion values they must consider for updating their revocation lists, e.g. accusations
from nodes that are more than m hops away are discarded. Note that nodes do not
need to know the hop-distance to their m-hop neighbors, but only the identities of
all nodes that are not more than m-hops away. This kind of information can be
provided by routing protocols. Assumption 6 is necessary because cryptographic
keys are used to provide message authentication in our revocation scheme. Here
we assume an external off-line KGC distributing initial private keys di to all nodes
i before joining the network. Furthermore, we assume that the KGC verifies each
node’s identity IDi before issuing the private keys. This TTP assumption corre-
sponds to scenario AV-2 in Section 2.1.6 and Figure 2.2. In addition, we outline a
solution with distributed on-line KGC corresponding to scenarios AV-3 and AV-4
as part of the extensions in Sect. 5.3.4.
We can summarize that all system assumptions for our schemes, except As-
sumption 2, are quite common in MANETs, and in fact mandatory in most ad hoc
routing and security protocols. Hence, the assumptions for our key revocation and
key renewal schemes do not impose much additional burden to the system.
5.2.2 Public Key Format
The validity period of cryptographic keys should be limited to reduce the likelihood
of compromise. As discussed earlier, an expiry date can be directly embedded in
ID-based public keys, as shown in Eq. (4.3). However, this key format is only
sufficient in schemes without revocation. In schemes with explicit key revocation,
public keys can be revoked before they expire. As a consequence a node might
wish to request a new key before the previous one expires at time tx. However,
since identities IDi are static in IBC schemes, issuing a key for the same expiry
date tx would result into the same compromised key di. On the other hand, issuing
new keys with a new expiry date t′x > tx might not be feasible, because a node i
could be only eligible to possess keys until tx. Furthermore, it is desirable in IBC
schemes that expiry dates are chosen in a predictable manner, e.g. in fixed intervals
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∆T . This allows the computation of valid public keys at the beginning of each new
expiration interval tx+1 = tx + ∆T without the exchange of these new keys. Hence,
to enable immediate key renewal after key compromise, some additional data v
that can be changed with every key renewal must be added to the public keys. We
introduce the following key format below
Qi(tx, vi) = H1(IDi||tx||vi), (5.1)
where v is the version number of i’s public key. For instance, upon revoking
Qi(tx, vi) = H1(IDi||tx||vi), node i can request a new key Q′i at time t < tx, with
Q′i(tx, v
′
i = vi + 1) = H1(IDi||tx||vi + 1). Note that the version number v always
starts with v = 1 for every new expiry date tx and is incremented with each key
renewal that occurs before tx.
The new key format is a trade-off between user friendliness and performance.
The format in Eq. (5.1) allows a node i to request new keys at any time, but
requires the notification of all other nodes about the new key. Therefore, node i
can either broadcast its new key Q′i or send a message containing the new version
number v′. Recall that v always starts with v = 1 and hence the first keys of each
interval do not need to be broadcasted. Key renewal and distribution with v > 1
are discussed in Section 5.3.3. The best performance is achieved for public keys of
format in Eq. (4.3), but then nodes have to wait until the next expiration interval
to request a new key, i.e. for a maximum time of ∆T ; and only receive a key if the
node is still eligible to obtain keys at that time.
5.2.3 Notations
We need to introduce some notations for our schemes. A summary of notations
and symbols can be found in Table 5.1. Let N denote all network nodes in the
MANET, where Ω = |N | is the number of network nodes. R is the communication
range of all nodes for transmitting and receiving messages and |x − y| denotes
the Euclidean distance between two nodes x and y. Let N1,i denote i’s one-hop
neighbors, i.e. all nodes in immediate communication range of i, with N1,i = {j :
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Notations
N Set of all network nodes
Ω = |N | Number of all network nodes
N1,i Set of i’s one-hop neighbors
σi = |N1,i| Number of i’s one-hop neighbors
σ Average number of one-hop neighbors in network
Nm,i Set of i’s m-hop neighbors
%i = |Nm,i| Number of i’s m-hop neighbors
% Average number of m-hop neighbors in network
δ Threshold in accusation scheme
ε Security parameter for accusations by nodes in l-hop distance,
with l > 1
m Propagation range of accusation and revocation messages
KRLi(tx) i’s key revocation list containing accusation and revocation
information for public keys with expiry date tx of all nodes in
m-hop distance
tx Embedded expiry date of public keys
∆T Fixed expiry intervals, i.e. tx+1 = tx + ∆T
|x− y| Euclidian distance between two nodes x and y
α, β False positive and false negative rates of implemented moni-
toring scheme
a||b Concatenation of two binary strings a and b
cij Column vector in KRLi containing received accusations from
node j
rij Row vector in KRLi containing received accusations against
node j
rk counter for received k-vectors
Hi i’s honest one-hop neighbors
nih = |Hi| number of i’s honest one-hop neighbors
Fi i’s falsely marked honest one-hop neighbors
nif = |Fi| number of one-hop neighbors falsely marked by i
Mi i’s malicious one-hop neighbors
nim = |Mi| number of i’s malicious neighbors
Ui i’s malicious undetected one-hop neighbors
niu = |Ui| number of i’s undetected malicious one-hop neighbors
C colluding nodes
nc = |C| number of colluding nodes
Θi i’s trusted one-hop neighbors
Table 5.1: List of Notations: Key Revocation and Renewal Schemes
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|j − i| ≤ R; ∀ j ∈ N}. Thus N1,i ⊆ N for all i ∈ N . Let σi denote the number
of i’s one-hop neighbors, i.e. σi = |N1,i|. Now let Nm,i denote i’s m-hop neighbors,
i.e. all nodes j ∈ Nm,i can be reached with at most m hops from node i using
the deployed routing protocol. Let %i denote the number of i’s m-hop neighbors,
i.e. %i = |Nm,i|. For an easier representation and without loss of generality, we
denote i’s one-hop neighbors as j ∈ N1,i = {1, . . . , σi} and i’s m-hop neighbors as
j ∈ Nm,i = {1, . . . , %i}, respectively, where i itself is part of N1,i and Nm,i.
5.2.4 Create Key Revocation Lists (KRLs)
Each node i creates a key revocation list KRLi(tx) containing all gathered accusa-
tion values for keys with the current expiry date tx, i.e. accusations from its own
neighborhood watch and received accusations from its neighbors. A revocation list


























in which accusation values are represented as aik,j ∈ {0, 1,−} with {k, j} ∈ {1, . . . , %i}.
Value aik,j indicates that node i “heard” that node j accuses node k of malicious
behavior (aik,j = 1) or, that j believes k is trustworthy (a
i
k,j = 0). Accusation value
aik,j = − indicates that node k and node j are more than m hops apart, and thus
are not allowed to give statements about each others trustworthiness. Accusation
values aii,i, i.e. i = j = k, indicate that node i revoked its own key, whereas accusa-
tion values aij,i, i.e. i = k, indicate that node i accuses node j of malicious behavior.
Both cases will be explained in Algorithms 2 and 1 in Section 5.3.1, respectively.
All other accusation values are derived from received accusation messages which is
explained in Algorithm 4 in Section 5.3.1. In the remainder of this chapter, we use
KRLi for short because all information in the revocation list are for public keys of
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the current expiry date tx. All expired public keys are automatically revoked and
thus not listed any longer.
Each j-th column vector in KRLi for 1 ≤ j ≤ %i, short cij, contains all accu-
sations aik,j made by node j against nodes k ∈ Nm,i. The upper index i denotes
that values are current values in i’s KRLi. Note that other nodes l might have
different values stored in their revocation lists KRLl, e.g. aik,j 6= alk,j for i 6= l in
some cases. Discrepancies in accusation values may exist, because accusations take
time to propagate through the network. In addition, nodes have different m-hop
neighborhoods and thus receive different accusation and harakiri messages.
Each j-th row vector in KRLi for 1 ≤ j ≤ %i, short rij, corresponds to a node
j ∈ Nm,i and contains, among other information, the accusation values aij,k from
all nodes k ∈ Nm,i evaluating node j. Hence, the i-th row in KRLi contains all
received accusations against node i itself. In particular, elements 1 to %i in r
i
j
contain accusation values aij,1 to a
i
j,%i
. Element (%i +1) contains the identity IDj of
node j, the next element (%i+2) the current version number v
i
j of public key Qj(tx).
And the last element (%i +3) contains a 1-bit flag X
i
j that, when set, indicates that





1 if aij,i = 1 (Condition 1)





j,k ≥ δ ∀ k ∈ Nm,i with X ik = 0 (Condition 3)
0 else
(5.3)
Basically, node i considers j’s public key as revoked, i.e. X ij = 1, if at least one
of Conditions 1-3 is true. Condition 1 describes the case that node i observed the
malicious behavior of node j during its own neighborhood watch (see Revocation
Algorithm 1 in Section 5.3.1). Condition 2 covers the case that i received a harakiri
message from j indicating that private key dj has been compromised (see Revoca-
tion Algorithm 2 in Section 5.3.1). And finally, Condition 3 defines that public key
Qj(tx, v
i
j) is revoked if node i received at least δ accusations against node j from
trustworthy nodes k (X ik = 0) in i’s m-hop neighborhood. Here, δ is a security pa-
rameter of our scheme. Note that “-” is treated as zero value in the summation. If
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none of the three conditions applies, node i considers node j and its current public
key Qj(tx, v
i
j) as trustworthy, i.e. X
i
j = 0.
When first creating its key revocation list KRLi, node i initializes all accusation
values with aik,j = 0 for all {k, j} ⊂ {1, . . . , %i}. As a consequence, all revocation
values X ij = 0. This means we assume all nodes to be trustworthy until proven
otherwise. In a more hostile environment, accusation values could be set to aij,k = 1
until it has been observed that node j is indeed trustworthy. Note that accusation
values aik,j cannot be initialized with “-” because node i does not know the hop
distance between nodes j and k. This kind of information will be obtained as
part of the KRLi update, which we explain in Section 5.3.1. Once node i enters
the network it starts its neighborhood watch and evaluates received accusations to
update its KRLi. We assume fixed expiry intervals with tx+1 = tx + ∆T , i.e. all
values in KRL(tx) are re-set every ∆T .
5.2.5 Trust Model
First of all, we assume that the external KGC is honest, not compromised and
trusted by all nodes. In applications where this is difficult to ensure, a distributed
KGC can be deployed, e.g. [17, 19, 28, 51, 81, 99, 101]. Furthermore, as part of
System Assumption 6, the KGC checks the identities of nodes before they receive
their private keys to ensure that nodes only obtain keys corresponding to their
identities.
The security and accuracy of our revocation scheme is based on the trust model
defined in this section. We need the following definitions before we can derive the
trust model:
Def. Direct Accusations: Accusations received from one-hop neighbors contain-
ing the result of their neighborhood watch.
For example, node i receives column vector cjj from an one-hop neighbor j ∈ N1,i,
where cjj contains the results of j’s monitoring of all its one-hop neighbors k ∈ N1,j.
Def. Reported Accusations: Accusations received from one-hop neighbors re-
porting accusations from nodes in l-hop distance, with 1 < l ≤ m.
For example, node i receives column vectors cjk from an one-hop neighbor j ∈
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N1,i, where k ∈ Nm,i \N1,i.
Def. Trusted Node: Node i trust all nodes j ∈ Nm,i with X ij = 0.
Note that we cannot call a node “trusted”. The term has to be put in a relation,
i.e. node i trusts node j, whereas another node k might not trust j. We are now
ready to derive the trust model for our revocation scheme, in which each node i:
1. trusts that one-hop neighbors j ∈ N1,i that have been identified as malicious
in i’s neighborhood watch (with aij,i = 1) are indeed malicious.
2. accepts direct accusations of any trusted one-hop neighbor j ∈ N1,i.
3. accepts the majority vote of reported accusations from a group of at least ε
trusted one-hop neighbors.
4. trusts δ or more accepted accusations (both direct and reported) against one
node j ∈ Nm,i to justify the revocation of j’s keys.
The first item is based on the assumption that a monitoring scheme with very
few false positives is used. For this reason, aij,i = 1 leads to X
i
j = 1. Please note
that a single trusted node cannot revoke a key. In fact, trust in a node follows
that direct accusations are accepted and reported accusations by this nodes are
considered for the majority computation. Node i counts all accepted accusations
towards the δ revocation threshold. Only once at least δ accusations against the
same node j ∈ Nm,i have been accepted, j’s keys are treated as revoked by node i,
i.e. X ij = 1. This rule is reflected in Condition 3 in Eq. (5.3). Security parameter
ε ensures that reported accusations from neighbors beyond i’s own monitoring
range have been observed by a group of trusted one-hop neighbors. This limits
the impact of accusations that have been modified while propagating through the
network. In our revocation scheme, δ and ε serve as security parameters that help
preventing attacks by (colluding) malicious nodes and counteract inaccuracies of
the implemented monitoring scheme as we demonstrate in our security analysis in
Section 5.4.
There are some universal bounds for the security parameters, namely 1 ≤ ε ≤ σi
and 1 ≤ δ ≤ %i. Typically δ ¿ %i in order for our scheme to work, where the actual
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value depends on the hostility of the network and network topology. We give
tighter bounds for selecting these parameters such that attacks by colluding nodes
are prevented in Section 5.4.
5.3 Key Revocation and Renewal for IBC Schemes
In this section, we propose a novel key revocation and key renewal scheme pairing-
based for IBC schemes employed in MANETs.
5.3.1 Key Revocation
Every node in a MANET needs to be able to instantly verify whether a public key
is revoked which requires that public key revocations are handled within the net-
work in a self-organized fashion. Therefore we introduce a completely self-organized
accusation-based revocation scheme with threshold δ that is based on monitoring
one-hop neighbors. In our accusation-based scheme, the keys of node i are revoked
either if node i notices that its own key has been compromised or if a node receives
at least δ accusations against one node. We introduce four algorithms to provide
key revocation in IBC schemes deployed in MANETs. In Algorithm 1: Neighbor-
hood watch, nodes monitor the nodes in their neighborhood for suspicious behavior.
Algorithm 2: Harakiri enables nodes to efficiently and securely revoke their own
keys. In Algorithm 3: Propagate, accusations are securely sent to all neighbors.
And finally in Algorithm 4: Update KRL, nodes update their key revocation lists
using received accusations. Algorithms 1 and 2 require the propagation of messages
to all neighbors, e.g. Algorithm 1 requires the propagation of observations and Al-
gorithm 2 the propagation of so-called harakiri messages. Hence, Algorithm 3 is
triggered by Algorithms 1 and 2, but also by Algorithm 4, namely whenever the
key revocation list (KRL) of a node is updated as response to received accusation
or harakiri messages. Basically Algorithms 3 and 4 create a loop that ensures that
all accusations and harakiri messages are sent to all nodes in an m-hop neighbor-
hood. An overview of the key revocation mechanism showing the interaction of the
individual algorithms is depicted in Figure 5.1. The flow charts of the individual

















































Figure 5.2: Flowchart: (a) Neighborhood Watch, (b) Harakiri, (c) Propagate.
algorithms are in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, in which the cloud symbol represents the
event that triggered the algorithm, the dashed box contains all the steps of the
algorithm, and the parameter at the end of the flowchart represent the output of
the algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Neighborhood watch. The neighborhood watch scheme is a
local monitoring scheme, in which each node i monitors all neighbors in its one-
hop neighborhood Ni,1 for suspicious behavior. Metrics and tools for detecting
suspicious behavior have been discussed in Section 5.1.2. The algorithm is depicted
in Fig. 5.2-(a). As defined in Section 5.2.4, every network node i stores a key
revocation list KRLi as shown in Eq. (5.2). Please recall that the i-th column in
KRLi, i.e. cii, corresponds to i’s own accusations. Consequently, each time node
i observes suspicious behavior of one of its own one-hop neighbors j, it updates
the corresponding accusations values accordingly, i.e. aij,i = 1. Node i can only
monitor nodes j in its immediate communication range, i.e. j ∈ N1,i, and thus
only accusation values aij,i with j ∈ N1,i are updated during neighborhood watch.




































































































Figure 5.3: Flowchart Revocation Algorithm 4: Update KRL
Accusation values are updated every time i observes suspicious neighbors and at
the beginning of every new expiry interval tx+1 = tx + ∆T . Once an accusation
value aij,i is set, the value will not be reset to zero until a new public key Qj(v
′, tx)
with v′ > vij is received or a new time interval t
′
x starts.
Every time node i changes at least one accusation value aij,i from 0 to 1, i.e. from
trustworthy to malicious status, i creates an neighborhood watch message nmi,j for
each one-hop neighbor j ∈ N1,i according to Eq. (5.4) and starts Algorithm 3 to
propagate the accusations.
nmi,j = (fKi,j(IDi, nmi), (IDi, nmi)), for all j ∈ N1,i (5.4)
A neighborhood watch message nmi,j contains the identity of the sender, here IDi,
and the observations from i’s neighborhood watch denoted as nmi. For simplicity,
we choose nmi = KRLi, i.e. i submits its entire key revocation list. More bandwidth
efficient solutions, e.g. only submitting values from i’s neighborhood watch, i.e. cii,
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or only updated values are discussed as extensions and improvements to the scheme.
To avoid unauthorized or modified accusations, accusation messages are protected
by a MAC function f(), where pairwise pre-shared keys from Eq. (4.4) serve as MAC
keys. In particular, node i computes an accusation message nmi,j for each node
j ∈ N1,i using Ki,j. The verification of received accusation messages is described in
Algorithm 4. After computing all accusation messages, node i starts Algorithm 3
to propagate its observations.
Algorithm 2: Harakiri. The steps of the harakiri algorithm are illustrated in
Fig. 5.2-(b). When a node i realizes that its private key di has been compromised,
i creates a harakiri message hmi as shown in Eq. (5.5) below.
hmi = (IDi, di, Qi, (tx, vi), “revoke”, hopcount) (5.5)
The message contains the sender’s identity (IDi), the compromised private key di,
the corresponding public key Qi, the expiry date and version number of the public
key (tx, vi), and a text string that marks the message as revocation message. The
last field in the harakiri message is the hopcount that ensures that the message
reaches all nodes in m-hop distance to i, i.e. all nodes j ∈ Nm,i. Therefore, sender i
initially sets hopcount = m. Note that only node i and the entity that compromised
i are in possession of di and are thus the only entities that can create a valid harakiri
message hmi. Since the adversary has no motivation to revoke the key, the harakiri
message does not need to be authenticated or otherwise protected. The verification
process of received harakiri messages checks wether di is a valid private key and
corresponds to Qi and IDi and is discussed in Algorithm 4. Every time a node i
detects its compromise and creates a harakiri message hmi, i will start Algorithm 3
to propagate the message.
Algorithm 3: Propagate. In this algorithm nodes securely propagate accusations
to their one-hop neighbors. The steps are illustrated in Fig. 5.2-(c). Accusation
messages ami can be neighborhood watch messages nmi,j (see Eq. (5.4)), harakiri
messages hmi of a compromised node i (see Eq. (5.5)), or key revocation update
messages umi,j from Algorithm 4 (see Eq. (5.8)), i.e. ami ∈ {nmi,j, hmi, umi,j}. As
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illustrated in Figure 5.1, Algorithm 3 is triggered by Algorithms 1, 2 and 4. The
initiator of Algorithm 3, i.e. sender i of ami, sends its accusation message(s) to all
its one-hop neighbors j ∈ N1,i. Note that for ami = hmi there is only one message
that is broadcasted to all neighbors, whereas for ami = nmi,j or ami = umi,j there
are σi messages, i.e. one for each neighbor j, that are unicasted to each neighbor.
Algorithm 4: Update KRL. In this algorithm, node i updates its key revocation
list KRLi using the received accusation messages amj from its neighbors j. Thus,
Algorithm 4 is triggered by Algorithm 3 (see Figure 5.1), and key revocation lists are
updated every time a new accusation message is received. We distinguish between
three types of updates according to the received message amj and we describe the
update process for received harakiri, neighborhood watch, and update messages
separately in the following paragraphs. The algorithm is the most complex one in
the revocation scheme and requires several processing steps, as illustrated in the
flow chart in Figure 5.3.
Received amj = hmj. The receiver i of a harakiri message hmj needs to verify
whether the message is authentic. As mentioned earlier, it is not necessary to
check who sent the message (which is why hmj does not provide not message
authentication), because the public key that corresponds to the broadcasted private
key dj should not be used any longer regardless of the sender of the message.
However, it needs to be verified if the broadcasted private key dj corresponds to
public key Qj and identity IDj. Only then, public key Qj should be revoked.
Otherwise, adversaries could fabricate false harakiri messages that cause public
keys of uncompromised nodes j to be revoked. Node i verifies whether hmj is valid
by checking wether Eq. (5.6) below is true.
Ki,j = ê(dj, Qi) (5.6)
The check verifies whether the broadcasted private key dj indeed corresponds to
the public key Qj and thus IDj. Therefore, a recipient of hmj, here node i, looks
up whether it is in possession of public key Qj and the pre-shared key Ki,j and if
so, uses the Ki,j to check whether Eq. (5.6) is true. If i is not in possession of these
5.3 Key Revocation and Renewal for IBC Schemes 101
keys, i first computes Qj from the received IDj, tj and vj according to Eq. (5.1) and
checks whether the received IDj and the computed Qj correspond to each other.
If this check is successful, i derives Ki,j according to Eq. (4.4). Finally, i checks
whether Eq. (5.6) is true. If the check is successful, i updates its key revocation
list KRLi by setting accusation value aij,j = 1. Hence, Condition 1 in Eq. 5.3 is
satisfied and i sets X ij = 1 and thus considers Qj(tx, vj) revoked. Then i decrements
the hopcount, i.e. hopcount := houpcount − 1 and if hopcount > 0, node i starts
Algorithm 3 with ami = hmj. If one of the check fails, i discards hmj and aborts
the algorithm.
Received amj = nmj,i. When node i receives a neighborhood watch message
nmj,i from one of its neighbors j ∈ N1,i, i first needs to verify if the message is
authentic. If the check is successful, i uses the received message nmj to update
its key revocation list KRLi. In the following we describe all necessary steps of
the verification and update process. Note that, if a step is successful, i continues
with the next step, else i drops the packet and aborts the algorithm. For efficiency
reasons, node i first checks if the sender of the message is a trusted one-hop neigh-
bor before executing the (potentially) computationally more demanding message
authentication. Upon receiving amj = umj,i, node i performs the following steps:
1. neighbor check : i checks whether sender j is a direct neighbor, i.e. j ∈ N1,i.
2. check trustworthiness : i checks whether j is considered trustworthy, i.e. X ij =
0.
3. verify message authenticity : i verifies the MAC of the received message nmj,i
using pre-shared key Ki,j. If i is currently not in possession of Ki,j, i first
computes the key according to Eq. (4.4).
4. copy neighbor’s observation: i extracts column vector cjj from nmj to update
its own column vector cij in KRLi. In other words, i adopts all accusation
values from j’s neighborhood watch. Here, node i copies only accusation
values of nodes that are in i’s own m-hop neighborhood, i.e. ajk,j for all k ∈
Nm,i. All other accusation values are discarded. Upon completion, node i
sets the update flag, i.e. update = true.
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5. store other nodes’ observations : i scans through all columns cjk with k ∈
{1, . . . , %j} in KRLj and stores all columns cjk for which all following condi-
tions hold:
(a) k 6= i
(b) k 6= j
(c) X ik = 0
(d) k /∈ N1,i
(e) k ∈ Nm,i
Columns cjk that do not satisfy Condition (a) are discarded because the col-
umn corresponds to i’s own neighborhood watch. Condition (b) is necessary
because j’s neighborhood observations have already been adopted in Step 4.
Condition (c) ensures that only accusations from trustworthy nodes k are
used. Condition (d) discards j’s copy of observations of i’s other one-hop
neighbors, because i receives these observations directly from these one-hop
neighbors. The last condition ensures that i only stores accusations from
nodes in its own m-hop neighborhood which might be different from j’s m-
hop neighborhood.
Node i checks Conditions (a)-(e) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , %j}. If all conditions
are met for k, i stores cjk and increments counter rk. All other columns are
discarded. We refer to the stored vectors as k-vectors. These vectors are not
directly used to update key revocation list KRLi because the vectors contain
“second” or even worse n-th hand information. As discussed in our trust
model in Section 5.2.5 we need a minimum of ε received k-vectors to establish
trust in the reported accusations of node k. If at least ε k-vectors, i.e. rk ≥ ε
are collected, i updates its KRLi as described in the next step.
6. use accumulated k-vectors for update: Node i checks for all k ∈ {1, . . . , %i}
whether rk ≥ ε. If true, i.e. i stored k-vectors cjk from at least ε one-hop
neighbors j, node i updates the k-vector inKRLi as described in the following.
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For an easier representation and without loss of generality, we assume i stored
rk column vectors c
j
k from rk one-hop neighbors j with j ∈ {1, . . . , rk} in
Step 5, with rk ≥ ε. Each accusation value ail,k with l ∈ {1, . . . , %i} in cik is
computed from the majority vote over all collected ajl,k, with j ∈ {1, . . . , rk}





















Basically, if more than halve of the accumulated accusation values ajl,k against
a node l equal 1, node i sets the value to 1. If more than halve of the
accumulated values are 0, i sets the value to 0. If no majority can be found,
the accusation value in KRLi remains unchanged. Note that the range for
index l of the accumulated accusation values ajl,k is l ∈ {1, . . . , %j}, whereas
in the KRL update, node i only considers values of nodes l in its own m-
hop neighborhood, i.e. l ∈ {1, . . . , %i}, where %j might be different from
%j. Accusation values a
j
l,k of the accumulated k-vectors with l /∈ Nm,i are
discarded in the update calculations. Note that all k-vectors that have been
used for the KRL update are erased, whereas “unused” k-vectors with rk < ε
remain in i’s storage. If rk ≥ ε for at least one k, i.e. i updated at least one
k-vector in KRLi, node i sets the update flag update = true.
7. prepare update message: If update = true, which is always true for ami =
nmi,j, node i prepares an update message umi,j for all its one-hop neighbors
j ∈ N1,i according to Eq. (5.8). The messages are constructed similar to the
neighborhood watch messages nmi,j in Eq. (5.4), where the difference is not
in the message but rather in the treatment of received accusation messages
ami = nmi,j or ami = umi,j. For simplicity, we assume umi = KRLi, where
more bandwidth efficient solutions such as only sending updated vectors are
possible. Each message is protected with pre-shared key Ki,j serving as MAC
key. All messages umi,j for all j ∈ N1,i serve as input to Algorithm 3 and thus
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are propagated to i’s one-hop neighborhood. After triggering Algorithm 3,
the update flag is reset, i.e. update = false.
umi,j = (fKi,j(IDi, umi), (IDi, umi)), for all j ∈ N1,i (5.8)
Received amj = umj,i. If node i receives a KRL update message from j, i
proceeds almost as in the previously described case for received neighborhood watch
messages nmi. More precisely, upon receiving ami = umi,j, node i executes Steps 1-
3 and 5-7 as described in the previous paragraph. In other words, node i updates
its key revocation list KRLi identical to the previously described case, except that i
does not copy accusations from j’s neighborhood watch (Step 4). If node i updated
at least one of its k-vectors, i.e. update = true, i creates an update messages umi,j
according to Eq. (5.8)for all j ∈ N1,i and starts Algorithm 3 as described in Step 7.
5.3.2 Example for KRL Update
We present an artificially small and simple network scenario to illustrate how Al-
gorithm 4 works for a received neighborhood watch message, i.e. for ami = nmi,j.
Note that this example also covers ami = umi,j, because both scenarios only dif-
fer in Step 4. In our example we consider six network nodes i with i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}
with a network topology as shown in Figure 5.4. In the figure all nodes that are
in each others direct communication range are connected by a solid line, which
corresponds to one hop. The nodes maintain key revocation lists for nodes in two
hop communication range, i.e. m = 2, and the security parameters are set to
δ = 3 and ε = 2. We can observe from the figure node 1’s one-hop neighborhood
N1,1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and its two-hop neighborhood N2,1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We now show
how node 1 updates its revocation list KRL1 upon receiving accusation messages
am2 = nm2,1, am3 = nm3,1, am4 = nm4,1 from its one-hop neighbors 2, 3 and 4,
respectively. To update its key revocation list, node 1 executes Algorithm 4 for
each received accusation message. For simplicity, we assume that all public keys
Q2, Q3 and Q4 are not expired and have a version number v = 1. Hence, we neglect
values (tx, v) in our example. Node 1’s revocation list from before the update as





Figure 5.4: Network Topology in Toy Example
well as the extracted key revocation lists from am3 and am4 are shown below.
KRL1 =

0 0 0 0 0 ID1 0
1 0 0 0 − ID2 1
0 0 0 0 1 ID3 0
0 0 0 0 0 ID4 0




KRL3 = KRL4 =

0 1 0 0 1 − ID1 0
1 0 1 1 − − ID2 1
0 1 0 0 0 − ID3 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 ID4 0
0 − 1 1 0 1 ID5 1






0 1 0 0 0 − ID1 0
1 0 1 1 − − ID2 1
0 1 0 0 1 − ID3 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 ID4 0
0 − 1 1 0 1 ID5 1




For brevity of the presentation, we consider a parallel execution of Algorithm 4 for
all received accusation messages and we discuss the steps in the following:
1. Nodes 2, 3 and 4 are all one-hop neighbors (see Figure 5.4).
2. Nodes 3 and 4 are considered trustworthy because X13 = X
1
4 = 0 in KRL1,
whereas node 2 is marked as malicious (X12 = 1) and thus am2 is discarded.
3. Node 1 successfully authenticates am3 and am4 using K1,3 and K1,4, respec-
tively.
4. Node 1 uses column vectors c33 from KRL3 and column vector c44 from KRL4
to update column vector c13 and c
1
4 inKRL1, respectively. The updated vectors
in KRLi are:






















Then node 1 sets update = true.
5. Node 1 scans through all columns inKRL3 and discards the following columns:
c31 because this column contains 1’s own reported accusations, c
3
2 because node
1 does not trust node 2 (X12 = 1), c
3
3 because 3 ∈ N1,1 and 1 used 3’s direct
accusations already in Step 4, c34 because 4 ∈ N1,1 and 1 trusts 4’s direct accu-
sations more than 3’s reported accusations, and c36 because 6 /∈ N2,1. Hence,
node 1 only stores c35 from KRL3. For similar arguments, node 1 stores only
c45 from KRL4.
6. Node 1 checks for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5} whether rk ≥ ε, which has only one
element k = 5 with r5 = 2 ≥ ε = 2. Consequently, node 1 uses those two
vectors to update c15 in KRL1. Using the majority vote over c35 and c45 from







































0 0 0 0 0 ID1 0
1 0 1 1 − ID2 1
0 0 0 0 1 ID3 0
0 0 0 0 1 ID4 0
0 0 1 1 0 ID5 0


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7. Since update = true, node 1 prepares an update message um1,j for j =
{2, 3, 4, 5} according to Eq. (5.8). Finally, node 1 starts Algorithm 3 to prop-
agate these messages to its one-hop neighbors.
5.3.3 Key Renewal
The presented IBC revocation scheme for MANETs needs to be complemented by
a key renewal algorithm to enable node i to obtain a new key pair (Qi, di) after its
public key expired, or was revoked by a harakiri message or δ accusation messages.
In any case, a node needs to access the off-line KGC for key renewal. When doing
so, the node must re-authenticate itself to the KGC using some credentials that
identify the node. An off-line KGC cannot distinguish between malicious nodes
whose keys have been revoked because of bad behavior or honest nodes whose
keys have been compromised. Therefore, malicious nodes can always request new
keys once their old keys have been revoked due to malicious behavior. However,
these malicious nodes must act under their true identities in order to successfully
authenticate themselves to the KGC. To restrict the power of such malicious nodes,
we select a maximum version number vmax, i.e. the number of key renewals for the
same expiry date is restricted. Clearly, a node that requests more than vmax key
renewals in one expiry date interval is either malicious or not able to appropriately
protect its key data.
If node i received a new key Q′i with version number v
′
i > 1, i needs to broadcast
its new public key to its m-hop neighborhood after re-joining the network. The
receivers of Q′i, update the version number in their revocation lists accordingly
and set all accusation values for Q′i to zero. If only the expiry date is new and
v′i = 1, i does not need to inform other nodes about its new keys. Every node
in Nm,i automatically updates all accusation values and revocation flags in its key
revocation lists at every new expiry interval, i.e. when t > tx and the new expiry
date of all keys is set to tx+1 = tx + ∆T . Consequently, the key revocation lists are
re-set every ∆T .
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5.3.4 Extensions
Many extensions to the proposed key revocation and key renewal schemes are pos-
sible. We briefly outline some of them in this section.
• Distributed On-line KGC. Our schemes can be easily modified for MANETs
with distributed on-line KGCs, where the revocation scheme remains un-
changed and the distributed on-line KGC takes over the task of key renewal.
In that way external KGCs are only used for the initial key distribution
(availability scenario AV-3) or not at all (AV-4). Note that latter case re-
moves System Assumption 6. For example, (k, n)-threshold schemes can be
used to distribute master key s to all network nodes such that k D-KGCs can
collaboratively generate and distribute new private keys during key renewal,
as in [33, 77, 85, 124, 125]. Scenario B from the Distribute Algorithm in the
basic framework (see Section 4.3.2) is desirable for key renewal, because it
does not require confidential channels between node and on-line KGCs. Since
our revocation scheme works completely independent of the (k, n)-threshold
schemes, the solution is very efficient. In our scheme with distributed KGC,
all nodes serve as D-KGC and only one master key s is used. Hence, un-
like in [124], the compromise of k nodes compromises the entire system as it
does in all other schemes using a single master key that is distributed using
a (k, n)-threshold scheme, e.g. [33,77,85,125].
• Weighted Accusations. In another possible extension to our presented revo-
cation scheme, weighted accusation values are used, as introduced in [32].
Hence, instead of using binary values {0, 1} to represent accusation values
aij,l, accusation values are real numbers in interval 0 and 1, i.e. [0, 1]. The
value can be based on several parameters such as number of accusations a
node has made, number of accusations against a node or a certainty value
generated by the monitoring scheme.
• Confidential Accusations. To avoid that malicious nodes can overhear accusa-
tions against them and use this knowledge to keep the number of their accu-
sations below δ, accusations can be encrypted, as suggested in [124]. Unlike
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stated in [124], we do not think that malicious nodes that stop misbehaving
after noticing a number of accusations (< δ) against themselves pose a threat.
We rather believe that it does not matter whether nodes are just pretending
to be trustworthy or they are indeed trustworthy, because as long as the nodes
behave well they do not launch an attack. For instance, a previously selfish
node might realize that it is time to start forwarding messages again. However,
we believe that nodes may use the knowledge about their own accusations to
move to a new m-neighborhood whenever their accusation count approaches
δ. We refer to these kind of malicious nodes as roaming adversaries. For accu-
sation confidentiality, any symmetric encryption algorithm can be used with
a symmetric encryption key K ′i,j that is derived from the pre-shared keys Ki,j
in Eq. (4.4). In that case, all neighborhood watch and update messages are
encrypted and only sent to neighbors that are not accused in these messages,
e.g. nmi,j = (fKi,j(IDi, nmi), EKi,j(IDi, nmi)), for all j ∈ N1,i \ {L}, where
L is the set consisting of all neighbors that have not been accused by either
any node, node i’s one-hop neighbors or just node i, depending on the imple-
mentation. We conclude that encrypting accusations helps to thwart roaming
adversaries while sacrificing the motivational factor of overheard accusations.
• Dedicated Key Pairs. Harakiri messages hmi (see Eq. (5.5)) contain private
keys di which affects the security of all previous messages that were either
signed under di or encrypted under Qi. For example, an adversary who re-
ceives hmi can decrypt all messages encrypted under Qi as well as all messages
encrypted under Ki,j for any j ∈ N . In addition, adversaries can forge signa-
tures that look like they have been created before the signing key was revoked.
To prevent the described misuses of self-revoked keys, we suggest using dedi-
cated private and public key pairs for different purposes. For example, public
keys could contain a label that specifies the purpose of the keys, i.e.
Qi(tx, vi) = H1(IDi||tx||vi||label),
where label ∈ {sign, encrypt, revocation}. This format still allows nodes i
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to derive public keys Qj and pre-shared keys Ki,j of other nodes j in a non-
interactive fashion. When using this key format, private keys used in the
revocation scheme can be revealed in harakiri messages without revealing
private keys dedicated to other purposes. In addition, once a public key used
in the revocation scheme is revoked, all other public keys of the same node
are revoked as well.
• Adapting Scheme to Hostile Environments. The presented key revocation
scheme can be adapted to many different environments, e.g. more hostile
ones. For instance, a different majority function for computing accusations
than the one in Eq. (5.7) can be defined, accusation values could be initialized
with ones instead of zeros and different triggers for when accusation messages
are sent can be defined. These parameters should be selected according to
the fraction of expected malicious nodes, i.e. the hostility of the MANET
environment.
• Adaptive Monitoring Schemes and Security Parameters. As mentioned in the
previous paragraph, monitoring scheme and security parameters should be
selected according to the hostility of the implementation environment. How-
ever, sometimes it might be advisable to adjust these values in the running
system. For instance, some nodes might have a number of accusations always
just below threshold δ. In that case the threshold of these or all nodes should
be dropped accordingly at the next expiry interval. If nodes still receive the
same number of accusations, their keys will be revoked during the new expiry
interval. In other cases it might be advisable to have an adaptive monitor-
ing scheme. For instance, if a node is at the edge of the network it does
not need to forward many packets. In that case, a monitoring scheme that
only monitors the number of forwarded packets is not able to evaluate the
maliciousness of these nodes. Here it would be advisable to have an adaptive
monitoring scheme that implements several kinds of metrics and thresholds
that can be selected according to some network parameters, such as network
density, number of neighbors, position in the network, etc..
5.3 Key Revocation and Renewal for IBC Schemes 111
• Efficiency Improvements. The efficiency of the proposed basic schemes can be
significantly increased by only sending new accusation as part of the neighbor-
hood and update messages, as opposed to entire key revocation lists. Another
way to improve the efficiency of the revocation scheme is based on the selec-
tion of when accusation messages are sent. For example, instead of sending
update messages each time one accusation value changes, messages could only
be sent when the revocation status Xi of a key changes, i.e. Xi = 0 → Xi = 1,
or until a node accumulated at least γ accusations, or at fixed time intervals
τ . However, note that the frequency updates are sent constitutes a security-
performance trade-off, because less frequent updates increase the performance
while the security might be reduced due to longer propagation delays of accu-
sations. In general, the frequency should be chosen according to the hostility
of the network and could be implemented in an adaptive manner. Further-
more, rules can be implemented to define priority levels for different message
types, e.g. harakiri messages could have highest priority and be sent out in-
stantly, changes in revocation status have lower priority and are sent out
in the next time interval τ , whereas other changes of accusation values are
collected until a certain threshold γ is reached.
• Network-wide Revocations. The propagation range m of accusations can be
removed in the revocation scheme. In that case accusations are sent to all net-
work nodes and thus nodes store information for all network nodes and their
public keys. The disadvantage of this modification is the increased commu-
nication load for the entire network and the increased storage requirements
for larger key revocation lists. Hence, m serves as performance parameter
that can be selected according to the number of malicious nodes, available
network bandwidth and power constraints of nodes. Removing m completely
enables the implementation of the revocation scheme in networks in which
nodes do not know which nodes are in their m-hop neighborhood (i.e. system
assumption 6 in Section 5.2.1 is eliminated).
• Adversary Models. In the described revocation scheme, the implemented mon-
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itoring scheme is treated as a black box with false positive and false negative
rates α and β, respectively. In other words, we assume that nodes mark their
one-hop neighbors as malicious or trustworthy with accuracy determined by
α and β, but we specify neither how malicious behavior is defined nor how
such behavior can be measured. Some possible metrics and detection mecha-
nisms are summarized in Section 5.1.2. In order to thwart particular attacks
and/or specific malicious behavior, the monitoring scheme must be modelled
according to the considered adversary model. In other words, the monitor-
ing scheme is set to detect the signature of a certain attack modelled in the
adversary model. For instance, if the adversary model describes adversaries
launching DoS attacks, the monitoring scheme could be set to detect large
numbers of sent packets. Or if the adversary model describes adversaries
who launch specific routing attacks such as blackhole attacks, the monitoring
scheme could be set to check the number of dropped packets. Since the moni-
toring scheme is treated as black box, the presented revocation scheme can be
used to thwart all types of existing as well as potential future attacks. Only
the monitoring scheme must be adapted to the respective adversary model
while the revocation scheme can remain unchanged.
5.4 Security Analysis
We assume the underlying IBC scheme including the pre-shared keys from Eq. (4.4)
to be secure and refer to Section 4.5.1 for a security discussion of the ID-based frame-
work. Henceforth, we limit our analysis to the introduced key revocation and key
renewal schemes. In Section 5.4.1 we show that our proposed key renewal scheme
resists Sybil and impersonation attacks. In Section 5.4.2, we show that our proposed
key revocation scheme prevents attacks by outsiders, and in Sections 5.4.3-5.4.6 we
analyze the scheme’s resilience to non-colluding malicious nodes, falsely accused
nodes, colluding one-hop neighbors, and colluding l-hop neighbors, respectively.
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5.4.1 Sybil and Impersonation Attacks on Key Renewal
Scheme
Malicious nodes could try to bypass security parameter δ by fabricating δ different
identities in a so-called Sybil attack [35]. In that scenario, a single node can send
δ accusations against node i and thus revoke i’s key. Our scheme uses ID-based
public keys of a fixed format, i.e. upon identifying to the KGC, a node can only
obtain one possible valid private key. Hence, Sybil attacks are prevented in our
scheme, because of the use of ID-based keys and the fact that the off-line KGC
checks the identity of every node before issuing keys.
Adversaries who have impersonated network nodes, cannot request new keys
upon their old keys have been expired or revoked, because the impersonators cannot
successfully authenticate to the KGC. On the other hand, malicious nodes that act
maliciously under their own identity are able to request new keys, however the
number of renewals in one time interval ∆T is limited to vmax. In addition, the
time span for attacks by malicious nodes is limited to the time period between key
renewal and subsequent key revocation in the neighborhood watch scheme.
We can conclude that the security of the key renewal scheme is based on the
honesty of the KGC and the procedure that is used to verify nodes’ identities.
5.4.2 Outsider Attacks on Revocation Scheme
In the revocation scheme, all neighborhood watch and update messages are pro-
tected with pre-shared keys Ki,j. Thus the messages provide message authentication
and integrity protection and can neither be fabricated nor modified by outsiders of
the network. On the other hand, harakiri messages are not protected but contain
private and public key pairs. Hence, the messages can only be created by insiders
or adversaries who compromised a network node. Note that latter have no reason
to send harakiri messages, because the message would cause the revocation of the
compromised keys and thus render its compromise useless. If dedicated key pairs
are used, as introduced as possible extension, the self-revocation of keys does not
affect any previously signed or encrypted messages of the same node.
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An outsider could attempt draining a node’s battery in a so-called battery ex-
haustion attack [115] by repeatedly sending messages that cause a node to perform
demanding computational operations. These attacks are prevented by our revoca-
tion scheme, because nodes only accept accusation messages from trusted one-hop
neighbors. This check is very efficient (basically it is just a look up of the sender’s
identity and revocation status in the key revocation list) and thus cannot be ex-
ploited to drain the battery. If an adversary spoofs the identity of a trusted one-hop
neighbor, the attack would be detected when verifying the authenticity of the first
message. Even though the verifying process is more demanding, the process cannot
be repeated because the spoofed identity is marked as malicious after the first mes-
sage failed to authenticate successfully. Consequently, no more messages originating
from the same source will be accepted, preventing the attack.
We conclude that outsiders to the network cannot attack the revocation scheme.
5.4.3 Selfish, Malicious, and Roaming Adversaries
We believe that node compromises are likely to occur in MANETs due to weak phys-
ical protection of nodes and potentially hostile network environments. In addition,
selfish nodes may exist in some applications. If the metrics of the implemented mon-
itoring scheme are selected accordingly, compromised and selfish nodes can both
be detected in our neighborhood watch scheme. In our revocation scheme, keys
from malicious nodes are first locally revoked by one-hop neighbors who witnessed
malicious behavior of these nodes as part of their neighborhood watch. These
witnesses then propagate accusations, which, once enough accusations have been
accumulated, lead to key revocations by all nodes in m-hop distance. Note that
keys are never globally revoked, each node i rather has their individual view on
which keys it considers as revoked based on its accusation values in KRLi. Hence,
our revocation scheme excludes adversaries who control compromised nodes from
the network, because their keys will be revoked and they cannot request new keys.
In addition, selfish nodes that do not participate in distributed network tasks such
as forwarding messages, will have their keys revoked. This forces selfish nodes to
frequently renew their keys, which imposes higher costs than performing the ini-
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tially requested network tasks. Hence, our revocation scheme encourages selfish
nodes to participate in network tasks.
A single malicious node can only send one accusation for each network node, i.e.
a single node cannot revoke a key of another node. In particular, each node k may
send more than one accusation against the same node j, however each receiver i
of these accusation message only stores one accusation value aij,k, namely the most
recent one.
An undetected malicious node attempting to launch a battery exhaustion attack
(as described in the previous section), could send messages that would be initially
accepted because they pass the verifications. However, eventually the attacker
would be marked as malicious as part of the neighborhood watch. The monitoring
scheme can be set such that the attack is detected before the battery of a node is
exhausted.
Malicious nodes cannot simply drop accusations against themselves, because
this will be detected by the neighborhood watch scheme. Besides, accusations are
broadcasted by all neighbors of a node and thus still reach other nodes, even if one
of the propagation paths is broken. Attempts of malicious nodes to modify accu-
sations against themselves are prevented by using integrity protected accusations.
However, an adversary can modify its own key revocation list before sending it to
all neighbors. The impact of this attack is limited by security parameters δ and ε
and will be discussed for colluding adversaries in the next sections.
A roaming adversary i may move to a new neighborhood every time its number
of accusation approaches δ. However, i’s new one-hop neighbors will eventually
detect i’s malicious behavior and thus i needs to move again before its key is
revoked. Lets assume nodes are uniformly distributed and each routing hop is over
a distance R. Then, the speed S that is necessary for roaming adversaries to travel
to a new m-hop neighborhood before their current keys expire at time tx is
S ≥ mR
tx − t .
Note that t is the current time and thus tx − t ≤ ∆T . We can observe that by
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selecting m sufficiently large and the expiry intervals ∆T small, an adversary has
to travel very fast to escape the revocation of its key. Hence, the capabilities of
roaming adversaries are fairly limited, because adversaries need to move fast and
cannot remain at the same location for a longer period of time. In addition, if
accusations are encrypted as described as one possible extension in Section 5.3.4,
nodes cannot learn about the number of accusations against them. Thus, nodes do
not know when they should move to a new neighborhood, which further limits the
power of roaming adversaries.
5.4.4 Falsely Accused Nodes
The introduced revocation scheme relies on monitoring one-hop neighbors and prop-
agating the observations. Hence, the scheme’s security and accuracy depend on its
resilience to colluding malicious nodes, as well as the false positive rate α and false
negative rate β of the employed monitoring scheme. We assume that all nodes
implement the same monitoring scheme.
For our analysis we need to introduce some notations, summarized in Table 5.1.
Lets Hi denote i’s honest one-hop neighbors, with |Hi| = nih, and Mi i’s malicious





Mi = ∅ and thus σi = nih + nim. Furthermore, Fi denotes i’s honest one-hop
neighbors that have been falsely marked as malicious by i, with |Fi| = nif , and Ui
denotes i’s undetected malicious one-hop neighbors, with |Ui| = niu. Hence, Fi ⊆ Hi
and Ui ⊆ Mi. Finally, the colluding nodes are denoted as C with |C| = nc. In our
analysis of colluding one-hop neighbors, we consider the case that all undetected
malicious nodes collude, i.e. C = Ui and nc = n
i
u.
We can observe that false positive rate α causes a node to falsely mark nif =
αnih of its honest one-hop neighbors as malicious. Consequently, from item 1 in
our trust model in Section 5.2.5, a node will revoke the keys of nif honest one-
hop neighbors. Note that falsely accused nodes do not directly pose a security
threat. However, besides the inconvenience false accusations may cause, a large
number of falsely accused nodes could stop the revocation scheme from working
efficiently or in the worst case from working at all. To be able to revoke keys of
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nodes in l-hop distance, with 1 < l ≤ m, a node i must receive at least δ (direct
or reported) accusations from trusted nodes. Each node i trusts all its one-hop
neighbors n ∈ Θi = (Hi \ Fi)
⋃
Ui, which follows that the number of trusted one-
hop neighbors is |Θi| = (1 − α)nih + βnim. If |Θi| ≥ δ, one-hop neighbors are able
to cause the revocation of a key per direct accusations. On the other hand, for
|Θi| < δ, node i must be able to accept reported accusations in addition to direct
accusations. In that case |Θi| ≥ ε must hold. Note that only reported accusations
can cause revocations of keys of nodes that are more than two hops away. From







to allow the acceptance of reported accusations. To allow direct accusations the
bound can be relaxed by replacing ε by δ in the equation. The derived bound serves
only as rough guideline and to keep inconvenience to a minimum and allow efficient
functionality of the revocation scheme, α should be selected as small as possible.
5.4.5 Colluding One-hop Neighbors
After showing the impact of false positive rate α on the revocation scheme’s security
and functionality, we now analysis the resilience of the scheme to colluding one-hop
neighbors. In particular, we show how security parameter δ and ε, as well as false
negative rate β should be chosen to prevent such attacks.
Def. Successful Attack by Colluding One-hop Neighbors: A group of nc ≤
σi colluding one-hop neighbors can convince an honest node i to mark the key of
another honest node j ∈ Nm,i as revoked in KRLi, i.e. X ij = 1.
An employed monitoring scheme with false negative rate β leads to niu = βn
i
m
undetected malicious nodes in i’s one-hop neighborhood. Hence, up to niu one-hop
neighbors u ∈ Ui may collude to launch an attack. Colluding one-hop neighbors u
can launch two types of attacks: A. Altering direct accusations, i.e. nodes u alter
their own accusations as part of their propagated neighborhood watch messages,
and B. Altering reported accusations, i.e. nodes u alter reported accusations of
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nodes that are 2 to m hop away in their propagated update messages. We describe
both attacks in the following and show how they can be prevented by appropriately
selecting security parameters and monitoring scheme.
A. Altering direct accusations:
Recall that δ accusations revoke a key (see Condition 3 in Eq. (5.3)) and that node
i directly copies the neighborhood observations of all trusted one-hop neighbors
j ∈ Θi (see Step 4 in Revocation Algorithm 4). We now consider the following
attack by colluding nodes u ∈ Ui:
• each node u ∈ Ui sets auj,u = 1 for an honest node j ∈ Nm,i and sends a
neighborhood watch message
Upon receiving nmu,i, i uses u’s neighborhood watch vectors c
u
u to update c
i
u in
KRLi. In that way, node i updates niu vectors in its revocation list, each containing
aij,u = 1. Thus, there are at least n
i
u accusations against node j in KRLi. Hence,
if the following inequality
niu ≥ δ
holds, node i will revoke node j’s key. This result is not surprising because δ is
the threshold for our revocation scheme, and thus δ malicious undetected one-hop
neighbors can revoke the key of any j ∈ Nm,i.
The described attack can be prevented by selecting δ and β such that niu < δ.
We know that nim ≤ σi, thus attacks by altering direct accusations can only succeed





holds, the described attack is completely prevented. We can observe that by se-
lecting δ ≥ σi, Eq. (5.9) always holds because β < 1 for any monitoring scheme.
In most monitoring schemes β typically ranges from 0.01 to 0.1 and thus δ can be
selected smaller than σi. Hence, attacks by colluding one-hop neighbors altering
their direct accusations can be prevented by selecting δ and β such that Eq. (5.9)
holds, which does not put many restrictions on the parameter selection.













































Figure 5.5: Attacks by Colluding Nodes: (a) One-hop Neighbors Altering Reported
Accusations, (b) Two-hop Neighbors Altering Direct Accusations.
B. Altering reported accusations:
We now consider another attack by colluding one-hop neighbors u ∈ Ui, in which the
adversaries alter reported accusations. Here, nodes u lie about accusation values of
nodes that are more than one hop away. The attack exploits the majority rule (see
Eq. (5.7)) that is applied by node i to derive column vectors cik, with k ∈ Nm,i\N1,i.
From Steps 5 and 6 in Revocation Algorithm 4, we can observe that at least b rk
2
+1c
trusted nodes are necessary to gain majority and thus determine the accusation
values in cik. In the attack described in the following, colluding nodes manipulate
their submitted k-vectors. The colluding nodes u ∈ Ui execute the following steps
to launch an attack of type B:
• each u ∈ Ui selects ∆ nodes in Nm,i \ N1,i, which is denoted as V , i.e. V ⊂
Ni,m \N1,i and ∆ = |V |.
• node u sets auj,v = 1 for all v ∈ V , and sends an update message umu,i.
Upon receiving all niu update messages umu,i, node i updates the accusation
value aij,v as a
i
j,v = 1 for all v ∈ V if the received k-vectors from the colluders
form the majority, i.e. if niu >
rk
2
(see Eq. (5.7)). If the number of accusations
reaches threshold δ, i revokes j’s key with X ij = 1. Note that the minimum number
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of colluding nodes to force the acceptance of the reported accusations is rk = ε.
Hence the minimum number of colluding nodes u ∈ Ui is niu = b ε2 + 1c. In the
remainder of our security analysis we use ζ = b ε
2
+ 1c. The attack is illustrated in
Fig. 5.5-(a) and we summarize the conditions for a successful Attack B below:
1. all v ∈ V are trusted by node i, i.e. X iv = 0 for all v ∈ V
2. ∆ ≥ δ
3. niu ≥ ζ
We assume that colluders can easily ensure that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
We now analyze how Condition 3 and thus a successful attack can be prevented
by the proper choice of security parameters and monitoring scheme. Recall that







the described attack is prevented. We would like to emphasize that Eq. (5.10)
reflects the best possible scenario from the attackers’ point of view, in which exactly
d ε
2
−1e honest one-hop neighbors report k-vectors. Less or more honest nodes would
both require a larger number of colluding nodes niu, because rk < ε in the first case,
whereas niu must maintain the majority in the latter case.
Note that 1 ≤ ε ≤ σi. Hence, selecting large ε relaxes the condition on the
accuracy of the monitoring scheme, but it reduces the efficiency and functionality
of our revocation scheme. However, in any case ε ≥ 1 and thus selecting β <
1
σi
ensures that Attack B is prevented for any selection of ε. Since σi varies for
different neighborhoods an average value σ should be estimated for the network
before selecting a monitoring scheme with appropriate β.
Remark 1. Colluding one-hop neighbors can combine Attacks A and B, i.e. alter
direct and reported accusations. In that case only ∆ = δ − niu k-vectors must be
manipulated, because the colluders send niu altered direct accusations. A combi-
nation of the described attack modifies Conditions 1 and 2 but not Condition 3.
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Hence, such a combined attack can still be prevented by selecting β and ε such that
Eq. (5.10) holds.
Remark 2. If System Assumption 4 does not hold (i.e. a node i does not know
which nodes are in its one-hop neighborhood N1,i), undetected malicious one-hop
neighbors u ∈ Ui could collude with undetected malicious l-hop neighbors c ∈ C,
where 1 < l ≤ m and X ic = 0, to launch the following attack. Colluders c share
their identities and credentials with nodes u, such that one-hop neighbors u can fool
node i into believing that those nodes are also one-hop neighbors. For instance, a
node u can set its MAC and IP address to c’s addresses (i.e. spoof node c) and then
use c’s key material to fool node i to believe that the message came from a node c
that is one hop away. In this way the colluders force i to increase the number of its
observed one-hop neighbors in KRLi to σi + |C|. This in turn increases the number
of undetected malicious one-hop neighbors n′iu (real one-hop neighbors plus l-hop
neighbors pretending to be one-hop neighbors). The one-hop neighbors can now
launch an attack altering direct or reported accusations of n′iu nodes. Note that the
described attack requires the colluders to share their secret key credentials, whereas
the other described attacks by colluders do not have this requirement. We conclude
that this attack is prevented if System Assumption 4 holds or n′iu < δ for direct
accusations and n′iu < ζ for reported accusations, respectively.
5.4.6 Colluding l-hop Neighbors
We now analyze attacks by colluding l-hop neighbors of i with 2 ≤ l ≤ m.
Def. Successful Attack by Colluding l-hop Neighbors, with 1 < l ≤ m: A
group of nc < %i colluding l-hop neighbors can convince an honest node i to mark
the key of another honest node j ∈ Nm,i as revoked in KRLi, i.e. X ij = 1.
A. Altering direct accusations:
We first consider an attack by colluding two-hop neighbors, i.e. l = 2, in which
the colluders alter their direct accusations. These altered accusations are received
by the one-hop neighbors of the colluders, which in turn report the (altered) accu-
sations to node i. We assume the following attacking scenario:
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• a group of colluding 2-hop neighbors C, with |C| = nc and C ⊂ (N2,i \N1,i)
• a group of nodes O that are one-hop neighbors of node i as well as of all nodes
c ∈ C, i.e. O ⊂ N1,i and O ⊂ N1,c for all c ∈ C
Furthermore, we assume that all nodes o ∈ O faithfully execute the revocation
algorithms. The attack consists of two phases:
Phase 1.
• each c ∈ C sets acj,c = 1 and sends a neighborhood watch message
• each receiver o ∈ O updates its KRLo with aoj,c = 1 if Xoc = 0 and revoke j’s
key if more than δ accusations were received
Phase 2.
• each o ∈ O sends an update message reporting the altered accusations, i.e.
aoj,c = 1 for all c ∈ C
• node i updates its KRLi if it received at least rc > ε c-vectors. In that case
the majority vote forces i to set aij,c = 1 for all c ∈ C. And if the number of
collected accusations is larger than δ, i revokes j’s key
The attack is illustrated in Fig. 5.5-(b) and works if the following three condi-
tions hold:
1. |C| ≥ δ
2. |O| ≥ ζ
3. all o ∈ O mark each c ∈ C as honest, i.e. Xoc = 0 for all o ∈ O and c ∈ C
We assume the first two conditions to be true and analyze Condition 3, i.e. the
probability that each colluder c ∈ C remains undetected by the monitoring scheme
of each of its one-hop neighbors o ∈ O. For an easier representation and without
loss of generality, we denote the one-hop neighbors as O = {o1, o2, . . . , oζ} and the
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colluding adversaries as C = {c1, c2, . . . , cδ}. The probability that one adversary cr




The probability that cr remains undetected by all considered ζ one-hop neighbors
o ∈ O is
βζno1mn
o2
m · · ·noζm
σo1σo2 · · ·σoζ
.
Now each of the δ colluding attackers cr must fool all one-hop neighbors o ∈ O,
which leads to probability (
βζno1mn
o2
m · · ·noζm
σo1σo2 · · ·σoζ
)δ
.
Lets assume that all nodes os have approximately the same number of one-hop
neighbors σ and approximately the same number of malicious one-hop neighbors
nm, then the probability of a successful attack by δ colluding two-hop neighbors





We know that nm ≤ σ and β < 1, i.e. the term in brackets is smaller than 1.
Furthermore, with typical values of β ranging between 0.01 up to 0.1, the probability
of a successful attack becomes negligible for small β and larger exponents.
The described attack assumes that node i receives a total of ε c-vectors, where
ζ contain the altered accusations. However, if node i does not receive any other c-
vectors, the colluders must manipulate ε c-vectors and thus “convince” ε as opposed
to ζ one-hop neighbors o, which further reduces the likelihood of the described
attack.
B. Altering reported accusations:
To increase their chance of a successful attack, the colluders in 2-hop distance
could alter reported accusations of neighbors in 3 to m-hop distance. In that
attack, assuming the best possible case from the attackers’ perspective, ζ instead
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the probability of a successful attack is only slightly larger and still negligible.
We now argue that the described attack for l = 2 is the best possible attack for
colluding nodes in l-hop distance, with 1 < l ≤ m. Colluders must always fool at
least ζ one-hop neighbors. Then in the best possible case (from the colluders’ per-
spective), the altered accusations propagate through the network. Consequently,
the probability of a successful attack by l-hop colluders can never exceed the prob-
ability in Eq. (5.12).
5.5 Performance Analysis
The performance of the key renewal scheme is identical to the initial key genera-
tion and distribution algorithms, as described in the ID-based framework in Sec-
tion 4.3.2. In the basic key renewal scheme, nodes must leave the network to obtain
new key material from an external KGC. Hence, no communication or computa-
tional costs are imposed onto the network. In contrast, if a distributed on-line KGC
is employed, k nodes acting as D-KGCs must collaboratively generate and distribute
new keys. As in all schemes employing threshold schemes, e.g. [125, 85, 77, 33], the
collaborative nature of communications increases the communication load of the
network and the computational load of the selected k nodes. Note that key renewal
in [124] only requires broadcast messages of the D-KGCs. However this scheme
only allows key renewal of unrevoked keys, whereas our scheme allows key renewal
after expiry and/or revocation, to allow nodes which keys have been compromised
to re-authenticate to the KGC (or k D-KGCs) to obtain a new key.
The performance of the revocation scheme depends in large parts on the fre-
quency accusation messages are sent, which in turn depends on the number of
malicious nodes in the network. There are two possible approaches: 1) propagation
of accusation messages are triggered by events, i.e. every time malicious behavior is
5.5 Performance Analysis 125
observed, key compromise detected or revocation lists updated, or 2) accusations are
propagated periodically with period ∆TA. First approach ensures fast propagation
of accusations but increases the communication overhead when many accusations
are reported. To avoid collisions and network congestions, nodes should wait for a
random period τ after an accusation event occurs, before sending out accusation
messages. In networks with high rate of malicious nodes, the second approach for
propagating accusations is desirable. Here, nodes accumulate all received accusa-
tion messages for a period ∆TA before propagating a summary of these messages.
To decrease the number of collisions in this approach, nodes each install a timer
that starts at a random time tr and propagate accusations every t = tr + i∆TA
where i ∈ N.
Another parameter that affects the network performance is propagation range
m. Depending on the network load created by the revocation scheme, m can be
adjusted. The smaller m, the lesser a message must be re-sent to the next hop. In
general, each accusation message ami is sent to |Nm,i| − 1 = (%i− 1) nodes j. Thus
small m decreases the network load. However, small m might cause that a node
i that wants to communicate to a node j, has no revocation information about j,
because j is outside of i’s m-hop neighborhood Nm,i. In that case i must request
revocation information from a node l in Nm,i that has information about j, i.e.
j ∈ Nm,l.
We now analyze the computational and communication costs of the different
accusation messages. The computation of a harakiri message hmi (see Eq. (5.5) is
virtually free for node i and does not require any cryptographic operations. The
message requires one broadcast to all nodes in range. The verification of a received
harakiri message requires one pairing computation if receiver j holds a copy of Kj,i
or two pairing computations otherwise. Hence, the system costs of one harakiri
message are at least (%i − 1) pairing computations and at most 2(%i − 1) pairing
computations. We conclude that the proposed harakiri messages are an extremely
efficient way to revoke keys, especially when compared to the alternative approach
of using digital signatures. Signature schemes require at least two computationally
demanding computation steps for each verification, e.g. modular exponentiations.
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A sender i of a neighborhood watch or update message nmi,j, umi,j, respectively,
must compute (σi−1) MACs and up to (σi−1) pairing computations. Each receiver
j of nmi,j or umi,j must verify the MAC and thus perform one pairing computation.
Note that for senders as well as receivers, pairing computations are only necessary
for pre-shared keys Ki,j that have not been computed and stored yet. In a fairly
static network, it can be assumed that both types of accusation messages only
require MAC computations after an initial phase in which all pre-shared keys are
computed.
Hence, we conclude that the computation costs of all accusation messages ami
are fairly low. Even in the worst case, i.e. a very dynamic network with frequently
changing neighborhoods, our scheme is at least as efficient as revocation schemes
using signatures, assuming that one pairing computation is not more demanding
than one verification.
New nodes that join the network or move to a new neighborhood, immediately
start their own neighborhood watch (Algorithm 1). After an initial observation
time Tinit, that may be used to establish routing information and other necessary
set up tasks as well, node i obtains its first monitoring results about its one-hop
neighborhood N1,i. Node i can now start to use received accusation messages amj,i
to update its key revocation list KRLi. Unlike all other accusation-based revocation
schemes [32, 33, 67, 77, 85, 124, 125], our scheme does not require the verification of
signed accusations. In our scheme, the protection of accusation messages, security
parameters δ and σ, and the majority vote for computing k-vectors ensure the
authenticity and accuracy of accusations. We can conclude that the procedure for
newly joining nodes in our scheme is extremely efficient and does not impose any
extra costs.
5.6 Discussions and Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a novel key revocation and key renewal scheme for
pairing-based IBC schemes in MANETs. The proposed neighborhood watch scheme
helps to detect malicious, selfish, and any other misbehaving nodes in MANETs
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and revoke the keys of all detected nodes. All observations are securely propagated
to an m-hop neighborhood. We provide a detailed descriptions of all algorithms
and, as a novelty, our revocation schemes provides efficient and secure mechanisms
for nodes to revoke their own keys and newly joining nodes to obtain past accu-
sations. Our solution is applicable to any pairing-based IBC scheme in MANETs,
including MANETs with distributed on-line KGC. For example, the proposed key
revocation and key renewal schemes can be seamlessly integrated into the ID-based
authentication and key exchange framework proposed in Chapter 4 as well as in the
recently proposed IBC schemes for MANETs [77,33], which do not provide neither
of these mechanisms. Furthermore, the proposed revocation scheme can be adapted
to PKI schemes in MANETs with off-line or on-line CAs.
In our extensive security analysis we show that our proposed key renewal and
revocation schemes are secure and thwart many common attacks. In particular,
we demonstrated that the proposed key renewal scheme thwarts Sybil and other
impersonation attack, and that the key revocation scheme prevents attacks by
outsiders, malicious non-colluding nodes and roaming adversaries. In our analysis of
colluding attacks, we showed how security parameters δ and ε and system parameter
β can be selected to entirely prevent attacks by colluding one-hop neighbors that
alter their direct accusations (see Eq. (5.9)) or alter their reported accusations
(see Eq. (5.10)). Furthermore, we demonstrated that the likelihoods of attacks by
colluding l-hop neighbors are negligible and we show how δ, ε, and β can be selected
to further reduce the propagation of directly altered accusations (see Eq. (5.11))
and altered reported accusations (see Eq. (5.12)).
In addition to its scalability using the security parameters, the performance and
security of the revocation scheme can be adjusted with parameter m. For instance,
greater m decreases the chances of roaming adversaries to remain undetected, where
smaller values increase the scheme’s performance with respect to bandwidth and
memory space. Our solution is very efficient due to the use of pre-shared keys in
MACs to secure accusation messages as opposed to using signatures. In addition,
the solution has lower communication costs because messages are propagated to an
m-hop neighborhood instead of to the entire network. Unlike existing solutions for
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MANETs, our solution provides a very efficient way for nodes to revoke their own
keys. Furthermore, newly joining nodes can simply join the network and start the
revocation scheme without first verifying a large number of past accusations and
revocations.
Chapter 6
Key Escrow Problem in MANETs
The KGC in IBC schemes is a key escrow because it knows all private and pre-
shared keys used in the network. The inherit key escrow property of IBC schemes
might be desirable in some cases, such as governmental and military applications,
but in many other applications the property may be considered a drawback. In
this chapter, we analyze the special role of key escrow in the context of MANETs.
We show that by implementing IBC schemes in MANETs, we can benefit from the
advantages those schemes have to offer while the impact of key escrow is minimized
by the special properties of MANETs. We analyze the probability of successful
key escrow attacks by malicious KGCs in MANETs and show countermeasures to
either prevent attacks or reduce the probability of success. In addition to analyzing
the prevention of key escrow in MANETs, we also study applications in which key
escrow is desirable, e.g. to monitor network nodes. Therefore, we show how a KGC
can increase its power as key escrow in MANETs. Hence, in this chapter we explore
the two faces of key escrow.
For our analysis, we introduce two adversary models for dishonest KGCs that
cope with the special properties of MANETs in Section 6.2. The fist model consid-
ers conventional KGCs, whereas the second introduces the new concept of so-called
spy nodes that are distributed in the network. In the following section we re-
view existing methods for key escrow prevention and discuss their applicability to
MANETs. In Section 6.3, we discuss the necessary conditions for successful passive
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and active attacks in each adversary model. Finally, we draw some conclusions in
the last section. Earlier versions of our analysis and the proposed spy model can
be found in [54,59].
6.1 Related Work
The problem of key escrow in IBC schemes is known since the introduction of the
schemes and has been studied for several years. Proposed solutions to prevent key
escrow in IBC schemes consider implementations in traditional networks, i.e. static
networks with an infrastructure and wired communication channels. In this section,
we highlight some of the proposed methods and discuss which of these methods are
applicable to MANETs.
Using a DH-like key agreement to prevent passive attacks by dishonest KGCs in
IBC schemes is widely known and discussed in [27]. The approach has been applied
to several ID-based AKE protocols, e.g. [19]. In the following Sections, we show
how the method can be used in our adversary Models I and II to prevent passive
attacks.
The general approach for preventing key escrow is to distribute the KGC’s
master secret s, to several entities, say n, such that at least k of those entities have
to collude to place a key escrow attack. Examples of such proposed solutions are:
(1) using a (k, n)-threshold scheme to distribute the master key [17]; (2) using n
KGCs to issue partial private keys that are added up by users to obtain full private
keys [28,51,101]; (3) using one KGC and (n−1) key privacy agencies to sequentially
issue private keys [81]; and (4) using a KGC and a mediator who each know a part
of the users’ private keys [99]. None of these solutions have been particularly been
proposed for implementation in MANETs. We show in our analysis in Section 6.3,
that the same methods can be used as a countermeasure to reduce the probability
of a successful attack. The approach of multiple KGCs is suitable for MANETs
because it only adds overhead to administrative tasks that are performed by the
KGCs and does not affect the performance of communications among network nodes
at all. After an initialization phase all communications and other activities among
6.2 Adversary Models For Dishonest KGCs 131
the network nodes are the same as in implementations with a single KGC. However,
in many applications users must accept a provider’s terms and conditions and thus
may have no choice but to trust a KGC or group of KGCs. Furthermore, KGCs
that are part of a distributed KGC need to cooperate to set up the system, agree
on parameters, algorithms, security policies, etc.. This cooperation during set up
may suggest cooperation among several KGCs to enable key escrow. Hence, in our
analysis we do not distinguish between single dishonest KGCs or groups of colluding
KGCs.
Another well-known method that decreases the probability of master key com-
promise is to assign an expiration date to master secret key s [17]. However, the
method only addresses honest KGCs that have been compromised and does not
prevent a dishonest KGC from being a key escrow.
Additionally, the method proposed in [41] suggests the encryption of messages
using additional private/public key pairs which are not known to the KGC. This
approach is not suitable here because the additional private/public key pairs are
not ID-based and thus require a PKI. This counteracts the reasons why we wanted
to use IBC schemes and sacrifices the special features of IBC schemes that are
attractive for deployment in MANETs.
6.2 Adversary Models For Dishonest KGCs
As the name implies, network users usually trust the system’s trusted third party.
However, this trust does typically not extend to the capability of this trusted third
party to decrypt all protected communications in the network. For this reason, key
escrow is considered a drawback in many network applications. In this section, we
introduce adversary models for dishonest KGCs in IBC schemes that abuse their
power as a key escrow to launch passive or active attacks on the users privacy.
In particular, we consider scenarios in which a KGC is attempting to eavesdrop
on communications between two nodes i and j in a MANET. In our analysis we
consider three different mechanisms (fully described in the next section) that can
be used by i and j to protect their communications in the network. We discuss the
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attacks that KGC can launch and introduce two adversary models for dishonest
KGCs in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, respectively.
6.2.1 Communication Protocols
Throughout our analysis, we consider node-to-node communications between two
nodes i and j in a MANET with focus on privacy and authenticity of their com-
munications. We do not consider lower layer protocols, e.g. we assume that secure
routing is in place for multi-hop communications. We consider the following three
types of ID-based protocols for protecting node-to-node communications:
Protection 1: Static Key Encryption. Nodes i and j use their long-term keys
for encryption and decryption, i.e. pre-shared keys Kij (see Eq. (4.4)) or public and
private key pairs (Qi, di) and (Qj, dj) (see Eq. (4.1) and (4.2)). Consequently, the
same key is used to secure all communications which follows that once the key is
compromised, an adversary is able to decrypt all previous and future communica-
tions.
Protection 2: Symmetric Key Exchange. Before starting to exchange data, i and
j execute a symmetric ID-based AKE protocol, such as Protocol 5. We assume that
the established session key SK is used to protect all subsequent communications
between i and j during that session. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, PFS cannot be
provided in symmetric AKE protocols.
Protection 3: DH-based Key Exchange. In the third scenario, i and j execute
an ID-based AKE protocol in which session key SK is derived using a DH-based
key exchange, such as Protocols 7, 8 and 10. Due to the use of a DH key exchange,
the protocols achieve PFS.
6.2.2 Attacks
In our analysis we distinguish passive and active attacks by malicious KGCs and
we define them as follows:
Passive attacks: In a passive attack, a KGC eavesdrops on communications be-
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tween i and j. In addition, a KGC might use its knowledge of private and public
keys (d,Q) and/ or pre-shared keys Kij to decrypt the eavesdropped communica-
tions.
Active attacks: In an active attack, a KGC does not only eavesdrop on com-
munications and decrypt them if necessary, but also intercept, create, modify and
re-direct messages. However, we would like to emphasize the difficulty of intercept-
ing messages in MANETs. While eavesdropping is a fairly easy task in wireless
networks, preventing broadcasted messages from propagating through the network
is relatively hard. In order to intercept messages, the KGC needs the ability to
jam signals in a controlled manner without arousing suspicion of the neighboring
(affected) nodes. However, in the adversary models introduced in this chapter we
assume that the KGC has all those capabilities. Consequently, a KGC can abuse
its powers to masquerade as another network node during an active attack. We
would like to emphasize the power of such an active attack, because the KGC has
knowledge of all the key material of any arbitrary node in the network, including
the node the KGC attempts to impersonate.
An example of an active attack in an IBC scheme is a KGC-in-the-middle-
attack. During this attack, a KGC “sits” in the middle of two nodes i and j
that communicate using Protection 1, 2, or 3 described in the previous section.
In a successful attack, the KGC masquerades as i to j and vice versa. After the
protocol execution, i and j each share a session key with the KGC but believe that
they share a session key with each other. The KGC can now read all encrypted
communications between A and B by intercepting and decrypting the messages
from the sender and then re-encrypting the messages using the key shared with
the receiver. Nodes i and j are perfectly fooled and cannot detect the KGC in the
middle that listens to their communications.
6.2.3 Adversary Models
We now derive two adversary models for dishonest KGCs in MANETs, taking
the special properties of MANETs into account. The first model can be derived





















Figure 6.1: Model I: (a) one-hop communication and KGC outside communication
range of i and j, (b) multi-hop communication and KGC outside the communication
range of i, j, and all intermediate nodes r, (c) one-hop communication and KGC
in communication range of i or j, here j, (d) multi-hop communication and KGC
in communication range of i or j or at least one intermediate node r, here r3.
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intuitively for MANETs, whereas the second one is based on so-called spy nodes, a
new concept that we introduce in this thesis. For each model, we consider one-hop
and multi-hop communications among the network nodes (see Figure 2.1 (a) and
(b)). The two models are illustrated for one-hop and multi-hop communications in
Figures 6.1 (a)-(d) for Model I and Figures 6.2 (a) and (b) for Model II, respectively.
In the figures, the communication range R of network nodes is depicted as dashed
circle and the reception range RKGC of the KGC as dark grey circle. We would
like to point out that a KGC is usually very powerful and thus its transmission and
reception range is much larger than the range of network nodes, i.e. RKGC >> R.
Model I: Dishonest KGC model. In this adversary model we consider one KGC
and several mobile nodes in a MANET. The KGC can be either outside the commu-
nication range of the communicating nodes i and j or inside their communication
ranges. The first case, i.e. KGC is out of range, is illustrated in Figure 6.1 (a)
for one-hop communications between i and j and in Figure 6.1 (b) for a multi-hop
communications. Consequently, in one-hop communications the KGC is outside i’s
and j’s communication range, whereas in the case of a multi-hop communication,
the KGC is outside the communication range of i, j, and all intermediate nodes r
on the routing path between i and j. In the second case, i.e. the KGC is within
communication range, the KGC is either in direct communication range of i or j in
the one-hop scenario (Figure 6.1 (c)) or inside communication range of i, j or any
other node r on the routing path in the multi-hop scenario (Figure 6.1 (d)).
Model II: Spy nodes model. In our second adversary model, we introduce a
new concept in which the KGC distributes so-called spy nodes in the network to
increase its own communication range. We denote spy nodes as o in the remainder
of this chapter. These spy nodes record all communications in their communication
range and send the recorded data back to the KGC. Spy nodes have the following
properties, they:
1. act and appear as regular network nodes
2. have the same power constraints as regular nodes
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3. do not possess the master key s of the system
4. can send recorded messages to the KGC
5. can play messages received from the KGC back into the network
Spy nodes in our scheme have properties 1 and 2 for two reasons, namely in
order to be cheap and to be indistinguishable from other regular network nodes.
A spy model with more powerful spy nodes is briefly discussed in Section 6.4.1.
Spy nodes cannot intercept messages because this requires jamming or similar ca-
pabilities, which is clearly beyond the power of a spy node. Spy nodes can use
multi-hop routing to increase their limited communication ranges, e.g. to commu-
nicate with the KGC, where the routing paths may consist of spy and regular
network nodes. By introducing spy nodes into the network, the KGC is able to
eavesdrop on communications outside its own communication range as long as a
spy node is in communication range, as illustrated in Figures 6.2 (a) and (b) for
one-hop and multi-hop cases, respectively. In the figures, spy nodes o are depicted
as grey circles and their communication range is shaded light grey. Note, that a spy
node needs to be in communication range of i or j in the one-hop scenario and in
range of i, j or one of the intermediate nodes r in the multi-hop scenario in order
to record communications between i and j.
6.3 Analysis of Attacks and Countermeasures
In this section, we analyze the necessary conditions for successful passive or active
attacks by dishonest KGCs in both adversary models. Furthermore, we discuss the
likelihood of successful attacks. We show countermeasures for all attacks that can be
prevented and, if a total prevention is infeasible, we explain how the probability of a
successful attack can be reduced. We separately analyze passive and active attacks
by dishonest KGCs on two communicating nodes i and j that use one of the three
protection methods discussed in Section 6.2.1 to protect their communications. In
our analysis, we make use of the following notations. We assume the communication
range, i.e. transmission as well as reception range, of all network nodes and spy
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nodes to be the same, i.e. R = Tx = Rx . Let RKGC be the reception range of the
KGC, with RKGC >> R. Let Di,j = (i, r1, r2, . . . , rl−2, j) be a routing path between
two communicating nodes i and j, where l is the length of the path. Furthermore,
|x− y| denotes the Euclidean distance between two points x and y. We use session
for the execution of an AKE protocol and subsequent communications that are
protected using the derived session key. The duration of a session is denoted as
Tses = ts1−ts0 , where ts0 is the starting time and ts1 the time the session terminates.
6.3.1 Passive Attacks
Model I: If the KGC is out of communication range it cannot launch a passive
attack, because the KGC is not able to eavesdrop on communications. However, if
the KGC is in communication range of either i, j, or one of the intermediate nodes
r, the KGC is able to eavesdrop on the communications between i and j. The
conditions for a successful passive attack in Model I can be summarized as follows:
Condition 1. The KGC is in communication range of at least one node nx on
the routing path, i.e., |KGC − nx| ≤ RKGC with nx ∈ Di,j.
Condition 2. The communicating parties i and j use either no security protocol,
or protection methods 1 or 2 for their communications.
Condition 3. If protection method 2 is used, the KGC needs to be in commu-
nication range during protocol execution.
The first condition is necessary for launching any attack. The second condition
is necessary to enable the KGC to read/decrypt the exchanged messages. If i and
j do not secure their communications at all, the KGC can simply eavesdrop on the
communications. If protection method 1 is used, the KGC can directly decrypt the
messages, whereas for protection method 2, the KGC needs to derive the session
key first. For example, for deriving the session key in Protocol 5, the KGC needs
to be in transmission range of the first and second flows (Condition 3).
Countermeasures:
AKE Protocol with PFS. Passive attacks by dishonest KGCs can be easily pre-
vented by implementing a DH-like key agreement protocol or any other protocol
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that provides PFS, such as Protocols 7, 8, and 10. By doing so, Condition 2 would
not hold anymore. Only ephemeral public keys are exchanged during protocol ex-
ecution, whereas computing session keys would require the KGC to know at least
one of the ephemeral private keys. Hence, the KGC is not able to decrypt the
communications anymore and is thus not longer a key escrow. Please note that
using DH-type AKE protocols to prevent key escrow by passive eavesdroppers is a
well known solution and not specific to MANETs [27].
Model II: In this model, the KGC cannot directly eavesdrop on communications
between i and j. However, the KGC can use spy nodes to launch a passive attack.
For a successful attack, Condition 2 and the following additional Conditions must
hold:
Condition 1’. At least one spy node o is in communication range of a node
nx on the routing path to record the exchanged messages, i.e. |o − nx| ≤ R with
nx ∈ Di,j.
Condition 3’. If protection method 2 is used, at least one spy node o needs to be
in communication range during protocol execution and record the first and second
protocol flows, i.e. Condition 1’ must hold for protocol flows 1 and 2.
In a successful passive attack, the recorded messages will eventually reach the
KGC. The KGC is then able to decrypt the communications directly or derive the
established session keys first and then decrypt.
Countermeasures: The same countermeasure as described for Model I can be ap-
plied, i.e. using an AKE protocol that provides PFS.
We do not analyze the likelihood of successful passive attacks because such
attacks can be entirely prevented by the discussed countermeasure.
6.3.2 Active Attacks
Now we consider active attacks, where executing a DH-like key agreement or any
other AKE protocol does not prevent the KGC from being a key escrow. The KGC
could, for instance, launch a KGC-in-the-middle attack and derive a new DH key
with each of the communicating parties without being detected. In the following













Figure 6.2: Model II: (a) one-hop communication and at least one spy node o in
communication range of i and j, (b) multi-hop communication and at least one spy
node o in communication range of i or j or at least one intermediate node r3.
paragraph, we derive conditions for each adversary model that are necessary for
launching successful impersonation attacks which enable the KGC to read/decrypt
communications, such as KGC-in-the-middle attacks. Next, we analyze the prob-
ability of successful active attacks in MANETs. Our analysis takes the dynamic
topology of MANETs into account that is caused by nodes joining or leaving the
network, as well as the mobility of nodes.
Model I: If the KGC is out of communication range, no attacks can be launched.
The KGC can only launch an active attack on nodes i and j if the following condition
holds:
Condition 4. The KGC is in communication range of at least two nodes nx and
ny on the routing path between i and j during an entire session, i.e. |KGC−nx| ≤
RKGC and |KGC − ny| ≤ RKGC during Tses, with (nx, ny) ∈ Di,j.
If Condition 4 holds, the KGC can launch the following attack: the KGC in-
tercepts the message from node nx and then sends the modified message back to
another node ny that is on the routing path, where nx and ny do not need to be
consecutive nodes on the routing path. The attack is illustrated in Figure 6.3 (a)
for one-hop communications between i and j, here nx = i and ny = j with the











Figure 6.3: Active Attacks in Model I with: (a) one-hop communication between
nodes i and j, (b) multi-hop communication between nodes i and j.
KGC in the middle. In the multi-hop case, nx and ny are intermediate nodes on
the routing path and the attack is illustrated in Figure 6.3 (b). The flash symbol
in both figures symbolizes the jam signal or other mean of intercepting messages
by the KGC. Nodes nx and ny are both not aware of the attack, because the KGC
can simply masquerade as any other network node.
Probability of successful attack. After showing how a successful attack can
be launched in Model I, we now discuss the likelihood of such attacks. Although we
assumed that the KGC has the power to intercept messages, we would like to point
out the difficulty of intercepting messages in MANETs. Even if we assume that the
KGC has a way to jam specific signals without arousing suspicion and disturbing the
actual protocol execution, we believe that a successful attack is still very unlikely
for the following reasons. In order for an attack to be successful, Condition 4 needs
to hold for each protocol flow u, i.e. for each flow of an AKE protocol and the
subsequent communications. Recall that after a KGC-in-the-middle attack, the
adversary (KGC) shares a key with i and another key with j. In order to prevent i
and j from noticing the attack, KGC needs to continuously re-encrypt all messages
with the respective keys.
We claim that the probability of a successful attack is low due to the dynamics
of MANETs and the distance of nodes to the KGC as we argue in the following.
Two packets of two different protocol flows ux and uy may not take the same route
Dij from a sender i to a receiver j, i.e. Dij(ux) 6= Dij(uy). Hence, a dishonest
KGC must be in communication range of at least two nodes nx and ny on route
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Dij(u) of each round u. Lets say a protocol has U rounds, where routes Dij(u)
with u ∈ {1, . . . , U} may be disjoint in different rounds, i.e. Dij(ux)
⋂
Dij(uy) = ∅
with (ux, uy) ∈ U and ux 6= uy. Hence, the probability of a successful active attack,
denoted by Psuc, depends on the probabilities PNI (u) that the KGC is in range
of at least two nodes nx and ny in each round u, i.e. PNI (u) : {|KGC − nx| ≤
RKGC ∧ |KGC − ny| ≤ RKGC ; (nx, ny) ∈ Dij(u), u ∈ (1, · · · , U)}. Hence, the





Note that all discussed ID-based AKE protocols in this thesis have three flows, i.e.
U = 3. We can observe from Eq. (6.1) that if PNI (u) = 0 in one of the (three)
rounds, Psuc = 0, i.e. the attack fails. To derive the actual probability Psuc of a
successful attack we need to calculate the probability PNI . Lets say N denotes
all network nodes, where NI contains all nodes inside the KGC’s communication
range and NO all nodes outside the communication range, i.e. NI : {|KGC −nx| ≤
RKGC ; nx ∈ N} and NO : {|KGC − nx| < RKGC ; nx ∈ N}. The probability of
having at least two nodes (nx, ny) ∈ NI on routing path Dij cannot be easily derived,
because the distributions of NI and NO are typically unknown and vary strongly
for different applications. Typically the probabilities of having a node out of NI or
NO on the path are not equal. In fact, we believe that NO >> NI , because most
nodes are roaming in a large distance D to the KGC, with D >> RKGC . Hence, the
probability PNI of having a node out of NI on the path is negligible which follows
that the probability Psuc of a successful attack is negligible too in these scenarios.
For an accurate analysis for particular applications, the distributions of NI and NO
can be used.
However, we believe that our quantitative analysis is sufficient because the dis-
cussed scenarios are true for most MANET applications. For example, in a bat-
tlefield where the KGC remains in a safe place, whereas the nodes are placed far
away in the enemy territory. Same is true in civil and other applications, where
users do not necessarily roam close to the KGC any longer after network or node
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initializations. The situation is comparable to PKI implementations, where nodes
do not roam close to their CA any longer once they received their certificate. Hence,
we believe that a successful attack is very unlikely due to the likely great distance
between KGC and the network nodes.
Countermeasures: Even though we believe that the probability of an active
attack is very small in Model I, we introduce the following methods to further
decrease the probability.
Session control. As a countermeasure for all attacks in which the KGC can
modify messages but cannot intercept them, we suggest that all network nodes r
acting as routers discard received messages that belong to the same protocol flow
but have different contents. For example, node r on the routing path should never
receive two messages that appear to come from sender i, belong to the same protocol
flow and session but have different contents.
Close proximity. Typically, the shorter the routing path, the less likely are two
nodes out of NI on the path. Hence, close proximity of nodes makes successful
attacks very unlikely. For this reason, we suggest two nodes to establish a new
shared key as soon as the nodes are in close proximity to each other.
Disjoint Paths. We suggest using different routing paths Dij for packets when-
ever possible. One feature of MANETs is the redundancy of routing paths that
offers several possible paths between a sender i and a receiver j. For most effective
prevention, the used routing paths should be chosen to be completely disjoint for
each flow, i.e. Dij(ux)
⋂
Dij(uy) = ∅ ∀ (x, y) ∈ (1, · · · , U), where x 6= y. In that
case, probability PNI (u) of each round u may be different which may reduce the
overall probability Psuc of an successful attack. Note that if the KGC is outside the
range in one of the rounds, the attack fails. If no disjoint or different routing paths
are available, the network nodes should utilize their mobility to enable the use of
different routing paths for different protocol flows.
Distributed KGCs using (k, n)-threshold or other schemes. A general coun-
termeasure for key escrow attacks is the implementation of distributed KGCs as
discussed in Section 6.1. However, as pointed out earlier, users have typically no
choice which KGCs to select and KGCs must cooperate to establish the distributed
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KGC, which may suggest cooperation for an attack.
Model II: Next we analyze active attacks in the spy model. An active attack
similar to the one described for Model I is feasible in Model II, but here the KGC
has a more realistic chance of a successful attack. In an attack, the KGC uses spy
nodes to launch an impersonation attack on two network nodes i and j to ultimately
eavesdrop on their communications. The attack is illustrated in Figure 6.4 and
can be looked at as spy-in the-middle-attack. Unlike Model II, the KGC itself
does not need to be in communication range and intercept messages. Instead,
a spy node o on the routing path directly sends the exchanged messages to the
KGC. Note that the spy node o does not need to intercept messages because it
is a part of the routing path. The KGC modifies the messages it receives from
o (after decrypting the messages if necessary) and sends them back to the spy
node, which forwards the modified messages to the next node on the routing path.
Please observe that spy nodes cannot launch the attack themselves, because they
do not possess the necessary key material to impersonate network nodes. The
communication between KGC and its spy nodes needs to be very fast in order
for this attack to work. Otherwise the delay τ of a message would be too long
and could cause the communicating nodes to drop the session and choose another
routing path. The described attack is feasible if the following two conditions hold:
Condition 5. At least one spy node o is part of the routing path between i and
j during an entire session, i.e., o ∈ Dij {i, j} = (r1, r2, . . . , rl−2) during Tses.
Condition 6. Spy node o and the KGC are able to communicate on-line, i.e.
without long communication delays τ .
We can observe from Condition 5 that this kind of attack only works in multi-
hop scenarios, because a spy o needs to be on the routing path between i and j in
order to relay the messages to the KGC. In an one-hop scenario, a spy node would
need to have jamming capabilities to intercept messages between i and j, which
is beyond the capabilities of spy nodes. In order to avoid long delays τ between
spy nodes and KGC, spy nodes could have a direct connection to the KGC using
directed antennas, satellite connections or dedicated cables. In another realization,
the routing paths between KGC and spy nodes are ensured to be short.




Figure 6.4: Active Attack in Model II with multi-hop communication between nodes
i and j.
Probability of successful attack. For analyzing the attack we assume that Con-
dition 6 holds. Hence, to calculate the probability of a successful attack Psuc, we
need to determine the probability that Condition 5 holds, i.e. the probability PSI
that at least one spy node o is part of the multi-hop path Dij of length l. Note
that here, the path excludes nodes i and j because they are obviously not spy
nodes. The probability PSI depends on path length l and the distribution of spy
nodes PS and regular network nodes PN in the network. The lengths l of routing
paths depend on the used routing protocol, the number of nodes Ω = |N |, mobility
patterns, node locations, roaming area, communication range of nodes, and many
other factors. Lets say we have a set or regular network nodes N , a set S of spy
nodes, and l is the average length of routing path Dij {i, j} between i and j. The
number of network nodes is denoted as Ω = |N | and the number of spy nodes as
Ψ = |S|. For a successful attack on a AKE protocol with PFS, at least one spy
node o needs to be a part of routing path Dij of each protocol flow u. Hence,
PSI : {o ∈ Dij(u) \ {i, j} ∀ u ∈ (1, . . . , U) and o ∈ S} and the probability Psuc of a





where PS(u) might be different in each round u because Dij(u) and l might vary.
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In the following paragraphs, we analyze the probability of an successful attack
in some specific scenarios. We assume that spy and networks nodes are uniformly
distributed in the network. Recall that the routing path Dij \ {i, j} consists of l
nodes. The probability PS(l) of the event that we take l nodes out of the total set







Eq. (6.2) describes the probability that one node the routing path is a spy node.
We can observe that by increasing the number of spy nodes Ψ in the network, the
KGC increases the probability of a successful attack, whereas decreasing the length
l of the path decreases the chance. Please note that we discuss the attack for the
case that exactly one spy node is on the path. However, if more than one spy node
is on the path, they will each execute the attack, since spy nodes do not know
of each other. Multiple spy nodes executing multiple attacks do not prevent the
attack from succeeding, however, it would increase the communication delay τ .
We now compute the probability of a successful attack for some specific network
scenarios. In our examples, we consider three-round protocols, i.e. U = 3, and
assume that length l(u) is the same in each round u. The probability PS(u) that
at least one spy node o is on a routing path Dij \ {i, j} can be computed from
Eq. (6.2). In Figures 6.5-(a) and (b), we illustrate PS and Psuc for a network size of
Ω+Ψ = 100 nodes, where the number of spy nodes Ψ ranges from 0 to 100 and the
average routing paths length is l = 4, 5, or 6. Note that the average path lengths
in AODV routing protocols in networks of this size is l = 4 [118]. We can observe
that for 5% spy nodes in the network, i.e. Ω = 95 and Ψ = 5, the probabilities
are PS = 0.1854 and Psuc = 6.38 · 10−3, and for 10% spy nodes, i.e. Ω = 90 and
Ψ = 10, the probabilities are PS = 0.3439 and Psuc = 0.0406. We believe that is
reasonable to assume that 5%-15% of all nodes are spy nodes, because deploying
more spy nodes is not cost effective for the KGC/adversary, whereas deploying less
spy nodes seems too insignificant to increase key escrow power.
In a second example we consider a network size Ω+Ψ = 1000, and probabilities















































































Figure 6.5: Probabilities PS(l) and Psuc for Varying Numbers of Spy Nodes S: (a)
PS(l) for network size 100 and average path lengths l = 4, 5, or 6; (b) Psuc for
network size 100 and l = 4, 5, or 6; (c) PS(l) for network size 1000 and l = 4, 7,
11; (d) Psuc for network size 1000 and l = 4, 7, 11.
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PS and Psuc are illustrated in Figures 6.5-(c) and (d) for varying number of spy
nodes Ψ and average path lengths of l = 4, 7, and 11. Note that l = 11 in AODV
routing protocols used in MANETs of this size [118]. We can observe that for
5% spy nodes, i.e. Ω = 950 and Ψ = 50, the probabilities are PS = 0.43 and
Psuc = 0.08; and for 10% spy nodes, i.e. Ω = 900 and Ψ = 100, the probabilities
are PS = 0.686 and Psuc = 0.323. This follows that if there are 5% spy nodes in
the network, the probability of a successful attack is below 1% for a network size of
100 and significantly below 10% in a network of 1000 nodes. Even in the extreme
case with 10% spy nodes, the probability is below 5% in the smaller network and
around 32% in the larger one. The probabilities as illustrated in Figures 6.5-(a) to
(d) serve as a rough estimate and probability Psuc highly depends on the average
path length l which in turn depends on the efficiency of the implemented routing
protocol and the mobility of the nodes.
Countermeasures: We showed that the probability of a successful attack is
fairly small. However, the probability can be further reduced by one or more of the
following countermeasures.
One-hop communications. Recall that active attacks in this model are only
feasible in the case of multi-hop communications. As a consequence, one-hop com-
munication can completely eliminate active attacks by dishonest KGCs. Hence, we
suggest that two nodes establish a fresh shared key whenever they are in direct
communication range.
Close proximity. Even if direct communication cannot be provided, close prox-
imity between communicating nodes results into shorter routing paths, which in
turn significantly reduces the probability of a successful attack. For this reason we
suggest to take advantage of these events and derive a session key whenever the
distance between two nodes is small.
Delay detection. Communicating nodes can check the delays τ of their protocol
flows and if a flow takes more time than an estimated delay τest, i.e. τ > τest, the
session is dropped. In that case, a new protocol run can be initiated using different
routing paths. Especially if several spy nodes are on the path, the communication
delay τ may be fairly large, and thus easy to detect. Please note that dropping a
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session after a certain timeout period is a common practice in many protocol im-
plementations, independent if the delay is caused by an attack, the communication
channel, or other non-security related reasons.
Distributed KGCs using (k, n)-threshold or other schemes. The use of multiple
KGCs to distribute the power was described as a countermeasure in the previous
adversary model and is applicable to this model as well.
6.4 Monitoring Network Nodes
As mentioned earlier, in some applications key escrow might be a desirable fea-
ture. For instance, in some networks, the network provider might be interested
to monitor network users for some legal issues. At the time users sign up for a
service, they agree that the provider is able to monitor their communications in
the network. However, communications or provided services are secured and can
only be monitored by one party, the KGC, which might be operated directly by the
network provider. In some other applications, such as government, military, and
law enforcement applications, users might not be aware that the KGC can monitor
their communications. Our analysis helps to understand what a KGC needs to do
to maintain the key escrow property in MANETs.
As we pointed out in Model I, due to short communication ranges of wireless
mobile devices and mobility of users, the probability Psuc of successfully monitoring
two nodes i and j is very low. Note that the probability of a successful attack of
a dishonest KGC is the same probability as for successfully monitoring nodes. In
applications where key escrow is desirable, Psuc must be maximized. From our anal-
ysis we can observe that in a regular network without spy nodes, i.e. Model I, the
probability of successfully monitoring nodes is negligibly small. Hence, the spy node
model, i.e. Model II, should be used when monitoring nodes. We observe from our
results for Model II that Psuc can be increased by increasing the number of deployed
spy nodes Ψ. However, we believe that it is not cost effective for a KGC to place
more than 5 − 10% spy nodes in a network. In addition, such an implementation
does not scale well. From our analysis for the spy node model we can also observe,
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that with longer routing paths, the probability of successfully monitoring nodes
increases significantly. As longer routing paths occur in large networks, monitoring
is potentially easier in such scenarios. Furthermore, the topology of the network,
the implemented routing protocol and many other factor can influence the routing
path lengths. All these factors can be used to the advantage of the KGC. We would
like to point out that in fairly static MANETs, the probability that a spy node is
on the routing path, i.e. PS(u), can be estimated to be the same in each protocol
flow u. In that case the probability for successful monitoring is Psuc = PS(u). In
summary, we can conclude that the introduced spy model significantly improves
the key escrow capability of a KGC in MANET applications.
6.4.1 More Powerful Spy Nodes
In the presented scheme we assume that the spy nodes have the same capabilities
as regular networks. However, in more advanced implementations spy nodes might
be more powerful devices, and, for instance, have larger communication ranges, be
equipped with directed antennas, or share dedicated may be even wired channels
with the KGC. Furthermore, the KGC or the provider of the network might choose
a more sophisticated strategy to place spy nodes in the network, e.g. at natural or
artificially created bottlenecks in the network. This would significantly increase the
probability that messages are routed through spy nodes placed at these locations. In
our analysis we assumed secure routing protocols, however without such protocols,
spy nodes can advertise that they are on the shortest path to the destination even
if they are not. KGC or network provider may be able to exploit other routing
attacks on unsecured routing protocols to increase the probability of successful key
escrow.
The discussed measures can help a KGC to monitor nodes or increase the like-
lihood of a successful key escrow attack for the price of more expensive equipment
and deployment costs.
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6.4.2 Other TTPs
Dishonest TTPs of other security schemes, such as CAs in PKIs, can also use spy
nodes to increase their power to launch attacks in MANETs. However, the power
of TTPs in other schemes is typically more limited than the power of KGCs in
IBC schemes. For example, KGCs know the private keys and pairwise secret keys
of all network nodes, whereas CAs are able to issue public key certificates but are
not aware of secret or private keys of users. Hence, while the presented adversary
models are applicable to other schemes, such as PKIs, the described attacks in
this chapter are specific to IBC schemes. For instance, CAs can never launch
passive attacks, independent of which protection mechanism is used to protect
communications (Protection 1, 2 or 3 in Section 6.2.1). A CA can launch an active
attack by generating key pairs (Qi, di) and issuing false certificates certii for the
keys, e.g. for node i. The attack is detectable because multiple certificates exist for
the same identity i but different public keys Qi. Similar attacks cannot be detected
in IBC scheme, because the KGC is in possession of the same key material than
the impersonated node.
6.5 Discussions and Conclusions
In this chapter, we considered the special role of key escrow in MANETs which has
never been studied in this context before. We introduced two adversary models of
dishonest KGCs which take the limited communication range of MANET devices
and multi-hop communications in such networks into account. We proposed a novel
model in which so-called spy nodes are deployed by a KGC to increase its abilities
to launch escrow attacks or legally monitor nodes. We were the first to explore
enhancing key escrow capabilities to enable monitoring nodes in MANETs.
We showed that passive attacks can be prevented in all adversary models by us-
ing DH-like key agreement protocols. Active attacks by a dishonest KGC cannot be
fully prevented neither in MANETs nor other networks. However, we demonstrated
that the probability of a successful active attack is significantly lower in MANETs
than in other wired networks with infrastructure. The results of our analysis re-
6.5 Discussions and Conclusions 151
vealed that active attacks in Model I and Model II are only feasible under certain
restrictive conditions. We evaluated the probability Psuc of successful active attacks
in both models and showed that successful attacks are rather unlikely. We derived
a formula to calculate Psuc in Model II and showed in Figures 6.5-(b) and (d) that
the chance of a successful attack is less than 1% in networks consisting of 100 nodes
in which 5% of all nodes are spies. Hence, the probability of successful attacks is
much lower in MANETs than in traditional networks.
In addition to our analysis, we presented countermeasures to further reduce the
likelihood of successful attacks. From our discussion, we conclude that the special
properties of MANETs combined with the presented countermeasures prevent a
KGC from being a key escrow in many MANET applications. On the other hand,




Future Trends and Their Impact
on Security Solutions
In this chapter, we will discuss some future trends of MANETs and analyze the
impact of such trends on both existing security solutions and the design of new
solutions for MANETs. In addition, we outline some security solutions for such
envisioned applications. Currently, many proposed security solutions assume that
no external TTP is available at any time (see AV-4 in Section 2.1.6 and Figure 2.2).
However, we believe that this worst case scenario is more of academic nature and
most real-world MANET applications (will) have access to some infrastructure such
as the Internet, TTPs, backbone networks, etc. For example, we believe that the
existence of a TTP to set up the network (AV-3) or initialize all nodes (AV-2) is a
realistic assumption in most current and future MANET applications. We predict
for the near future that network access and thus access to an infrastructure will
become commonly available at many locations, e.g. via wireless access points (APs)
and base stations (BS). Hence, in the future, network nodes will be able to at least
sporadically access a TTP (AV-1) from within a MANET. In such applications,
MANETs act as an extension to existing infrastructure networks. For example,
nodes which are not in direct communication range of an AP to a network can use
multi-hop routing to reach this AP. If at least one network node is in range, the
other nodes in the MANET are connected to the infrastructure through this node.
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The described approach is already deployed in wireless mesh networks (WMNs) in
which nodes may access the wireless mesh backbone (WMBB)by forming a MANET
to connect to one of the network’s APs.
In this chapter, we use WMNs to illustrate remaining challenges of securing
MANETs which act as extensions to existing infrastructure networks. We dis-
tinguish three categories of problems: (1) security problems of technologies that
are currently used; (2) problem of efficiently and securely adopting solutions from
MANETs; and (3) problem of efficiently adopting protocols that have been pro-
posed for wired infrastructure networks.
We briefly address the first category in Section 7.1 as part of our overview of
WMNs. We refer to [62] for our detailed discussion of security flaws of the widely
deployed EAP framework that is used for client authentication in WMNs. We
address problems of the second and third categories in more detail in Sections 7.2
and 7.3. More particularly, we modify the key renewal and key revocation schemes
from Chapter 5 for use in WMNs, which significantly improves the performance of
the schemes. In Section 7.3, we improve the efficiency of some AKE protocols that
require sporadic infrastructure access.
7.1 Security Challenges in WMNs
We gave a brief overview of WMNs (infrastructure, client and hybrid WMNs) in
Section 2.1.7 and now discuss security challenges of such networks. Currently de-
ployed WMNs only support two wireless technologies, namely IEEE 802.11 and
IEEE 802.16, where IEEE 802.11 is used for communications in the WMBB. Cur-
rently, the security offered by existing WMNs is based on the employed wireless
standard, i.e. IEEE 802.11i or IEEE 802.16e. In general, communications within
the WMBB are easy to secure due to stationary mesh routers (MRs) and the fact
that the backbone is set up by one domain controller. Hence, pre-shared secret keys
provide a suitable and efficient security solution. In addition, client access authenti-
cation is enforced by the employed wireless standard. Once clients have successfully
authenticated, network access is granted and the clients may access the Internet
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or other networks through the WMBB. EAP has been adopted as an access au-
thentication and key establishment framework in IEEE 802.11i and IEEE 802.16e.
For example, a mesh client who wishes to access a network starts an EAP session
with a MR in range, where the MR passes the messages to an AAA server in the
backbone. The established keys can then be used to protect the link between the
client and MR. Even though EAP is adopted by wireless standards, some security
vulnerabilities exist. Vulnerabilities are mainly due to the three-party communica-
tion model with weak physically protected MRs acting as authenticators, a protocol
execution across different network layers and media links, as well as the backward
compatibility of implemented ciphersuites. We summarize the security challenges
and potential attacks on EAP and some particular EAP methods in [62].
We can observe that communications between clients and MRs as well as com-
munications within the WMBB can be secured using existing security solutions
offered by wireless standards. In addition, the backbone can be secured using stan-
dard solutions for wired networks. Hence, the only communication links that still
require (new) security solutions are links among clients in client or hybrid WMNs.
Securing these communications is very important because wireless links provide no
physical protection and mesh clients are at high risk of compromise. The security
goals for client to client communications in WMNs are the same as in MANETs, i.e.
pre-authentication, authentication, and key exchange. However, like in MANETs,
the mobility of clients, device constraints and the lack of pre-existing trust make
providing such security goals difficult. For instance, it cannot be assumed that mo-
bile clients pre-share any credentials, and thus existing solutions such as in IEEE
802.11i and IEEE 802.16e are not applicable. In addition, certificate/key revocation
poses a major problem in all public-key solutions employed in WMNs. For example,
OCSP could be used, such that mesh clients access the WMBB and request the
status of particular keys from a server in the backbone. However, OCSP and other
on-demand revocation schemes require mesh clients to access the backbone when-
ever they need to verify the status of a key/certificate. Hence, these methods are
not suitable for hybrid and client WMNs. On the other hand, certificate revocation
lists could be provided for download from a server in the backbone or pushed to
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all clients. While this approach is feasible in all WMNs, the problem of identifying
malicious clients remains. Especially if malicious mesh clients are out of range of
access points to the network, revocation servers that reside in the backbone have
no evidence that could justify the key revocation of such nodes. We conclude that
suitable revocation schemes for WMNs should satisfy the following two conditions:
1. Revocation information can be downloaded from a server in the backbone.
2. Key revocations are based on accusations reported by mesh clients monitoring
other clients in their neighborhood.
Considering the discussed security challenges and constraints of WMNs, it seems
natural to adopt security protocols that have been proposed for MANETs to secure
client to client communications in WMNs. For the same arguments as made for
MANETs in Section 4.2, we believe deploying ID-based schemes to secure WMNs
is desirable. Rather than simply adopting solutions that have been proposed for
MANETs, such as our ID-based solutions in Chapters 4 and 5, solutions for WMNs
should be modified to take advantage of the existing infrastructure to increase the
performance and conserve energy of battery powered mesh clients. On the other
hand, it is crucial to keep the introduced network load in the bandwidth constrained
WMBB to a minimum. We discuss the impact of infrastructure in MANETs on
our security solutions in Chapters 4 and 5 in the remainder of this chapter.
7.2 Efficient Revocation in WMNs
We propose using the ID-based security framework from Chapter 4 to secure client
to client communications in WMNs and achieve the identified security goals. Re-
call that Algorithms 1-3 from the basic framework are executed by a central KGC.
In WMNs this KGC could be placed in the backbone of the WMN. In addition,
Algorithm 4, which establishes the pairwise pre-shared keys, is non-interactive and
thus does not require any communication. Hence, Algorithms 1-4 of our ID-based
framework do not need to be modified when deployed in WMNs. From our discus-
sion in the previous section, we know that implementing key revocation and renewal
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Figure 7.1: Overview of Key Revocation Scheme for WMNs
schemes are crucial, where first schemes should satisfy the two listed conditions.
To provide such solutions, we propose key revocation and key renewal schemes for
ID-based security schemes in WMNs that are based on our solutions in Chapter 5
and modified for an efficient deployment in WMNs by taking advantage of (spo-
radic) network access to the backbone. In our solution design we assume that all
mesh clients in WMNs are able to at least sporadically access the WMBB and thus
the backbone network. While this assumption is obvious for infrastructure and
hybrid WMNs, we argue that clients in client WMNs can access the backbone prior
to joining and/or upon leaving the network. Please note that in client WMNs in
which clients never have access to the WMBB, the solution from Chapter 5 could be
directly adopted without any modification. However, for all WMNs with sporadic
access, solutions from Chapter 5 can be optimized as we present in the following
subsections.
In our scheme, mesh clients upload their neighborhood observations to a central
server in the backbone. The server generates a global key revocation list based
on all received accusations using a threshold scheme. Mesh clients can download
the global KRL whenever they need a fresh list and have backbone access. Only
messages of higher priorities, such as harakiri messages are directly propagated to
other mesh clients in m-hop range. An overview of the revocation scheme for WMNs
is in Figure 7.1. We discuss the modified algorithms in the following sections, where
we distinguish between algorithms for key update for keys that have been expired
and key renewal for keys that have been revoked.
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7.2.1 Key Revocation
As in the revocation scheme for MANETs in Section 5.3.1, keys are revoked when-
ever clients realize their own keys have been compromised (harakiri) or at least δ
clients accused the same client. However, unlike the proposed solution for MANETs,
observed behavior is not propagated through the network but rather reported to
the KGC or another central server in the mesh backbone, referred to as revocation
server RS in the remainder. The RS generates a global key revocation list KRL
that can be downloaded by all nodes. Harakiri messages have higher priority and
are thus still propagated through the network. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, the
revocation scheme consists of five algorithms, namely Alg. 1 Neighborhood Watch,
Alg. 2 Harakiri, Alg. 3 Propagate, Alg. 4 Update local KRLi, and Alg. 5 Update
global KRL and a method to upload and download information to and from the
RS. The upload/download method requires backbone access via an access point
and messages are transmitted through the WMBB to the server in the backbone
and vice versa.











aΩ,1 · · · aΩ,Ω IDΩ (txΩ , vΩ) XΩ

 , (7.1)
where we use the following notations: N denotes the set of mesh clients, Ω = |N |
the total number of mesh clients, tS the time the list was last updated, ai,j with
{i, j} ∈ N the accusation values which indicate whether node j accuses node i of
malicious behavior (ai,j = 1) or not (ai,j = 0), IDi with i ∈ N the identity of client
i, (txi , vi) the expiry date and version number of the current public key Qi of client
i, and Xi the revocation flag that indicates whether public key Qi(txi , vi) has been
revoked (Xi = 1) or not (Xi = 0). Please refer to Chapter 5 for more detailed
information on notations and parameter generations and computations.
Note that the revocation list can contain information of expired keys Qi, with
txi < tS and stored keys may have different expiry dates txi . KRL(tS) is created and
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initialized by the RS, and then updated and maintained using uploaded accusations
from mesh clients. All accusation values and revocation flags are initialized with
zero. Prior joining a client mesh network or whenever mesh clients have access
to the backbone network and wish to update their revocation information, they
download the global revocation list from the server. Each client i stores a local
copy of the list, denoted as KRLi, which has the same format as the matrix in
Eq. (7.1). In between downloads, clients i can update their local copies using their
neighborhood watch observations and received harakiri messages. In the following
we describe the algorithms of the modified revocation scheme for WMNs.
Upload/Download. In client mesh networks, client must download the global
revocation list from the RS prior joining the network. If node i made observations
that lead to modifications in KRLi, i should upload its entire list KRLi or its
neighborhood watch observations cii to the RS upon leaving the network or at latest
prior (re-) joining a WMN. To encourage uploads, the procedure can be combined
with key updates, such that only clients which upload their accusations obtain fresh
keys.
In hybrid and infrastructure networks, clients can download the list once they
join the network. Here, clients should frequently upload their accusations to ensure
accurate and timely key revocation lists. Uploads should be timed according to
backbone accessability and network load. At the time a client i uploads its accu-
sation values, i downloads the most recent KRL(tS), where timestamp tS prevents
the distribution of old lists and unnecessary downloads. Again uploads should be
encouraged by the network.
All communications between RS and i are secured by symmetric keys derived
from a pre-shared key KRS,i = ê(sP, di) = ê(P, Qi)
s2 , where (s, sP ) are the private
and public key of the RS.
Algorithm 1: Neighborhood Watch. All mesh clients i monitor their one-hop
neighborhoods N1,i for suspicious behavior and update their local key revocation
list KRLi accordingly (see Revocation Algorithm 1 in Section 5.3.1). If suspicious
behavior is observed, the node sets its update flag (update = true), which indicates
that the node will upload its observations to the RS at the next possible time.
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Optionally, some special observations may have higher priority and trigger Algo-
rithm 3 for a prompt propagation of the observations, as indicated by the dashed
arrow from Algorithm 1 to Algorithm 3 in Figure 7.1.
Algorithm 2: Harakiri. The algorithm is identical to Revocation Algorithm 2 in
Section 5.3.1, i.e. when a client i realizes that its private key di has been compro-
mised, i generates a harakiri message hmi,j according to Eq. (5.5) and then starts
Algorithm 3 to propagate the message to all its one-hop neighbors.
Algorithm 3: Propagate. Identical to Algorithm 3 in Section 5.3.1, i.e. harakiri
and update messages are securely sent to all one-hop neighbors. This algorithm
is triggered by Algorithm 2 and 4, but may also be triggered by Algorithm 1 for
high-priority messages.
Algorithm 4: Update Local KRL. For received harakiri, neighborhood watch
and update messages, the algorithm is identical to Algorithm 4 in Section 5.3.1,
i.e. each client i uses received accusation messages to update their local revocation
list KRLi, where revocation flags X ij are computed according to Eq. (5.3). Clients
update their revocation lists every time they download a new copy of the global
revocation list. If the downloaded list KRL(tS) is newer than the stored local copy
KRLi(ti), i.e. tS > ti, client i replaces all columns of its local list with the respective
columns of the downloaded global list, except for the i-th column that contains i’s
own neighborhood observations.
Algorithm 5: Update Global KRL. The RS uses the uploaded accusations of
mesh clients to update the global revocation list. Unlike in the MANET version of
the revocation scheme, the server does not need to distinguish between one-hop and
multi-hop neighbors. Instead, the server directly copies column vectors cii from each
trusted node i into column vector ci in KRL. The current public key Qi(txi , vi) is
marked as revoked, i.e. Xi = 1, if at least δ accusations from trusted clients have





k ai,k ≥ δ ∀ k ∈ N with Xk = 0
0 else
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Every time an accusation value or revocation flag is updated, the server sets tS = t
and provides KRL(tS) for download.
7.2.2 Key Update
Mesh clients need to request a new key pair if their old keys are expired. Key
updates require clients to communicate with the KGC in the backbone and can be
performed at any time in infrastructure and hybrid WMNs, but need to be executed
by clients prior joining client WMNs. In latter case, a registered user of a corporate
WMN may download a new key pair when parking in the company’s parking lot in
which the gates are equipped with APs. In another scenario, users may download
a new key pair from their desktop computers that are connected to the company’s
LAN onto their PDA before going to a business meeting. Many other examples of
sporadic network access for key downloads are imaginable.
The frequency keys need to be updated, directly translates into the validity
periods ∆T of public keys. ∆T should be chosen according to the accessibility of
the network and the required security level. The KGC only issues fresh keys to
clients whose most recent public keys Qi(tx, vi) have neither been revoked and nor
been expired for too long, i.e. tx ≤ t ≤ tx + ξ with 0 ≤ ξ. Parameter ξ is a security
and performance parameter that indicates the grace period for key updates. During
this extra time period after key expiry, a client does not need to re-authenticate
because it can be assumed that the expired key has not been compromised since
its expiration.
Upon receiving a key update request from client i at time t, the KGC verifies
whether Qi(tx, vi) is marked as revoked in KRL(tS) and tx ≤ t ≤ tx + ξ. If both
checks are successful, the KGC generates a new private key di(tx+1, vi = 1) with
tx+1 = tx + ∆T and sends it to client i. All communications are secured with keys
derived from pre-shared key KKGC,i.
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7.2.3 Key Renewal
Key renewals are necessary whenever a public key Qi(tx, vi) has been revoked,
i.e. Xi = 1, or keys have been expired for longer than ξ and client i wish. This
algorithm is intended to help clients to recover from key compromises, e.g. as a
result of accidently or maliciously revealed keys, key revocations that are based
on false accusations, and missed key update deadlines. Hence, in contrast to key
updates, clients need to fully re-authenticate to the KGC to obtain new keys. This
is necessary to prevent adversaries which compromised a client to request new
keys. Therefore, clients cannot use their revoked private keys di or pre-shared keys
KKGC,i for re-authentication. Typically clients would re-authenticate using the
same methods used to obtain the initial key, e.g. when registering for the network
services.
7.2.4 Extensions
In addition to the extensions outlined in Section 5.3.4, the following modifications
or extensions to our scheme for WMNs are possible:
• Extended Neighborhood Watch. Access points, base stations and mesh routers
can be included in the neighborhood scheme algorithm to conduct accusation
values based on their own observations of clients in communication range.
Therefore, all access points to the WMBB do not only collect accusation
values of clients in range but also upload their own accusation values to the
RS. This modification improves the accuracy of the revocation scheme and
ensures that the RS holds information about at least some mesh clients. Since
access points are generally trusted more than mesh clients, their accusations
could have more weight than accusations by mesh clients.
• Local KRL Copies. Access points can store a copy of the global revocation
list KRL(tS), such that mesh clients can download the list from these entities
without the need to communicate with the RS in the backbone. Therefore, the
RS frequently pushes the revocation lists to the access points. This extension
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significantly reduces the communication load in the WMBB and allows much
faster downloads for clients. Furthermore, access points can accumulate all
uploaded accusations by clients over a certain time interval and forward them
as one packet to the RS to further reduce the communication overhead.
• Alternative Shared Keys. Instead of using pre-shared key KRS,i to derive keys
for securing communications between clients i and the RS, password or other
pre-shared keys that have been established during the clients’ registration to
the WMN may be used. For example, pre-shared passwords and keys from im-
plementations using RADIUS or DIAMETER servers, or freshly established
keys from successful EAP authentications.
• Faster Message Propagation. It might be desirable to spread some accusation
messages of high priority faster through the network. Like harakiri messages
hmi that are propagated to an m-hop distance, other messages could also be
immediately propagated through the network in addition to uploading these
accusations to the RS. However, this increases the network load, and if all
accusation messages are propagated through the network the performance
would be similar to the performance of the revocation scheme in Chapter 5.
7.2.5 Security and Performance Discussions
We refer to Section 4.5.1 for a security discussion of the ID-based framework, since
the framework does not need to be modified for a deployment in WMNs. The
security of accusation messages that are propagated through the client network,
such as harakiri messages, is the same as in our revocation scheme for MANETs
(see Section 5.4). All messages exchanged between each client i and the RS are
secured with keys derived from the pre-shared keys KRS,i which provide message
authentication, integrity and confidentiality. Hence, all messages are protected from
attacks by outsiders.
Accusations are directly reported to the RS which maintains the global key
revocation list. Keys are revoked if at least δ accusations from different trusted
clients have been received. Hence, the revocation scheme is secure for up to δ −
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1 colluding insiders. The security of the key update algorithm depends on the
likelihood of compromised pre-shared keys KRS,i. Before private key di is expired,
it is assumed that malicious behavior would be detected as part of the neighborhood
watch algorithm. The likelihood of key compromise upon expiry depends on the
time span between expiry tx and key update request t, which is t− tx ≤ ξ. Hence,
the likelihood can be adjusted with ξ. The security of the key renewal algorithms
depends on the method used for client re-authentication.
The compromise of master secret s leads to a complete compromise of the
network. However, we assume that KGC as well as the RS can be sufficiently
protected since they are both located in the backbone. To further reduce the
risk of compromise, the master secret s may be distributed over several enti-
ties [17,19,28,51,81,99,101].
The performance of the scheme depends on accessibility to the backbone and
the frequency key revocation lists and accusations are downloaded and uploaded.
In any case, the performance is significantly improved compared to the revoca-
tion scheme for MANETs in Chapter 5, because neighborhood watch and update
messages are not propagated through the network. Hence, the overall computa-
tional and communication load is reduced. To avoid introducing a lot of additional
communication load to the WMBB by downloads, we suggested storing global revo-
cation lists on network access points and accumulating accusations before sending
them to the RS. As in the original scheme, cryptographic pre-shared keys are used
which enables the use of efficient symmetric cryptographic primitives.
7.3 Efficient Authenticated Key Exchange
Ideally, AKE protocols provide all required security properties while being efficient
to comply with mesh clients’ and network constraints. Despite the discussed ad-
vantages of IBC schemes in WMNs it might be desirable to implement conventional
PKIs. For example, many public key schemes have already been standardized and
are widely deployed. In addition, the key escrow property of IBC schemes might
be considered as an obstacle for deployment. For these reasons, we discuss some
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efficiency improvements to conventional public key-based AKE protocols in this
section. The considered protocols use signed ephemeral DH keys to provide mu-
tual authentication and authenticated key exchange. Our protocol is more efficient
than a non-optimized signature-based AKE protocol and is thus of interest for
computationally and power-constrained mesh clients and bandwidth constrained
communication links. Many DH-based AKE protocols have been introduced and
subsequently broken, see [18, 90] for a discussion. In this section, we analyze such
an AKE protocol that has been broken and introduce a way to prevent the discov-
ered attack without increasing the computational or communication complexity of
the original protocol. We limit our discussions and comparisons on DH-like AKE
protocols using digital signatures. Such protocols provide (DP-8) non-repudiation
(see Section 2.2.3). However, more efficient DH-based AKE protocols that do not
use digital signatures, such as the MQV and ECMQV protocols [2, 90], should be
used if non-repudiation is not required.
In the remainder of this section we focus on efficient DH-based AKE protocols
that provide the following security properties (as defined in Section 2.2.3):
• Mutual entity authentication (NP-1)
• Mutual implicit key authentication (NP-2), including key freshness
• Completeness (NP-3)
• Known-key security (DP-1)
• UKS resilience (DP-2)
• Key control (DP-3)
• KCI resilience (DP-5)
• PFS (DP-6)
• Non-repudiation (DP-8)
• Replay resilience (DP-9)
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A common practice for achieving properties NP-2, NP-3, DP-1, DP-3, and DP-6
is using a DH key exchange, in which ephemeral DH-keys are exchanged to derive
the session keys. However, ephemeral keys do not have public key certificates
that bind owners and keys together and to provide key authentication, ephemeral
keys can be digitally signed using long-term private keys. In addition to NP-1,
digital signatures also provide properties DP-5 and DP-8. Properties DP-5 and
DP-9 can be achieved in a generic way in three-round AKE protocols by using key
confirmation and challenge and response techniques, respectively [18]. A näıve way
to obtain an AKE protocol that provides all listed properties is using a signature-
based AKE protocol (such as Protocol 3) with public key derivation. For instance,
the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [95] can be used to sign ephemeral DH keys.
We refer to such protocols as combined DH-DSA protocol.
As a step towards more efficient DH-DSA protocols, Arazi proposed an inte-
grated DH-DSA protocol [3] in which the DH key exchange is integrated into the
DSA. However, Nyberg and Rueppel [98] demonstrated a known-key attack on
Arazi’s protocol. Recently, Harn et al. [50] proposed variants of Arazi’s integrated
protocol that prevent the known-key attack and provide resilience to replay and
UKS attacks. Phan [119] pointed out that the protocols in [50] do not provide PFS
and key freshness and adds these two properties in his protocol variant. However,
the existing variants [50, 119] protocol add more security properties for sacrificing
the efficiency of Arazi’s original protocol. In this section, we introduce a new vari-
ant of Arazi’s protocol that provides the same security properties as the most recent
variant [119], while preserving the computational and communication efficiency of
Arazi’s original scheme.
7.3.1 Review and Analysis of Arazi’s Integrated Protocol
and its Variants
We use the following notation adopted from the DSA standard [95]: p is a large
prime, q is a prime divisor of p − 1, g is an element of multiplicative order q in
Zp and h(·) is a secure hash function. Mesh client i has a long-term private key
7.3 Efficient Authenticated Key Exchange 167
di ∈ Zq and a long-term public key Qi = gdi mod p. We assume that long-term
public keys have been authentically exchanged prior to the protocol execution, e.g.
using public key certificates. Hence, i and j are both able to compute a long-term
secret key L = gdidj mod p.
The protocol flow of Arazi’s protocol can be described as follows. Client i
randomly chooses an ephemeral private key ki ∈ Zq and derives an ephemeral
public key mi = g
ki mod p. The key mi is then used to derive one part of the
signature, i.e. ri = mi mod q. This step saves one modular exponentiation and
constitutes the integration part of the protocol. The signature equation is solved
in si according to DSA, i.e. hi = kisi − diri mod q where hi = h(mi). i sends
(si,mi) to j, which derives the second signature part ri from mi. In that way
the communication complexity is reduced. j performs the symmetric steps when
signing hj = h(mj). After successfully verifying the received signatures according
to DSA, both users compute the session key SK according to the DH key exchange,
i.e. SK = gkikj mod p.
Given the protocol flow of Arazi’s protocol, Nyberg and Rueppel [98] discovered





j mod p. (7.2)
The only parameters not publicly known in (7.2) are SK and L and the equation
can be solved in either SK or L by knowing the other parameter. We observe that
known key resilience and PFS are compromised in Arazi’s scheme because SK and
L appear only as bases in the attacking equation. If instead the parameters would
appear as bases as well as exponents in the attacking equation, solving the equations
in either SK or L is no easier than solving the discrete logarithm problem [95]. Harn
et al. prevent the known key attack in their integrated protocols by replacing hi
and hj with Hi = h(mi||SKij||SKji) and Hj = h(mj||SKji||SKij), respectively,
in their signature equations, where Kij = g
kidj mod p and Kji = g
kjdi mod p. In
that way, the attacking equations for their protocols contain the session keys Kij
and Kji as bases as well as inputs of the secure hash function h(·) which appear in
the exponents of g. However, Harn et al.’s protocols do not provide PFS and key
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freshness because, unlike in Arazi’s original protocol, session keys SKij and SKji
are not DH type keys. Phan adds PFS and key freshness to the protocols in [50]
by computing both session keys SKij and SKji as DH type keys, with SKij =
Q
kikj
i mod p and SKji = Q
kikj
j mod p where ni = Q
ki
i mod p and nj = Q
kj
j mod p
are exchanged during protocol execution.
7.3.2 Efficient and Secure Integrated AKE Protocol
Our integrated DH-DSA protocol is based on Arazi’s protocol and adopts the
method of modified signing equations and message flows from the three-round pro-
tocol in [50]. Most parameters in our protocol, including the session key SK, are
chosen and computed according to Arazi’s protocol. In the first protocol round,
client i computes ephemeral public key mi and sends it to j. j in turn computes
session key SK and ephemeral public key mj, derives the signature part rj and
solves the modified signature equation
H ′j = s
′
jkj − djrj mod q (7.3)
in s′j, where H
′
j = h(mj||L||SK), i.e. the hash value is computed over j’s ephemeral
public key mj, long-term secret key L, and session key SK. Then j returns (mj, s
′
j)
in the second round. If i can successfully verify signature (rj, s
′
j), i computes SK
and solves the modified signing equation
H ′i = s
′
iki − diri mod q (7.4)
in s′i, where H
′
i = h(mi||L||SK). i sends s′i to j in the last protocol round and j
verifies the received signature.
7.3.3 Security and Performance Analysis
The proposed integrated DH-DSA protocol prevents the known key attack by using
modified signature equations (7.3) and (7.4). The proof is similar to the one in [50].
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j mod p. (7.5)
The only unknowns in Eq. (7.5) are SK and L, however the equation can neither be
solved in K nor L because both parameters occur as bases and as input of the secure
hash function h(·) in the exponents of g. Hence, the proposed integrated protocol
provides known key resilience and PFS. Note that Phan’s attacks, as presented
on Harn et. al ’s protocols, are not feasible here because session key SK is a DH
key, i.e. our protocol provides PFS and key freshness. Since our protocol uses a
challenge-response structure and key confirmation it provides resiliency to replay
and UKS attacks. Using digital signatures provides mutual entity authentication,
KCI resilience and non-repudiation.
As in Arazi’s protocol, each participant in our protocol needs to perform four
modular exponentiations, namely one for computing the ephemeral public key, two
for verifying the signature, and one for computing the session key. The only slight
difference to Arazi’s scheme are the longer input strings of hash values H ′i and H
′
j,
which have the same length as the hashes in the other variants [50,119]. However,
hash computations are extremely efficient compared to modular exponentiations
and can be neglected for the overall computational performance. Furthermore,
during their first communication two parties i and j need to compute long-term
secret L which requires one modular exponentiation. We can observe that although
our protocol has three protocol rounds, the same information as in Arazi’s scheme
and thus the same number of bits (|p|+ |q|) are exchanged.
7.3.4 Alternative Crypto Schemes
The proposed integrated DH-DSA protocol was presented for a finite field imple-
mentation. However, the protocol can be easily modified to work in an elliptic
curve group, i.e. integrating an ECDH key agreement into ECDSA. Note that an
EC implementation of Arazi’s original integrated DH-DSA protocol also suffers from
Nyberg and Rueppel’s attack because a similar attack equation as in Eq. (7.2) can
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be derived, whereas our ECDH-ECDSA integrated protocol variant prevents the
known-key attack without decreasing the protocol’s efficiency.
In addition, the proposed integrated protocol can be implemented with second-
order characteristic sequences using the LUC scheme [94,114] as well as third-order
characteristic sequences using the GH scheme [46,47] or XTR scheme [83], respec-
tively. The mentioned crypto schemes can be implemented using second-order or
third-order linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs), respectively. Please refer to [45]
for more information on LFSR sequences. In our initial work in [55] and [56], we
showed that an attack equation similar to Eq. (7.2) cannot be derived for second-
and third-order LFSR-based integrated DH-DSA protocols even if Arazi’s original
protocol is used. However, later is was discovered that in Arazi-like integrated pro-
tocols based on LUC or XTR schemes, an adversary can use the public key of one
of the protocol participants to derive an attack equation with a probability of 1
27
that has SK and L as only unknowns. However, this new attack is not feasible on
integrated protocols from the GH scheme. Hence, integrated DH-DSA protocols
employing LUC or XTR must use modified signature equations (see Eq. (7.3) and
(7.4)) in order to prevent the discussed known-key attack. On the other hand,
integrated DH-DSA protocols employing the GH scheme can be used without such
modifications. In addition to the performance gain imposed by Arazi’s integration
step, LFSR-based integrated protocols help to further increase the performance due
to their efficient implementation in hardware and use of smaller fields for compu-
tations than crypto schemes based on the exponential function, such as DSA. A
detailed theoretical and experimental performance analysis is presented in [55].
7.3.5 Comparison
We summarize the performance and security properties of three-flow variants of the
combined DH-DSA protocol, Arazi’s integrated protocol, two three-flow variants of
Arazi’s protocol [50,119], and our proposed integrated protocol variant in Table 7.1.
Here, we consider variants of Arazi’s and combined DH-DSA protocols that are ex-
tended to three-rounds in a generic challenge-response manner to provide resilience
to replay and UKS attacks. Note that this extension does not increase the com-
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putational and communication costs. We only consider computationally expensive
operations, i.e. we count the number of modular exponentiations (m.e.) and list
the exchanged parameters and their bit lengths as a function of p and q.
We can observe from Table 7.1 that our protocol is the only protocol that
achieves all considered security properties (1)–(10) while providing the same com-
putational and communication efficiency as Arazi’s original protocol. Our experi-
mental results in [55] demonstrated that Arazi’s integration steps improves the com-
putational performance of a combined DH-DSA protocol by 20/which corresponds
to our theoretical results and conforms that considering only computationally de-
manding operations is valid. Furthermore, our integrated protocol is the only one
that prevents an adversary from obtaining the long-term secret key L from known
session keys. Harn et al.’s protocol requires one additional modular exponentia-
tion per user, resulting into the same computational performance as the combined
DH-DSA protocol, and lacks key freshness and PFS. Phan’s protocol achieves all
security properties but requires two additional exponentiations per user and the
exchange of |p| additional bits per user, thus showing the worst communication
and computational performance among all compared protocols.
7.4 Discussions and Conclusions
In this section we discussed the impact of sporadic or permanent infrastructure
access on existing or newly designed MANET security solutions. We used WMNs as
example to illustrate advantages and problems caused by such infrastructure access.
Existing security protocols and standards can be used to secure such networks,
but vulnerabilities may exist as discussed for the EAP authentication frameworks
in [62]. We outlined a key revocation scheme, key renewal and key update schemes,
and efficient AKE protocols all targeted to constrained environments in which nodes
have at least sporadically the chance to access a network, servers or other kinds
of infrastructures. The discussed solutions are only briefly outlined and subject to
future research.
Our proposed ID-based framework from Chapter 4 in combination with the
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Combined Arazi [3] Harn et Phan [119] Proposed
DH-DSA al. [50] protocol
Computation 5 m.e. ∗ 4 m.e. 5 m.e. 6 m.e. 4 m.e.
Costs/ User
Communication (m, s, r) (m, s) (m, s) (m,n, s) (m, s)
Costs/ User |p|+ 2|q|† |p|+ |q| |p|+ |q| 2|p|+ |q| |p|+ |q|
Security Properties
1. NP-1 X ‡ X X X X
2. NP-2 X X – § X X
3. NP-3 X X X X X
4. DP-1 X – X X X
5. DP-2 X X X X X
6. DP-3 X X – X X
7. DP-5 X X X X X
8. DP-6 X – – X X
9. DP-8 X X X X X
10. DP-9 X X X X X
Table 7.1: Performance and Security Properties of 3-flow DH-DSA
Protocols
∗ m.e. denotes a modular exponentiation in Fp
†|x| denotes the bit length of x, i.e. x = log x
‡X denotes that the security property is provided by the protocol
§– denotes that the security property is not provided by the protocol
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proposed key revocation and key renewal schemes can be used to secure communi-
cations in all types of WMNs. Communications between clients and servers in the
backbone as well as among clients can be secured using the pairing-based pre-shared
keys, where the revocation scheme allows parties to verify whether keys have been
revoked. We showed how efficient key revocation can be provided in WMNs by
taking advantage of sporadic backbone access to a central RS in combination with
a local monitoring scheme. conventional revocation schemes are not applicable to
WMNs due to the lack of both revocation information and permanent network ac-
cess in hybrid and client WMNs. The proposed scheme is based on our revocation
scheme for MANETs in Chapter 5 with significant performance improvements due
to the use of global revocation lists.
Next, we introduced a new variant of integrated DH-DSA protocol that: (1)
resists the known key attack that was proposed on Arazi’s protocol; (2) provides all
security properties of other Arazi-based protocols; and (3) preserves the excellent
performance of Arazi’s original protocol. Hence, our protocol preserves computa-
tional and communication performance without sacrificing security which makes
our protocol as secure as the latest variant of Arazi’s protocol [119] and as efficient
as Arazi’s original protocol. Using LFSR-based variants of the integrated proto-
col may lead to further efficiency improvements. Hence, the proposed protocols
are suitable for constrained devices, such as mobile mesh clients, and bandwidth




In this thesis, we presented a complete ID-based security solution for MANETs in-
cluding system set up, pre-authentication, authentication, key exchange, key revo-
cation, key renewal and key escrow prevention. All proposed schemes are designed
to meet the special security goals and constraints of MANETs, which were demon-
strated in a security and performance analysis for each scheme. The basic versions
of the proposed schemes can be employed in MANETs in which an external TTP
initializes nodes before they join the network and the TTP might be still accessible
at later times (see TTP availability scenarios AV-2 and AV-3 in Figure 2.2). In
addition, we show how our solutions can be adopted to MANETs with no external
TTPs (AV-4 in Figure 2.2) as well as to MANETs with sporadic infrastructure ac-
cess (AV-1 in Figure 2.2). In the following sections we summarize the contributions
of this thesis and outline directions for future work.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
• Pre-Authentication Models: We identified pre-authentication among nodes—
that is, the initial establishment of pairwise shared credentials—as a neces-
sary prerequisite for providing authentication, key exchange, and numerous
other security goals in MANETs. We categorized several pre-authentication
models that cope with the lack of infrastructure in MANETs, discussed ad-
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vantages and shortcomings that helped to identify target applications, and
presented solutions for each model. The models can be used to enable pre-
authentication in the large number of existing security solutions for MANETs
that previously neglected this security goal. As a result of our discussion,
we identified self-authenticating public keys—and resulting non-interactive
pairwise pre-authentication—of IBC schemes as attractive features to solve
pre-authentication in MANET applications that previously had no sufficient
security solutions.
• Authentication and Key Exchange Framework: We proposed an ID-based
authentication and key exchange framework for MANETs that enables ef-
ficient and secure pre-authentication, authentication and authenticated key
exchange among network nodes. The security of the framework is based on
the underlying pairing-based IBC scheme and thus on the difficulty of solv-
ing the BDH problem. We described an algorithm for efficient system set
up in which costs are solely carried by an external KGC. In addition, pre-
authentication is efficient and secure because pairwise pre-shared keys are
derived in a non-interactive fashion. Our framework is flexible and can be
implemented with any pairing-based IBC scheme, where the derived pairwise
pre-shared keys enable the use of any symmetric or ID-based AKE protocol
to establish fresh session keys. The basic scheme is suitable for MANET ap-
plications with KGC availabilities AV-1, AV-2, or AV-3 (see Figure 2.2) and
we outlined how the scheme can be modified to be completely independent of
any external TTP (AV-4) by implementing a distributed on-line KGC using
a (k, n)-threshold scheme.
• Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols: We presented a set of ID-based AKE
protocols that can be seamlessly integrated in our proposed authentication
and key exchange framework but also serve as an independent solution. The
first AKE protocol is an extremely efficient and purely symmetric protocol
that utilizes pairwise pairing-based keys as pre-shared secrets. We then de-
rived more protocols by gradually adding security features, which sacrifices
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some of the computational efficiency of the first protocol. The security of the
protocols are based on the difficulty of solving the BDH problem and we show
which security properties are achieved by each protocol. Our performance and
security analysis enables the selection of the most efficient AKE protocol for
particular MANET applications depending on network constraints and secu-
rity needs.
Furthermore, we introduced efficient DH-based AKE protocols that estab-
lish fresh session keys by exchanging signed ephemeral DH-keys. Our pro-
tocols employ the integration step from Arazi’s protocol [3] which helps to
reduce computational and communication costs significantly. Our protocols
are the only Arazi-type protocols that resist Nyberg & Rueppel’s known-
key attack [98] on Arazi’s protocol while maintaining the efficiency of Arazi’s
original protocol and offering all additional security properties of recent Arazi
protocol variants [50,119]. Our integrated protocols can be implemented using
finite fields, elliptic curves or second- or third-order characteristic sequences
as crypto primitives.
• Self-organized Revocation: We introduced a novel fully self-organized revoca-
tion scheme for IBC schemes deployed in MANETs. The revocation scheme
can be seamlessly integrated into our authentication and key exchange frame-
work as well as in any other pairing-based IBC scheme for MANETs that does
not provide a mechanism for revocation, e.g. in [33,77]. Unlike the only other
revocation scheme for IBC schemes in MANETs to date [124], our scheme
does not require distributed on-line KGCs in the network or any other KGC
for that matter. Furthermore, our scheme is the first revocation scheme for
MANETs that enables nodes to efficiently and securely revoke their own keys.
Importantly, the scheme allows newly joining nodes to securely and efficiently
obtain previous accusations. All communications in our revocation scheme are
cryptographically protected but unlike other proposed schemes do not require
digital signatures. Once pairwise pre-shared keys are computed, all messages
require only the computations of symmetric cryptographic primitives such as
MACs and hash functions, which makes our scheme very efficient. Security
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parameters δ and ε and performance parameter m make our scheme adjustable
to the hostility of the MANET environment and the degree of resource con-
straints of network and devices. In our extensive security analysis we have
showed that our revocation scheme prevents all attacks by outsiders, individ-
ual selfish or malicious nodes as well as roaming adversaries. Furthermore,
we showed how security parameters δ and ε as well as monitoring schemes
with α and β can be selected to prevent attacks by colluding nodes.
• Key Renewal: We presented a new format for ID-based public keys that allows
for key renewal at any time. Unlike other proposed key formats, e.g. [124], our
format allows key renewal for the same expiry date tx, i.e. before the start of
a new expiry interval tx+1. The key renewal scheme is complimentary to our
revocation scheme and allows users to request new keys when their current
ones have been revoked. We showed in our security analysis that Sybil and
other impersonation attacks on our key renewal scheme are prevented due to
the use of ID-based keys and the fact that an on-line KGC checks the identity
of every node before issuing keys.
• Key Escrow Prevention: We were the first to discuss key escrow in the con-
text of MANETs and we analyzed the probability of successful attacks by
malicious KGCs abusing their power as key escrow. From our analysis we
concluded that the special features of MANETs—such as short communi-
cation range and node mobility—significantly reduce the escrow capabilities
of malicious KGCs compared to infrastructure and/or wired networks. We
then introduced the novel concept of spy nodes that can be utilized by KGCs
to significantly increase their escrow capabilities in MANETs. As part of
our analysis we discussed countermeasures to either increase or decrease key
escrow capabilities.
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8.2 Future Work
The proposed security solutions for MANETs can be enhanced in several ways to
further improve their performance. In addition, our theoretical security and per-
formance analysis could be supplemented by simulation and experimental results.
In this section we describe some of these possible enhancements and extensions.
• AKE Protocols: Our analysis of the proposed ID-based and integrated AKE
protocols proved a large number of security properties and the resistance to
most common attacks on AKE protocols. This could be supplemented by
a formal security proof. We already outlined directions for such proofs in
the Canetti and Krawczyk security model for key exchange protocols [25].
We believe that this security model is a good choice for formally proving
the security of the proposed ID-based AKE protocols because the presented
protocols are all designed using one of the three authenticators, which have
been proven to be secure in this model; namely MAC, digital signature and
public key encryption-based authenticators [10,25].
• Revocation Scheme: As a next step in the performance and security evalua-
tion of our proposed revocation scheme, the behavior of the algorithms could
be further studied in simulations. For instance, security parameters δ and ε
and performance parameter m could be varied in a simulation to study the
security performance trade-off. In particular, the propagation delay of accu-
sation messages in an m-hop neighborhood should be studied including the
total time from observing malicious behavior to the actual revocation of a key.
Furthermore, it would be of interest to analyze how monitoring schemes with
different false positive and false negative rates α and β influence the scheme’s
performance as well as resistance to attacks by colluding nodes. Latter re-
sults could be then compared to our theoretical results. In addition, node
mobility and its impact on security and performance could be simulated for
different mobility patterns. As a next step, the simulated performance results
of our scheme should be compared to revocation schemes that use a sign &
broadcast approach. Finally, the performance of our revocation scheme for
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MANETs and WMNs should be both simulated and compared to measure the
performance gain by taking advantage of sporadic infrastructure access. As
an extension to our security analysis of our key revocation scheme for WMNs,
the detection of malicious APs or MRs that refuse forwarding recent KRLs
to clients or uploading client accusations to the RS could be studied.
• Key Escrow: The spy model could be further examined by simulating several
mobility patterns of regular and spy nodes and analyzing the impact on the
probability of successful key escrow attacks Psuc. Following this, simulations
could consider deployment of static spy nodes at certain key locations, such
as network bottlenecks, or analyze the effects of different routing protocols on
Psuc. In addition, more applications for the usage of monitoring nodes could
be explored.
• Extensions to AKE Framework: The presented authentication and key ex-
change framework can be further extended to provide additional features and
functionalities. Some extensions can be easily added by utilizing keys derived
from the pairwise pre-shared keys in the framework. For example, many
proposed security solutions assume the pre-existence of shared keys but do
not provide mechanisms for establishing such keys. These solutions could
be implemented making use of the pre-shred keys. For instance, one of the
existing symmetric key-based secure routing protocols could be integrated in
the framework by using the pairwise pre-shared keys to secure each hop on a
multi-hop routing path, e.g. [65, 63,100].
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